THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAVIER GONZAGA AND ESTELITO ARIAS, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

It was, to say the least, a rather unnerving experience to which
Roberta Verra, the common-law wife of the victim, Bienvenido Cordova, was subjected on the evening of May 22, 1970 in Barrio Mimamara, Mahaplag, Leyte. 
With the other members of the family having retired for the night, she
was still up as there was a sick child under her care.  First, she noticed a bolo being thrust
through the floor made of bamboo slits. She peeped through an opening near the
kitchen and she saw appellant Estelito Arias under
the banguera holding a firearm, aiming it in
the direction of the kitchen door. 
Immediately thereafter, there was a loud explosion caused by a shot
being fired.  Then she saw her husband prostrate.  He was bathed in his own blood and was
groaning in pain.  His death, as
testified to by the Municipal Health Officer of the town who conducted an
autopsy three days thereafter, must have been instantaneous, with four bullet
wounds entering the left lung and heart and other bullets piercing the left
arm.  Appellant Estelito
Arias, along with Javier Gonzaga and Marianito Pasaylo-on, were
prosecuted for murder.  Only the first
two were convicted in view of the insufficiency of evidence against Pasaylo-on.  Both of
them appealed with appellant Gonzaga having died in
the meanwhile.^[1]
The remaining appellant is Estelito Arias.  In the lower court, as with us, his plea for
acquittal is based on an alibi.  He was
elsewhere when the fatal occurrence took place. 
The trial judge was not convinced. 
Neither are we.  There was positive-identification
from Roberta Verra. 
It was bolstered by the circumstance testified to by another witness,
who saw him, along with the other accused, coming from the direction of the
fatal occurrence that same night.  He had
a gun with him.  Deference to the
well-settled doctrine as to the inherent weakness of such a defense when proof
of such a character is available calls for the affirmance
of the conviction.  Appellant’s guilt had
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

It was shown by the evidence for the prosecution that on the
night of May 22, 1970, while the members of her family had already retired,
Roberta Verra was still up and awake because she was
attending to her sick child.  It was then
that she saw somebody from underneath the house thrust a bolo through the floor
which was made of bamboo slits.^[2]
She stood up and peeped through an opening near the kitchen.  There, she saw Estelito
Arias under the banguera, holding a firearm
and aiming it towards the door of the kitchen.^[3]
Immediately thereafter a shot was fired; her ears were deafened by the loud
blast of the gun report.^[4]
She then heard her husband groaning and saw him bathed in his own blood.^[5]
Although she was terribly frightened, she rushed to her husband.^[6]
She likewise saw Javier Gonzaga and Marianito Pasaylo-on near the
ladder of their kitchen, the former with a short firearm.^[7]
Then she noticed the accused running towards the direction of Barrio Balinsasayao.^[8]
It was not difficult for her to identify the accused as she had known appellant
Arias^[9]
for ten years and had recognized appellant Gonzaga
who was a former landlord.^[10]
The moon was out, and there was a light coming from the lamp of the altar of
the Blessed Virgin.  Furthermore, the
premises of the house was clear of vegetation as the lot was tilled and was
newly planted with corn.12 She also testified that Javier Gonzaga instituted a case for assault against her husband,
resulting in his imprisonment in Abuyog, Leyte in 1970.13 He was released that same year.14
When her husband was shot, they were no longer tenants of Javier Gonzaga, as they were ejected from the land by him in 1969,
and her common-law husband intended to file a case against Javier Gonzaga in the Court of Agrarian Relations.15
She further testified that accused-appellant Estelito
Arias was a tenant of Javier Gonzaga and even had a
house within the coconut plantation.16 There were no personal differences
between her and the appellant but it was only her common-law husband who was
nurturing one against him.17 Another witness, Manuel Verra, residing in Barrio Canmarating,
Abuyog, Leyte, testified
that on May 22, 1970, at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, after fishing in
the Layug river, he went to the house of his tenant Ponciano Cerbo, where the corn
harvested was stored.18 It was not till after midnight
that he arrived there.19 On the way to Cerbo’s
house, he met the three accused, namely, Javier Gonzaga,
Estelito Arias and Marianito
Pasaylo-on, all of whom were known to him and thus
immediately recognizable.20 They were armed, Gonzaga with a short firearm, Arias with a long one, and Pasaylo-on with a bolo tucked in his waist.21
There was no difficulty knowing who they were because it was a moonlit night,
the sky was clear, and the area where they met without any vegetation except
corn newly planted, just four (4) inches tall.22 While they were armed, he was not
afraid, because they just crossed ways and they were walking rather briskly.23

The lower court relying on such evidence found the two accused
appellants Estelito Arias and the now-deceased Javier
Gonzaga guilty of the crime of murder beyond
reasonable doubt.  The defense of alibi
interposed by them was rejected.  Estelito Arias as the sole appellant did continue to press
such a claim.  Deference to a long list
of our decisions especially so where the culpability of an accused is shown not
only by identification but by other circumstantial evidence demonstrates the
futility of such effort.  People v.
Berame,24
decided less than a year ago, is the latest case in point.

1.  It is easily
understandable why the identification of an accused as a participant in the
commission of an offense by evidence that is worthy of credence and belief
negates the claim of alibi.  The falsity
of an assertion that he was elsewhere and therefore could not have been guilty
of the crime imputed to him becomes apparent. 
Where the proof of his presence then is clear and positive, such a
defense is unavailing.  In the language
of Justice Laurel in People v. Caroz:25 “Alibis cannot stand and prevail
over clear and convincing affirmation of credible witnesses.”26
Such a doctrine is of respectable lineage. 
It was first announced by Justice Torres in United States v. Roque,27 a
1908 decision, where the accused “was recognized with rare unanimity by
five eyewitnesses to the sequestration as being one of the four armed
individuals who in the early morning of the 23rd of June, 1904, abducted the
deceased, * * *.”28 Since then, as pointed out by
Justice Trent in United States v. Lasada,29 promulgated two years later, alibi
cannot avail as against “the positive and direct testimony”30
of the witnesses for the prosecution.  A
host of cases indicates how authoritative is such a doctrine.31

2.  The testimony that came
from Roberta Verra, the common-law wife, was clear
and positive.  She was an eyewitness to
the tragic occurrence.  Such a dolorous
event must have left an indelible impression in her mind.  Appellant was seen by her, through an opening
near the kitchen holding a long firearm aimed at that direction.  Then came the shot fatal in its
consequences.  It hit her husband in
vital spots.  He was groaning, bathed in
his own blood.  Appellant with the two
other accused were seen by her running away from the scene of the crime. She
could not possibly have been mistaken. 
It was a moonlit night.  There was
nothing to obstruct the view, with the premises around the house devoid of
vegetation.  Appellant was no stranger to
her.  She had known him for ten years at
least.32 Parenthetically,
it may be noted that the inculpatory evidence coming
from a bereaved widow identifying the malefactor has usually elicited
acceptance from this Court.  The first
case of record is United States v. Lumanlan,33 a 1915 decision.  An excerpt from the opinion of Justice Laurel
in People v. De Guzman34 fits the situation:  “Appellants claim that their identity
has not been sufficiently established, much less their participation in the
crime of which they were convicted.  We
have carefully examined the record and are convinced that the appellants were
among those who perpetrated the robbery against Valentin
Dungca and Julia Lacsamana
and who mercilessly raped Julia. 
Appellants were well known to Julia and the latter identified them.  Julia, also, had sufficient time to recognize
their features while they were successively abusing her.  While the appellants sought the darkness of
the night, detection on the part of the offended woman was facilitated by the
moonlight then piercing the house.”35 There are several other decisions
of a similar nature since then.36 Nor is this all.  There was a circumstantial evidence equally
persuasive as to the guilt of appellant. 
Along with the other two accused, he was seen leaving the vicinity of
the crime.  Such testimony came from
Manuel Verra. 
It was entitled to credence, and the lower court believed it.  It admits of no doubt therefore that
appellant was positively identified. 
What is more, his presence at the place where the criminal act occurred
was likewise established.  His defense of
alibi was thus completely discredited.

3.  The appealed decision is
quite exhaustive.  The lower court
discussed in detail the evidence submitted by both the prosecution and the
accused.  It took pains to arrive at the
truth of the matter.  It did not just
ignore the claim of appellant that he could not have committed the offense as
he was nowhere near the scene of the crime. 
Rather it was guided by the authoritative doctrine, succinctly stated by
Justice Laurel, thus:  “The defense
of alibi is always received with caution. 
It should be proved by probable evidence which reasonably satisfies the
court of the truth of such defense. 
Alibis cannot stand and prevail over clear and convincing testimonies of
credible witnesses”.37 It was on that basis that it
rendered the judgment of conviction. 
After a thorough appraisal of the evidence, hearing and observing the
witnesses and weighing what was said by them, it reached that conclusion.  So do we, and not solely on the equally
well-settled principle that the finding of facts by the trial judge is to
remain undisturbed, absent a showing of a fact or circumstance which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.38

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of September 21, 1971 is
affirmed insofar as it found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder appellant Estelito Arias, the sentence imposed
being reclusion perpetua with his civil
liability in favor of the heirs of the deceased fixed at the amount of
P12,000.00.  The appealed decision is set
aside insofar as the now-deceased Javier Gonzaga was
likewise found guilty of the same offense, his death occurring during the pendency of this appeal.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.

^[1] A
certificate of death was submitted to this Court on July 11, 1975. 
When the Solicitor General was asked to comment, he submitted such a
pleading stating that “in view of the confirmed death of appellant Javier Gonzaga,” his office “recommends the dismissal of
the criminal case against him.”

^[2] T.s.n., Session of April
15, 1971, 13-14.

^[3] Ibid,
14-15.

^[4] Ibid,
16.

^[5] Ibid.

^[6] Ibid,
17,56.

^[7] Ibid,
18,56.

^[8] Ibid,
18-19, 57.

^[9] Ibid,
13.

^[10] Ibid,
20.

11 Ibid, 20, 24,
57.

12 Ibid, 24-25.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid, 20.

15 Ibid, 21-23, 31.

16 Ibid, 25-26, 45.

17 Ibid, 42.

18 T.s.n., Session of April 14, 1971, 2-3, 10-11.

19 Ibid, 16-17.

20 Ibid, 5-6.

21 Ibid, 7-8, 17-18, 24, 26.

22 Ibid, 7, 16.

23 Ibid, 7-8.

24 L-27606, July
30, 1976, 72 SCRA 184.

25 68 Phil. 521 (1939).

26 Ibid, 526.

27 11 Phil. 422.

28 Ibid, 426.

29 18 Phil. 90 (1910).

30 Ibid, 100.

31 Cf. United States v. Ambrosio,
17 Phil. 295 (1910); United States v. Bañagale,
24 Phil. 69 (1913); United States v. Garcia, 26 Phil. 289 (1913); United
States v. Hudieres, 27 Phil. 45 (1914); United
States v. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587 (1915); People v.
Cabantug, 49 Phil. 482 (1926); People v. Layos, 60 Phil. 224 (1934); People v. Medina, 71
Phil. 383 (1941); People v. Timbang, 74 Phil.
295 (1943); People v. Japitana, 77 Phil. 175
(1946); People v. Dedal, 82 Phil. 203 (1948);
People v. Castillo, 82 Phil. 420 (1948); People v. Canastre, 82 Phil. 480 (1948); People v. Meriales, 84 Phil. 18 (1949); People v. Faltado, 84 Phil. 89 (1949); People v. Bondoc, 85 Phil. 545 (1950); People v. Lagon Ramos, 85 Phil. 683 (1950); People v. Sasota, 91 Phil. 111 (1952); People v. Avila, 92
Phil. 805 (1953); People v. Venegas, 95 Phil.
209 (1954); People v. Sawit, 100 Phil. 507
(1956).

32 Cf. Brief for Appellee,
28-30.

33 31 Phil. 486.

34 70 Phil. 23 (1940).

35 Ibid, 26.

36 Cf. People v. Gallego,
82 Phil. 335 (1948); People v. Buransing, 88
Phil. 363 (1951); People v. Mallabo, 89 Phil.
288 (1951); People v. Abalos, 90 Phil. 261
(1951); People v. Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872
(1953); People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 (1953);
People v. Umali, 99 Phil. 36 (1956); People v.
Arpon, 100 Phil. 765 (1957).

37 People v. De Guzman, 70 Phil. 23, 26-27
(1940).  Justice Laurel cited the
following:  United States v. Garcia,
26 Phil. 289 (1913); United States v. Oxiles,
29 Phil. 587 (1915); United States v. Olais,
36 Phil. 828 (1917); People v. Badilla, 48
Phil. 718 (1926); People v. Limbo, 49 Phil. 94 (1926); People v. Cabantug, 49 Phil. 482 (1926); People v. Palamos, 49 Phil. 601 (1926); People v. Medina, 59
Phil. 330 (1933).

38 Cf. People v. Berame,
L-27606, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 184.  The
opinion cited twelve recent opinions starting from People v. Gumahin, L-22357, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 729 to People v.
Payao, L-29364, Nov. 21, 1975, 68 SCRA 70.