CIPRIANO DEFENSOR, PETITIONER VS. THE HONORABLE RAMON BLANCO, ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS AND DEMOCRITO DELEONIO RESPONDENTS.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an, appeal under section 13 of Republic Act No. 1267, as amended by
section 8 of Republic Act No. 1409 to review a judgment rendered on 20 September
1960 by the Court of Agrarian Relations, Eighth Regional District, Iloilo City,
in CAR Case No. 959.

It appears that on 17 March 1960, respondent Democrito Deleonio, then
petitioner, filed a petition (Annex A) in the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Eighth Regional District, Iloilo City, alleging that; he is the owner of a
parcel of agricultural land, containing an area of three (3) hectares, a part of
Lot 6329 of Dumangas Cadastre, situated in barrio Solangan, municipality of
Dumangas, province of Iloilo, worked by his tenant, then respondent Cipriano
Defensor, now petitioner; that: he (Deleonio), a farmer by occupation, had
notified then respondent Defensor, by means of a letter written in Visayan
dialect dated 17 June 1958, received by the latter on 8 July 1958, and on 16
March 1959 had filed notice with the Court of Agrarian Relations of his
intention to cultivate the landholding personally; that as landholder, he had
also sent by registered mail a copy of the notice to eject him (Defensor) but
the latter refused to receive the copy of the notice so it was returned to
petitioner Deleonio on 18 March 1959, and praying that his tenant, then
respondent (Defensor), be ejected from the landholding so that he (petitioner
Deleonio) could personally cultivate it and for other just and equitable
remedies and reliefs.

In his answer dated 23 March 1960 (Annex B), the herein petitioner, then
respondent, denied the bona fide intention of the landholder to
cultivate the land himself personally, because aside from his other extensive
landholdings under cultivation with hired workers, he is engaged in the purchase
and sale of rice; and as special defenses he averred that then petitioner
Deleonio was not the absolute owner of the landholding but merely a mortgagee
whose right over it was to expire on the following year (1961); and that on 27
April 1957, with the sanction or approval of the respondent Court, the same
parties, in an amicable settlement entered into by them on 22 April 1951, agreed
to have the land cultivated by the herein petitioner, then petitioner-tenant,
and prayed that the petition be dismissed and that then petitioner, respondent
herein, be ordered to pay him P100.00 as attorney’s fees, and for other just and
equitable reliefs. (CAR Case No, 939-Iloilo).

After hearing, the Court of Agrarian. Relations rendered judgment, the
dispositive part of which is as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the ejectment of the respondent
Cipriano Defensor from the landholding in question subject to the provisions of
Section 22(3 & 4), R. A. 1199, as amended, in relation to Section 1, Rule
13, Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, (p. 9, Annex C).

In his motion for reconsideration of the judgment just rendered (Annex D),
the then respondent Defensor argued that under Rep. Act No, 1199 an owner, a
lessee, usufructuary, or a legal possessor of a landholding can eject a tenant
if in good faith he intends to cultivate the land himself personally, but after
the passage of Rep. Act No. 2263, the amendatory law which took effect on 19
June 1959, a landholder who is a mere lessee, usufructuary, legal possessor, or
a vendee a retro cannot eject the tenant because of such bona
fide intention to cultivate the land himself personally. On 24 October
1960, then petitioner Deleonio, now respondent, filed an opposition (Annex E) to
the then respondent’s motion for reconsideration contending that the use of the
word “landholder-owner” in Republic Act No, 2263 should not be construed in a
limited sense but should be given its general and full meaning so as to include
all and every kind of ownership including that of a vendee a retro. On
21 November 1960, the trial court denied the then respondent’s motion for
reconsideration (Annex F).

The respondent Court made the following findings and pronouncements:

“After a careful study of the evidence of both parties, it is our candid
opinion that the petitioner has complied with all the mandatory provisions of
the law regarding ejectment on the ground of personal cultivation. The law
presumes the bona fide intention until the landholder-owner has failed
to cultivate the landholding personally for at least three (3) years. It follows
that before this eventuality comes, the presumption of bona fide
intention is inherent in the filing of the petition. Much more so, because the
petitioner has been personally working on rice lands since the age of 15 and now
that he is 44 years old he is still physically capable to undertake the labor
required of a tenant in the cultivation of rice field. The evidence has shown,
that he owns three (3) hectares of land, 2 hectares of which are worked on by
his son-in-law while the remaining one (1) hectare is personally tenanted by
him. With the area of the landholding which is three (3) hectares, in case the
respondent tenant is ejected, the petitioner-landholder can properly and
efficiently work on and cultivate the landholding. The weans of livelihood of
the petitioner is not sufficient to make both ends meet, because he has 11
children, 4 of whom are already married, but 7 are still with him, under his
support. As a matter of fact, his son, 18 years old could not continue his
studies in the Maritime School due to lack of means. True it is that he is
partly engaged in selling rice in Negros Occidental, but his income therefrom,
together with that which he has been deriving from his 1 hectare land, is not
sufficient for the support and education of his children. x x x

The decision rendered in Case No, 353 between the same parties which was
based on an amicable settlement to the effect that respondent Defensor shall
continue as tenant of the landholding, is not a legal impediment to the filing
of the present petition nor the agreement had with respect to the seedlings
which took place in the second week of March, 1960.

The only issue to be decided in this case is purely legal, whether a
vendee-a-retro can eject a tenant on the ground of personal
cultivation. It appears on record that the landholding was sold by Ignacia
Depakakibo to the petitioner on April 27, 1956, for a period of ten (10) years
and with the right to repurchase within the last four (4) years. Before Republic
Act No, 2263 took effect on June 19, 1959, a landholder may be an. owner,
lessee, usufructuary and legal possessor, but the mandatory law R. A. 2263, says
of “landholder-owner” as the competent person to dispossess tenant on the ground
of personal cultivation.

It is admitted by evidence of both partiesthat the landholding was sold to
the petitioner with the right, to repurchase. If this is so, the petitioner is
the landholder of the respondent. The law does not sake any distinction on the
ownership of the owner. It may be absolute or relative or conditional as in the
case of the pacto de retro. The law simply Mentions the word owner and
no more. As a consequence therefore, where the law does not make any
distinction, it should be applied as it is and not interpreted as it should have
been. In a sale with the right to repurchase, all the elements of ownership are
transferred to the vendee, such as the petitioner in this instance, subject only
to the right of repurchase.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

We greatly sympathize with the plight of the respondent because he has been
the tenant of the landholding for decades and “this land has witnessed the birth
of his children, the death of his family, the joys and pains of his life as a
farmer”, but the interpretation of the law is raised squarely and it is indeed
painful that this court has reached the opinion that a vendee-a-retro as
landholder-owner can eject a tenant on the ground of personal cultivation before
the repurchase actually takes place.”

In his appeal entitled “petition for certiorari” filed 8 December 1960 ( G.
&. No. L-17812) , the herein petitioner contends that respondent Decmocrito
Deleonio, who is a vendee a retro of the landholding, has no right to eject the
petitioner Cipriano Defensor from it on the ground of personal cultivation,
because only an absolute owner thereof has such right. Otherwise, the petitioner
adds, the security of tenure of the tenant would be rendered nugatory and
ineffectual.

The petitioner does not dispute the findings of the respondent Court
regarding the notice requirements as provided for in Sec, 50 (a) o£ Republic Act
No, 1199, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2263, and the bona fide intention or “good
faith of respondent-landholder Deleonio to personally cultivate the landholding
involved in CAR Case No. 959-Iloilo, entitled “Democrito Deleonio vs. Cipriano
Defensor.”

The only point to determine is whether the respondent Democrito Deleonio, the
vendee a retro of the landholding, subject of the controversy, has the right to
eject his tenant Cipriano Defensor, the herein petitioner, from said landholding
on the ground of personal cultivation.

The petitioner’s contention that Section 50 of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended by R, A, 2263, applies only to the absolute owners of agricultural lands
and not to conditional owners like a vendee a retro, is without merit,
for said section 50, which partly provides that-

SEC. 50. causes for the Dispossession of Tenant. – Any of the following, and
no other, shall be sufficient cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his
holdings:

(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder-owner or his relative
within the first degree by consanguinity to cultivate the Land himself
personally or through the employment of farm machinery and implements: Provided,
however. That should the landholder-owner or the aforesaid relative not
cultivate the land himself for at least three years or the landholder-owner and
his successor in interest should fail to employ mechanical farm implements for a
period of at least five years after dispossession of the tenant, it shall be
presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to
demand possession of the land and damages for any loss incurred by him because
of said dispossession: Provided, further, That the landholder-owner or the
aforesaid relative shall, at least one year but not more than two years prior to
the date of his petition to dispossess the tenant under this subsection, file
notice with the court and shall inform the tenant in writing in a language or
dialect known to the latter of his intention to cultivate the land himself,
either personally or through the employment of Mechanical implements: x x x.

is clear and needs no interpretation. The law does not require that absolute
ownership of the landholding be vested in the “landholder-owner” to give him the
right to eject his tenant on the ground of personal cultivation or through the
employment of farm machinery and implements. A vendee a retro of a
landholding is certainly an owner thereof, subject only to a resolutory
condition or the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase it if duly
availed of by him. When Section 50(a) quoted above was amended, the vendee a
retro was not included among those excluded, to wit: the lessee, usufructuary
and legal possessor.

The argument of the petitioner that to include vendee a retro in the
term “landholder-owner” found in Section 50 (a) of “R.A. 2263 is “premature and
run counter to Article 1607 of the New Civil Code” (P. 73, Record), is without
merit, for the provisions of said article (1607) do not deprive the vendee a
retro of his ownership and title to the landholding, but merely requires a
judicial order, after the vendor a retro had bean duly heard, before a
consolidation, of ownership in the vendee a retro, upon failure of the vendor a
retro to repurchase the landholding or to comply with the provisions of Article
1616, may be recorded in the corresponding Registry of Property. Should the
vendor a retro repurchase the landholding, the petitions would be entitled to be
reinstated as tenant in the landholding.

The judgment under review is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista. Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.