THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. REYNALDO RAMOS Y LINAO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is a case certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the
ground that it is “of the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed in
this case is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor General,
and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by the lower court.”

When this certification was submitted to this Court, the question arose as to
the procedure to be followed by the Court of Appeals in certifying cases to this
Court under section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 52, which reads as follows:

“Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division
should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should
be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and
shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination,
as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.”

The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, as provided in the above-quoted provision of the law, must of necessity
depend upon the correctness of that opinion. There is nothing in the law
precluding this Court from exercising its authority to pass upon such question
which concerns its own jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may exercise
its power of review, the Court of Appeals is bound to make in its order of
certification such findings of facts as are necessary to support its conclusion
that either life imprisonment or death is the penalty to be imposed. This is
indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3, which provides that where a court to which
an appeal has been taken has no appellate jurisdiction over the case and it
certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so “with a specific and clear
statement of the grounds therefor.” The requirement of clear and specific
grounds is precisely a device to prevent erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction
from a lower to a superior court.

Furthermore, the words “shall refrain from entering judgment thereon”
appearing in the provision above quoted, are a sufficient indication that the
Court of Appeals, at the time of certifying the case to this Court, had already
examined the evidence and was ready to render judgment on the merits, but having
found from the facts established by proof that the penalty to be imposed is
either death or life imprisonment, instead of entering judgment thereon, it
certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final determination. Since the
certification is the only ground for determining our jurisdiction, it must
contain not only conclusions of law but also findings of fact, the latter being
more important than the former for they supply the real basis for determining
jurisdiction. This is similar to a complaint or petition filed in a court, which
must show on its face the jurisdictional facts, and the court will assume
jurisdiction where the facts thus set out are sufficient, regardless of whether
it turns out upon trial or hearing that the sum to be recovered or the penalty
to be imposed is within the jurisdiction of lower courts.

The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court
of First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed,
for in such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to
be erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already
exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits containing both
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more
practical for the administration of the law that this Court should exercise its
appellate jurisdiction by examining the evidence and correcting all errors both
of fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here,
the Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the merits and is
refusing to complete the exercise of appellate jurisdiction because it believes
that such jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to
transfer the case to this Court. It is in that transfer that we believe we may
intervene in order to prevent an erroneous transfer.

As a matter of fact, we have been so doing in other cases transferred to this
Court under section 145-H of the Administrative Code. Under such provision,
whenever an appeal is taken erroneously to the Court of Appeals, the case shall
be sent to this Court “which shall hear the same as if it had originally been
brought before it.” Some of the cases transferred to this Court under this
provision have been returned to the Court of Appeals, thus reversing the opinion
of that court on questions of law relating to jurisdiction. And there can be no
reason why the same thing cannot be done in cases transferred under section
145-K of the Administrative Code.

It is already a rule that this Court may reject claims upon its jurisdiction,
predicated upon issues that are not real or substantial. Thus, we have rejected
direct appeals to this Court upon the issue of jurisdiction which was found to
be unsubstantial and not real. (People vs. Imas, 64 Phil., 419; Uy
vs. Villafranca, 64 Phil., 561.) And in at least one instance, we
rejected an appeal found to be frivolous. (De la Cruz vs. Franco, 1 Off.
Gaz., June 1942, p. 582.) If this is so, there can be no valid reason why we
cannot reject transfers made by the Court of Appeals which we find to be not
only unsubstantial but clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make
effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this
Court, as defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section 138,
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259),
offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including
offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed on the same occasion,
come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the remaining
offenses fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. To hold
that this Court is bound to assume jurisdiction over an offense only because the
Court of Appeals, through mistake, believes that the penalty to be imposed is
either life imprisonment or death, which in truth and according to the findings
of fact of that same Court, the penalty should be lower or much lower, is
tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating jurisdiction to
a mere matter of method or procedure.

We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the
Court of Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of
fact necessary to support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is
either life imprisonment or death. While this Court will not review the findings
of fact, it will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived
therefrom. And if this Court finds the conclusions to be correct, it will assume
jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the case will be returned to the
Court of Appeals.

Messrs. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado and Briones agree with
this theory. Messrs. Justices Bengzon, Padilla and Tuason do not.

The present case is, however, accepted by this Court because the order of
certification issued by the Court of Appeals is in substantial compliance with
the requirements of the law and of the rules for it makes reference to the
opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contains
sufficient findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment
should be imposed upon the appellant.

Messrs. Justices Pablo, Perfecto and Padilla agree with this conclusion.
Messrs. Justices Bengzon and Tuason agree on other grounds. Messrs. Justices
Paras, Feria, Hilado and Briones do not.

From all the foregoing, let the appeal in this case take its course in this
Court until final determination upon its merits.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, and Hilado, JJ., concur.

MORAN, C. J.:

I certify that Mr. Justice Briones voted in
the manner stated in this opinion.

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PERFECTO, J.:

Robbery with rape committed in Manila on April 5, 1946, is the crime imputed
to appellant. Finding him guilty, the Court of First Instance of Manila
sentenced him to from 8 years and 1 day of prison mayor to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify Filomeno Lerias and
his family in the sum of P2,380 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. On October 11, 1946, the record of the case was
on appeal received in the Supreme Court. Sometime between November 11, 1946, and
March 15, 1947, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals. The case was
heard and submitted for decision on July 9, 1947. On the same day the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution certifying the case to
the Supreme Court in accordance with section 145-K of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by section 2 of Republic Act No. 52, because the division was
of opinion that the penalty that should be imposed to appellant is reclusion
perpetua. No reason is advanced in the opinion in support of the conclusion,
although it mentions the fact that the Solicitor General recommended that
reclusion perpetua be imposed upon appellant.

The resolution of transfer to this Court is before us for action. Controversy
has arisen as to the interpretation of section 145-K of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 52, the one recreating the
Court of Appeals. We will express succinctly our own interpretation. Said
section reads as follows:

“Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division
should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should
be imposed, the said Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and
shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination,
as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.”

The provision calls for the following procedural steps:

1. That a criminal case be submitted for decision to a division of the Court of
   Appeals, presupposing the processes leading to have the case ready for final
   action.

2. That the division had formed the opinion that the appellant is guilty and
   that the penalty of death or life imprisonment, should be imposed. The opinion
   must be based on conclusions of fact and of law, requiring, therefore, study of
   the evidence, deliberation by the division, and agreement or unanimity as to the
   facts proved and as to the law applicable. In brief, the division should do all
   that it should if it had to render decision on the case.

3. That on certifying the case to the Supreme Court for final determination,
   the division should state in its opinion the reasons why death or life
   imprisonment should be imposed.

4. That upon receiving the certification, the Supreme Court shall determine if,
   upon the facts found by the Court of Appeals, its conclusion that death or life
   imprisonment should be imposed is correct or not. If it should find it correct,
   it shall take steps in order to dispose of the case for final decision. If
   otherwise, the Supreme Court shall proceed to render decision upon the facts
   found by the Court of Appeals by imposing to the appellant the penalty provided
   by law.

5. That in case the Court of Appeals should certify a criminal case to the
   Supreme Court without conclusions of fact, the case should be remanded to the
   Court of Appeals with instruction to make findings of fact and render its
   opinion or decision upon them. Without said findings of fact, the Supreme Court
   is not in a position to determine whether the opinion of the Court of Appeals is
   correct or not.

The resolution of the Court of Appeals in this case does not contain any
finding of fact. No reason is adduced in support of its conclusion that life
imprisonment should be imposed upon appellant. This Court is not in a position
to determine whether the .resolution is correct or not. The fact that the
Solicitor General has recommended reclusion perpetua as penalty is
immaterial. The Court of Appeals must base its conclusion upon its own findings,
not upon the findings made by the Solicitor General. The need of expressing its
findings of fact, imposes on the Court of Appeals the duty of studying the
evidence, in which it will determine whether the appellant is guilty or not.

We conclude that the case should be remanded to the Court of Appeals so that
it may be able to write an opinion with conclusions of fact, in the same way as
if it had to render a decision in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.

We notice that in the controversy, the dignity, prestige, and feelings of
tribunals and judges are being mentioned as arguments. We deem it our duty to
express our disagreement with the use of such things as arguments in a matter of
law. In matters of law and justice, the dignity, prestige, and feelings of
tribunals and judges are not involved. They are considerations which are
completely foreign. Law does not deal with the feelings of those who are called
upon to administer it. Justice has no favors nor fears, and never takes into
account whether its decisions affect or not the sensibilities or
susceptibilities of anyone. In matters of justice, there is nothing affecting
the personality of those who are called upon to administer it.

We vote to
remand the case to the Court of Appeals with instruction to make an opinion with
findings of fact.

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TUASON, J.:

I dissent in so far as the resolution holds that it is necessary for the
Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the reasons for its opinion that
death penalty or life imprisonment should be imposed. I particularly dissent
from the ruling that if this Court “finds them (Court of Appeals’ conclusions)
to be wrong, the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals.” This Court’s
interpretation does not accord with the plain language of section 145-K of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52, section 2, quoted
in the resolution. Moreover, this interpretation would lead to anomalous
results. Having regard to the relationship between the different courts and the
nature of judicial processes under the scheme upon which the Philippine courts
are organized, as well as to the literal sense of the terms of the law, it seems
obvious that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is, under our judicial set-up,
final as far as that Court is concerned, regardless of the correctness of the
opinion. It appears to me from the words of the law, considered in relation to
the working of the Philippine courts, that when a case is certified to this
Court, it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to decide on the merits. This is the literal
import of the clause in section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code, “for
final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.” And
as I have stated and will later explain more fully, the Legislature could not
have intended to give this section the meaning which this Court’s resolution
attaches thereto. We are to presume that the Legislature realized that this
Court might not always agree with the Court of Appeals, and yet it made no
proviso that in the event of disagreement the Supreme Court might or should
remand the cause to the Appellate Court. Section 145-H of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended makes such provision when an appeal is
erroneously taken to this Court or to the Court of Appeals. The other inference
we can draw from the absence of similar provision from section 145-K is that the
phrase “as if the case had been brought before it on appeal” denotes an appeal
taken to this Court properly, regularly and according to law, and not through
ignorance, mistake or inadvertence of the appellant or the clerk of court.

Quite apart from the explicit wording of the law, the resolution of the
majority will lead to an untenable situation and unnecessary waste of time
without any compensating benefit. Slight reflection, I trust, will illustrate my
point. But before I go ahead, let me call attention to the fact that this
Court’s resolution is obscure and apparently contradictory in one important
particular. The resolution orders that “the appeal in this case take its course
in this Court until final determination upon its merits.” This result has been
reached on the sole basis of the Solicitor General’s brief which the Court says
suffices to take the place of a required reasoned certification by the Court of
Appeals. I infer from the phrase “final determination upon its merits” that this
Court will dispose of the appeal irrespective of the punishment which, upon
review of the evidence, may be meted out to the appellant. If this be the
intention, some explanation is needed to reconcile it with the pronouncement
that if this Court “finds them (Court of Appeal’s conclusions) to be wrong, the
case will be returned to the Court of Appeals.” Whatever the intention, the
resolution will not, I dare say, bear analysis.

I will first assume that what this Court means is that it will refuse to take
jurisdiction of the appeal if it discovers at any time before decision is handed
down, that the appropriate penalty for the crime charged is less than
imprisonment for life. On this assumption, this Court, in order that it may
determine whether it will keep the case or return it to the Court of Appeals,
will, if it is to be faithful to its duty and fair to the parties, have to study
thoroughly the evidence, the pleadings and all other essential matters to arrive
at a just conclusion. The study had to be as thorough and as conscientious as if
the case were to be finally terminated here. Mere reading of the Court of
Appeals’ certification or the Solicitor General’s brief would not do. I am at a
loss to understand the statement that “while this Court may not review the
findings of fact, it may certainly pass upon the correctness of the legal
conclusions derived therefrom.” I am unable to understand how this Court or any
other court could tell the correctness of any legal conclusion unless it
reviewed or knew the facts. The Court of Appeals’ or the Solicitor General’s
findings of fact might be wrong or deficient. To resume, if this Court reaches
the same conclusion as the Court of Appeals or the Solicitor General regarding
the penalty merited by the crime, it will render final judgment; if it
disagrees, it will send back the case to the Court of Appeals. In remanding the
case, this Court will have to set out the reasons for its order or resolution,
for the guidance of the court that is to render decision according to the tenor
of the order, for the information of the parties and for the benefit of
Philippine Jurisprudence. And, naturally, the Court of Appeals will be bound to
follow the resolution of this Court, not only because it cannot punish an
accused with death or life imprisonment, which in its opinion is the proper
penalty, but also because it has to obey this Court’s mandate.

Herein comes the incongruity or, if I may be allowed to say, useless waste of
time. The above considerations will reveal the lack of any substantial good to
be gained by the shuttling back of the case to the Court of Appeals. The remand
of the case is a meaningless formality after this Court has studied and
deliberated on it and “utter[ed] the last word” which, in the nature of the
Court of Appeals’ relation to this Court and because of that Court’s limited
jurisdiction regarding penalty, strips the Court of Appeals of all discretion to
render any decision according to its lights, the resolution of this Court to all
intents and purposes lays down the law of the case and leaves nothing for the
Court of Appeals to perform except what amounts to a ministerial or clerical
function. Now, it may be asked, what in the name of reason prevents this Court
from pursuing the only sensible course under the circumstances, speaking
directly to the parties, disposing of the case once and for all, sentencing the
appellant to a penalty justified by the circumstances of the offense, whatever
the penalty may be, instead of making the Court of Appeals an automaton and
perhaps doing violence to its feelings, its conscience and conviction. I fail to
see how one course of action could impair this Court’s integrity any more or any
less than the other. In fact I can not see that the question of integrity enters
into the scene at all. It is this Court’s virtually telling the Court of Appeals
to write a decision—with its inseparable statement of facts and reasoning which
is contrary to its way of thinking—that would tend to produce the feared
effects, not on this Court but on another court which has its own dignity,
prestige, feelings which this Court can not afford to ignore.

Other grounds of objection suggest themselves. One that readily comes to mind
concerns the appealability of the decision of the Court of Appeals under the
situation I have endeavored to paint. Could the accused, in the event of
conviction, appeal to this Court? If the answer is yes, would the appellant have
much prospect of success? And would it be fair and just to the parties for this
Court to review a decision which is nothing more than a reflection or concrete
expression of its own findings and ideas? The appellant’s chance of winning the
appeal would be no greater than an ordinary litigant’s chance of having a court
reconsider and reverse its own decision. Delving farther into the consequences,
do we not practically deprive the accused of the right of appeal granted him by
the Rules of Criminal Procedure? And does not this Court in effect decide the
case without having heard the parties in oral argument, a right to which they
are entitled under the law?

If, on the other hand, this Court wants to convey the idea that it definitely
acquires jurisdiction from the mere fact that it is satisfied with the Court of
Appeals’ showing in its certification or the Solicitor General’s reasoning in
his brief, even if in reality the certification or the brief be not supported by
the evidence, then, I say again, with all due respect, that the resolution is
devoid of any rational, ideal or practical objective, unless this Court believes
that correct syllogism though predicated on incorrect analysis and synthesis of
the facts, has the effect “of protecting the integrity of its own jurisdiction
against possible misconceptions of the law by a lower court” But I do not
believe that a procedure which pays homage to matters of form in absolute
disregard of matters of substance can enhance the prestige or integrity of the
courts. If it be argued, as insinuated, that a reasoned certification will
“avoid its being whimsical or capricious,” I beg to disagree. A certification in
any form can be whimsical or capricious, if indeed it be possible to imagine
that responsible judges could be swayed by whims or caprice from the path of
duty.

Furthermore, reliance on the certification alone is fraught with danger to
the cause of justice. Suppose, for instance, the Court of Appeals in its
certification or the Solicitor General in his brief is right in holding
that reclusion perpetua or death is demanded by the circumstances of the
crime but fails to convince this Court. This is likely to happen when the
facts are inadequately or improperly presented in the certification or brief. In
that event the case will be remanded with the statement that in this Court’s
opinion the penalty imposed by the trial court ought not to be modified, and the
Court of Appeals will render judgment affirming the appealed decision in
pursuance of this Court’s order, an order which, under this example, is
erroneous born of a haphazard, superficial study of the proofs.

The explicit and positive language of the law read in the light of
contemporary practice and procedure permits only the conclusion that the
certification by the Court of Appeals operates by its own force to shift the
jurisdiction on the appeal to this Court. The Court of Appeals’ opinion, like
the judgment of a Court of First Instance, condemning a defendant to the
electric chair or life imprisonment, gives the case a serious aspect which
demands that the highest court should take control. If the penalty which the
Court of Appeals believes should be imposed should turn out to be wrong, or if
the accused should prove to be innocent or deserving of a lighter sentence than
that given him by the trial court, final decision by this Court would not be
incompatible with its exalted position in the judicial hierarchy. It is in exact
conformity to the almost universal practice, based on a practical and rational
administration of justice, of making a court finish a case once it has acquired
initial legal jurisdiction over the same. Stated differently, and with
particular reference to criminal cases appealable directly to the Supreme Court,
it is not the penalty that should be imposed but the penalty that has actually
been imposed by the Court of First Instance which gives this Court appellate
jurisdiction. If the trial court sentences an accused to reclusion
perpetua or death, this Court takes cognizance of the appeal even though the
penalty has to be reduced or the defendant acquitted. This Court does not pause
to inquire into the correctness of the sentence appealed from as a preliminary
step to test this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. When it finds that a lesser
term of imprisonment is warranted, this Court does not wash its hands and
certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals for decision; it itself lowers the
penalty to the proper grade and puts an end to the case. By the same token and
for stronger reasons, a certification by the Court of Appeals founded on the
unanimous opinion of a division thereof that death or life imprisonment is
called for by the crime, should be entitled to a consideration and respect no
whit less than that accorded the judgment of a single judge of an inferior court
and ought to confer upon this Court a jurisdiction no less absolute than that
conferred by one trial judge’s decision.

I do not think section 3 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court cited in the
resolution can be applied to cases (like the present) certified to this Court
under section 145-K of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 52. I am inclined to think that this Rule of Court was promulgated with
section 145-H of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, in view, which
provides that “all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court
or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper Court, which shall hear
the same, as if it had originally been brought before it.” The Rule of Court
referred to makes specific reference to cases taken to the Court of Appeals over
which it “has no appellate jurisdiction”. The quoted phrase is another way of
saying cases erroneously appealed. In a true and larger sense, the Court of
Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of cases like the one under consideration.
The instant appeal was properly brought before that Court, and, as a matter of
fact, it could and should decide the case were it not for its belief that the
penalty should be increased.

Other differences may be worth taking into account. A statement of the
grounds of the Court of Appeals for certifying cases falling under section
145-H, while convenient to this Court is not likely to cause embarrassment or
work unfairness to the parties. Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court is
obliged to advance under this procedure any opinion on the merits of the case.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals or of this Court in cases erroneously
appealed can be, and usually is, determined from the issues formulated and the
arguments adduced in the briefs. The courts are able to judge from the briefs
alone whether questions of fact or only questions of law are submitted for
decision, or whether the questions involved are, under the law or the
constitution, ones that should go to one court or the other. And in passing on
these questions, as I have said, the merits of the case do not have to be
dragged into the discussion. But a certification under section 145-K goes to the
very bottom of the prosecution. Lastly, while a certification under section
145-H is purely ministerial in character, as it has for its object the curing of
a mistake of transmission or filing, certification under section 145-K is a
judicial action which, as I maintain, and by the unequivocal meaning of the law,
generates a new juridical situation that elevates the case on a higher plane of
jurisdiction.

After the foregoing dissenting opinion was filed, the resolution of this
Court was to a large degree rewritten. In certain respects, the resolution as
altered is a reply to my dissenting opinion. I make this explanation in order to
account for discrepancies to be found between the text of the resolution and my
references to and quotations from it. The resolution has not been changed on the
basic grounds of my dissent, and on these fundamental propositions I have
nothing to take from what I have stated. Regarding other features of the
resolution, I have nothing to add beyond commenting on the statement that “The
instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of First
Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in
such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be
erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already
exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits containing both
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more
practical for the administration of the law that this Court should exercise its
appellate jurisdiction by examining the evidence and correcting all errors both
of fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court.”

In pointing to appeals from the Courts of First Instance to this Court as an
example, I merely wanted to emphasize that this Court’s jurisdiction is
determined by what the lower courts say shall be the penalty and not what this
Court believes. Considered in this light, the line which this Court draws to
differentiate a judgment of a Court of First Instance and a certification by the
Court of Appeals does not and can not matter. The presence of “findings of fact
and conclusions of law” in the Court of First Instance’s judgment and the
absence of such findings and conclusions from the Court of Appeals’
certification do not detract a whit from the force of the comparison I made
between a judgment and a certification. The difference is purely one of practice
and procedure, and one reason for the difference is that Courts of First
Instance are expressly required by law to make such findings and conclusions
while the Court of Appeals is not so required when it certifies a case under
section 145-K of the Administrative Code as amended. The other reason for the
difference is that the Court of First Instance deals with the merits of the
case; the Court of Appeals is concerned essentially with jurisdiction.

In their fundamental aspects the two cases are the same. If “the Court of
First Instance has already exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment,” as
the resolution says, so has the Court of Appeals. I can not understand how it
could be “more practical for the administration of the law that this Court
should exercise its appellate jurisdiction” in one case than in the other. In
both cases, there are findings of facts and conclusions of law by the Court of
First Instance; in both cases we have the briefs of the parties; in one case the
record and the evidence are as complete as in the other. The only difference I
can perceive on this point is that in one case it is the Court of First Instance
which opines that capital punishment or life imprisonment is the right penalty
whereas in the other case the Court of Appeals substitutes its opinion for the
trial court’s regarding the penalty.

It is not only practical to review a case certified to this Court under
section 145-K without a detailed explanation of the opinion, but findings of
fact and conclusions of law by the Court of Appeals would constitute an unfair
intrusion by a court which is not a party to the case, whose findings and
conclusions have no place in the decision by this Court on the merits, and whose
opinion the law or procedure has not provided the prejudiced party a means or
opportunity of refuting.

When this Court says that it assumes jurisdiction of a direct appeal from the
Court of First Instance “even where the judgment appears to be erroneous on its
face.” it unconsciously admits the dispensability of findings of fact and
conclusions of law by the Court of Appeals as a practical necessity. And this
Court must agree that if its appellate jurisdiction can be exercised unhampered
by manifestly incorrect or unsound findings and conclusions in the appealed
decision, an unreasoned opinion by the Court of Appeals should not give cause
for objection on the score of practical utility. As a matter of fact, since the
creation of the Court of Appeals, more than ten years ago, the uniform practice
has been for that Court or the various divisions thereof to certify cases to
this Court under section 145-K of the Administrative Code as amended without
giving the reasons for their opinion. No hitch ever developed in the cases so
certified to retard or inconvenience their disposition by this
Court.

Bengzon and Padilla, JJ., concur in the foregoing
dissent.