ROSARIO SANTOS VDA. DE BONIFACIO, VIRGNIA BONIFACIO, ROSALINDA BONIFACIO, ROMEO BONIFACIO, ZENAIDA BONIFACIO, GENEROSO BONIFACIO, ANDRES BONIFACIO, JOSE BONI­FACIO, JOVITO BONIF…

Direct appeal to the Supreme Court (lodged prior to the enactment
of republic Act No. 5440) from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), in its Civil Case
No. 8275, senten­cing the defendants-appellants, B. L. T. Bus Co., Inc., and its
driver Sergio de Luna, to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, as damages arising from a vehicular accident,
the total amount of P240,905.72, with interest from
the filing of the complaint.

Said Civil Case 8275 was filed pursuant to a reservation made by
the plaintiffs to file a civil action separately from the criminal case
instituted against the L. T. B. bus driver Sergio de Luna in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, for homicide and multiple physical injuries and damage to
property through reckless imprudence, in connection with the same vehicular
accident.  The Laguna court had con­victed
de Luna of the criminal charge, but the judgment was appealed and is pending in
the Court of Appeals.

Of the detailed findings of fact of the trial court, we affirm
the following as either non-controverted or
preponderantly established by the evidence:

“Before February 27, 1964, Jovito Bonifacio,
Sr., together with his wife (plaintiff Rosario Santos Vda.
de Bonifacio) and neighbor Agustin Angeles, used to
bathe in the Pansol hot springs at Los Baños, Laguna, twice a week.  They made such trips in his 1962 Mercedes
Benz car with plaintiff Alberto Concepcion as his
driver, a duly licensed driver since 1946.

“About 4:00 o’clock
in the morning of February 27, 1964,
the four of them left Barrio Sumilang, Pasig, bound for the Pansol hot springs
in Los Baños, Laguna. 
Jovito, Sr. was seated beside his driver
Alberto Concepcion; while Agustin Angeles was seated
on the left side of the rear seat with plaintiff Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio
to his right.  Alberto Concepcion was driving the car on the right lane facing Los
Baños at the rate of 30 miles per hour because the
concrete road was slippery as it was then drizzling.  After going down the overpass or bridge and
negotiating the curve after the said bridge at Barrio Landayan,
San Pedro Tunasan, Laguna, Alberto Concepcion saw a cargo truck parked on the left portion of
the concrete highway without any parking lights.  It was about 5:20
a.m., still dark and raining. 
While he was about 15 meters from the said parked cargo truck, he saw
for the first time the oncoming LTB passenger bus No. 136 bearing 1964 plate No. PUB-1276, about 200 meters away from him and about 185
meters behind the parked cargo truck.  Said
bus was then driven at a very fast clip by the defendant Sergio de Luna.  Because he was on his right lane, Alberto Concepcion continued on his way at the rate of 30 miles per
hour.  The parked truck was entirely on
the left lane and about one (1) meter from the center, of the concrete
highway.  His Mercedes Benz was passing
alongside the parked truck and about 70 cm. from the center of the road.  Just as he was about to pass beyond the
parked truck, the oncoming LTB bus suddenly swerved to its left towards the
right lane of the Mercedes Benz and collided with the Mercedes Benz.  The place of collision was about 10 meters
from the parked truck.  The impact caused
the Mercedes car to swerve to the right shoulder of the road facing Los Baños as Alberto slammed his brakes, and the Mer­cedes car
stopped on the right shoulder, which is about two meters wide; while the LTB
bus made a complete U-turn and finally stopped on the left lane of the concrete
highway facing Los Baños or the direction where it
came from.  It was filled with about 40
passengers then (see pictures Exhs. H, I, J, K, L, M, and SS or 13 and 26, pp. 92-94, 391, 576, rec.).
 The left front part of the Mercedes Benz
was smashed (see pictures Exhs. H
and I, p. 92, rec.).  The violent
impact threw Jovito Bonifacio,
Sr. out of the car onto the right shoulder of the road facing Los Baños, causing his instantaneous death (Exhs.
J, K, L and M, pp. 93-94, rec.) while
the other passengers, the driving [sic] Alberto Concepcion
, Mrs. Rosario Santos Vda. de
Bonifacio, and Agustin Angeles, lost cons­ciousness
and were seriously injured.  They
recovered consciousness in the Manila Sani­tarium and Hospital in Pasay City
to where they were brought that same morning of the incident.” (Decision,
Rec. on App., pp. 116-119)

As is usual in cases of this kind, three main issues arise:

(1)  
Who of the drivers of the colliding vehicles was
at fault?

(2)  
Is the employer of the guilty driver responsible
for the fault of the latter?

(3)  
Are the damages awarded reasonable?

Taking up the questions seriatim, we find that the court
below cor­rectly held that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the L. T. B. bus driver, de Luna, who failed to take the
necessary precautions demanded by the circumstances. He admitted that when the
mishap occurred, it was still dark; and as it was raining, requisite prudence
required that de Luna should be more careful than usual, and slacken his pace,
for the wet highway could be expected to be slippery.  Even assuming that the presence of the parked
cargo truck did cons­titute an emergency, although it was in plain view, still,
if de Luna had not been driving unreasonably fast, his bus would not have
skidded to the left and invaded the lane of the oncoming car when he applied
his brakes.  His having failed to see the
parked cargo truck until he was only 50 meters from it also justifies the
inference that he was in­attentive to his responsibility as a driver.  That he did not know that anyone else was
using the road is no defense to his negligent opera­tion of his vehicle, since
he should be especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the
highway; and his failure to keep a proper lookout for persons and objects in
the line to be traversed constitutes negligence (7 Am. Jur.
2d 901).  Furthermore, in intruding into
the lane reserved for vehicles coming from the opposite direction, it was
incumbent upon the bus driver to make sure that he could do so without danger.

Confirmatory of the foregoing considerations is the fact that de Luna
himself admitted, in the statement, Exhibit “A”, taken by the chief
of police, and subscribed and sworn to before the mayor of San Pedro, Laguna,
at 8:00 o’clock in the same morning of the accident, and while the facts were
fresh in his mind, that when he (de Luna) noticed the parked cargo truck he
slammed on his brakes and because of this, the bus skidded to the left and hit
the Mercedes Benz car (” x x x
x x ang
ginawa ko po ay nagpreno ako ng aking
sasakyang minamaneho at dahil po dito
ay umislayd ang aking trak na
papuntang kaliwa, subalit siya po
namang pagdaan ng isang awtong
Mercedes Benz na aking nabunggo x x x
x .”)

The version at the trial of defendant-appellant Sergio de Luna,
and his witnesses, is that when the former saw the parked cargo truck he slowed
down, swerved a little to the left, then completely stopped his vehicle; that
right then, the Mercedes Benz car hit his bus, with such force that the bus
turned to the direction where it came from. 
Not only is this version belied by de Luna’s original and spontaneous
statement to the San Pedro Police, but it was infirmed by physical facts.

It is incredible, and contrary to common experience and observa­tion,
that the bus, admittedly three (3) times bigger than the car, and loaded with
about forty (40) passengers, could be turned around while standing still by the
impact of the much smaller car.  Nor was
his swerving to the left justifiable if he were in control of his vehicle,
since he had a clear view of the left lane and the oncoming Mercedes Benz from
the driver’s seat of the bus.  Evidence,
to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
it must be credible in itself (People v. Baquiran,
L-20153, 29 June 1967, 20 SCRA 451).

There was no negligence on the part of the driver of the Mercedes
car, Alberto Concepcion.

“A motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the
highway, even after he sees an approaching motorist coming toward him on the
wrong side, is generally entitled to assume that the other motorist will return
to his proper lane of traffic, x x x x x
.” (8 Am. Jur. 2d 319)

That the L.T.B. bus was damaged near the front right wheel and
fender proves that the Mercedes was already very close to the place of
collision when it occurred, so that the car driver had no chance to evade
it.  Nor did said driver, Concepcion, possess any means of knowing that the bus
intruding into his line of travel was skidding out of control, and could not
draw back to its proper lane.

Appellants pretend that the Mercedes car was proceeding at
reckless speed, but this charge rests on nothing more substantial than an
alleged statement by Mrs. Bonifacio at the hospital
that her driver was driving fast.  The
court below, in our opinion, correctly discredited this evidence, for at the
time it was supposedly made, Mrs. Bonifacio was still
in a state of shock, with visitors barred by doctor’s orders; and, moreover,
defense witness, ex-Cpl. Casantusan, did not even
take down or report the pretended statement, notwithstanding its patent
importance; there was no corroboration thereof, and it was contradicted by the
car driver and by Mrs. Bonifacio herself.  The rule, too well-known to require citation
of authorities, is that in the absence of clear error (and none is shown in the
present instance) a trial court’s estimate on the credibility of witnesses,
whose demeanour it had unparalleled opportunity to
observe, will not be disturbed on appeal.

At any rate, so long as the Mercedes car remained in its proper
lane, its speed could not have been the proximate cause of the mishap.

On the second issue posed, the rule under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines makes an employer liable for damages caused by his
employee in the discharge of his duties, unless the former ade­quately proves
having exercised due care in the selection and super­vision of the employee.

Appellant company defends that it had observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage, conformably to the last
paragraph of said Article 2180.  It adduced
evidence to show that in hiring driver de Luna, the latter was tested on his
proficiency as a driven that he passed the test given by the company’s board of
examiners, composed of the office manager, the medical director, the chief of
the legal department and the job superintendent, aside from the orientation
test given by experienced drivers along the different lines of the com­pany;
that the company issued service manuals to its employees, aside from memorandum
circulars and duty orders to govern the conduct of its drivers; that it assigns
inspectors interlinked with one another along the different lines of the
company to see to it that the rules and regula­tions are complied with by all
the drivers; that it metes out penalties, such as fines, to erring drivers;
that it maintains shops at different stations, where several mechanics are
assigned to see to it that no truck leaves on the line without being thoroughly
checked; that it keeps a summary of service records of its drivers to help in
determining their efficiency and fitness; that it conducts seminars on
safe-driving and prevention of accidents; that it had received an award of
appreciation in 1963 by the National Traffic Safety Committee; that it used the
best available brake lining on Bus No. 136 and that said bus was completely
checked for roadworthiness the day before the accident.

Yet the evidence of appellant company also established facts that
demolished its very defense of “diligence of a good father of a
family”, for it plainly shows inexcusable laxity in the super­vision of
its driver and in the maintenance of its vehicles.  Salient among these facts are the following:

(a)  Defense witness Cuevas asserted that the brake
lining of the bus was changed on 10
January 1964, over a month prior to the accident, although brake
linings last about 30 days only.  The
change in lining was overdue but the appellant bus company tried to hide this
fact.  Said the trial court:

“xxxx. The
job sheet for the change of brake lining appears dated Jan. 10, 1964, in ink.  There was an attempt to change it by crossing
out “Jan.” and super-imposing the word “Feb.” in pencil
(see page 598, rec.). There was an attempt to make “Feb. 10, 1964” as
altered appear as the correct date – – instead of Jan­uary 10, 1964 – – – by
not arranging chronologi­cally the various orders and/or job sheets for said
bus No. 136 in said folder, Exh. 27, and by placing
the said small job sheet as page 11 of the said folder, Exhibit 27, which has
for its first page an order for bus No. 136 dated February 18, 1964 (p. 1 of
Exhi­bit 27 or Exh. 25-B, p. 290, rec.).” (Rec.
on Appeal, p. 132)

By resorting to these documentary alterations, the company in­dicated
its awareness that its case is weak or unfounded and from that may be inferred that
its case of appellant lacks truth and merit,^[1]
The claim on appeal that the alteration in the writing was innocent, or that
the company should have been given an opportunity to explain because it was
caught unaware that the court below would take the incident against them as it
did, is untenable.  The rule requires
that a party, producing a writing as genuine but which is found altered after
its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, should account
for the alteration, and, if “he do that, he may give the writing in
evidence, but not otherwise.” (Section 32, Rule 132, Revised Rules of
Court) In other words, the company should have ac­counted for the alteration
when it introduced the job sheet in evidence, and not endeavour
to explain the alteration afterwards.

(b)  The record of driver de Luna shows that, on
the average, he was at the wheel and on the road for eleven (11) hours
and thirty-five (35) minutes per day, from Paete to Manila
and back, and Paete to San
Antonio and back, starting before dawn until the
evening.  He has been in the Paete -Manila route for four (4) years (T. s. n., 22 November 1965, pages 38-39).  He was paid by the hour, so that the more
time he drove, the greater compensation he received.  The employer company thus abetted, obviously
for the sake of greater profit, the gruelling
schedule, unmindful of the harmful consequence that excessive working time
would register upon the driver’s health, and, particularly, on his
reflexes.  The pay-off came when driver
de Luna, because of his accumulated fatigue and inatten­tiveness, failed to
notice seasonably the presence of the parked cargo truck upon his lane of
traffic, impelling him to brake suddenly in an effort to avoid hitting it.  The braking made the bus slide and encroach upon the other lane, resulting in its collision
with the oncoming auto­mobile.

(c)  
Sergio de Luna had repeatedly violated company
rules.  Despite his numerous infractions,
31 in all since 1951, and including a collision with a carretela,
the company took no more drastic action against him other than repeated
warnings and imposing token fines, which on the whole amounts to tolerance of
the violations or laxity or negligence in the enforcement of the company rules.

(d)  
On its bus involved in the accident (No. 136),
the appellant company was also negligent. 
The bus was last overhauled on 26
Jan­uary 1963 but was usually overhauled every six months; its overhauling, therefore, was overdue by six months.  In addition, as heretofore observed, its
brake linings were last changed on 10 January 1964, but were usually changed
every 30 days; the changing was, therefore, overdue by one (1) month and
seventeen (17) days at the time of the mishap, and must have contributed to the
driver’s inability to control the skidding that led to the collision.

In the face of these plain instances of lax supervision, the
trial court has aptly remarked:

“The mere issuance of numerous rules and regulations, without
the corresponding periodic checks as to whether such rules and regulations are
being complied with, is not sufficient to exempt the defendant bus firm from
liability arising from the negligence of its employees.  Neither the establishment
of maintenance and repair shops, which do not regularly service its buses,
would suf­fice to demonstrate the diligence of the employer in the selection
and supervision of its employees and in servicing and maintaining the buses in
good running condition.”

The minor errors charged against the appealed decision do not
suffice to overrule the findings of negligence of both the driver and the
company, measured by the requirements of ordinary diligence.  Appellants’ complaint in their brief, that
the lower court applied the law requiring carriers to observe extraordinary
diligence with respect to passengers, and not ordinary diligence with respect
to third parties as in the present case, is without basis.

On the question of damages, the trial court properly took into
account that the late Jovito Bonifacio,
Sr., was already a success­ful businessman when his life was cut short, at the
age of 49, by the highway accident.  He
was treasurer of Bonifacio Bros., Inc., a firm owned
by himself and his brother, and which is engaged in the business of repairing
motor vehicles.  The assets of said firm
in 1962 were worth P1,059,754.53; it had 102 employees receiving a salary of
P1,800.00 or more, per annum; in 1963, its assets were worth P995,885.78
(Exhibits “KK-2” & “KK-3”).  In April, 1963, the deceased founded J. Bonifacio Bros., Inc., which also engaged in the same line
of business, with principal office at 267 P. Casal, Manila,
and of which he was president at the time of his demise.  The deceased had a net income of P33,738.62 and P24,000.00 in 1962 and 1963, respectively.^[2]
The lower court, therefore, fairly assessed that, had he lived to the age of
55, he would have earned a total net income of P144,000.00.  The six-year life expectancy allowed by the
trial court is shorter than that shown by insurance mortality tables, but the
award was not appealed.

Bonifacio’s family incurred expenses of
P13,764.05, as follows: coffin – P600.00; burial lot –
P90.00; cost of publication of death notices – P720.00; tomb – P4,850.00; food
and gasoline during vigil – P1,782.00: other expenses – 500.00; compensation to
a private investigator to look into the records of defendant driver Sergio de
Luna – P222.05; and damage to Mercedes Benz car, not covered by insurance –
P5,000.00.

Defendants-appellants question the actual and litigation expenses
because they were paid by the firm J. Bonifacio
Bros., Inc., arguing that said firm, not the plaintiffs, has the right to claim
the damages by virtue of subrogation, per Articles 1302 and 1303 of the Civil
Code.  This is a defense that, even if
true (which we need not rule upon), should have been invoked in the court
below, and its interposition comes too late on appeal.  Moreover, such a technical defense deserves
scant consideration, because the firm is a family corporation and a subroga­tion
of parties will neither diminish the expenses nor exculpate de­fendants-appellants
from liability therefor.

Plaintiff-appellee Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio
regained cons­ciousness at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital.  She suffered a la­cerated wound in the
frontal region of her head, contusion on the left side of her face, fracture of
the distal portion of her left ulna and dislocation of the left femur.  She was confined in the hospital from 27 February 1964 to 15 March 1964.  Her hospital bills and compensa­tion for
special nurses amounted to P1,658.48.  During her confinement, she failed to receive
her salary, amounting to P608.00.

Driver Alberto Concepcion of the
Mercedes Benz car, sustained compound fractures; his right foot was in a
plaster cast for six (6) months and one (1) week; his left leg was under
traction and hanging for two (2) weeks, his left hip-bone dislocated.  He was confined in the hospital for one (1)
month and four (4) days.  Up to the time
the lower court rendered its decision on 30 July 1966, Concepcion
had to go in crutches to the hospital, for treatment.  His medical expenses amounted to P1,777.21.  As a driver
of the deceased Jovito Bonifacio,
Sr., he was paid a weekly salary of P50.00, with free meals, which remuneration
may be estimated to be P4,000.00 yearly (T. s. n., 22
October 1964, page 10).  He was 40 years
old at the time of the accident and there is no indication as to when he would
be able to drive again.  If he would be
permanently incapacitated from driving again, he may, in the future, be able to
find a different calling or gainful occupation. 
The award of P15,000. 00, a
s compensatory damages, is fair and reasonable.

Agustin Angeles suffered a broken right wrist, a crack in the top
left part of his head, sunken left eye, and a wound in the left cheek.  He regained consciousness at the hospital
only after 11 days from the time of the accident.  He was confined for 18 days, and billed for
P1,097.98.  Due
to the accident, his memory and vision were impaired; he now walks with a cane;
his bowel movement and urination are now abnormal and irregular; he cannot
freely move his right arm.  He was 76
years old at the time of the accident, but despite his age, he used to repair
watches, with an average monthly income of P250.00.  He cannot repair watches anymore.  The lower court granted him compen­satory
damages for P3,000.00.

For their shock, worry and anguish, the court below awarded moral
damages to the plaintiffs-members of the family of the deceased Jovito Bonifacio,Sr.
in the sum of P20,000.00; to Rosario Santos Vda. de Bonifacio, the sum of
P10,000.00; to Alberto Concepcion and Agustin
Angeles, the sum of 5,000.00 each.  It
also granted the family group and each of the aforenamed
plaintiffs P5,000.00, as exemplary damages.  The quantum of moral and exemplary damages
thus awarded is not unconscionable, as appellants aver, but are justified,
considering all the circumstances of the case.

Interest on the various damages at 6% per annum since the filing
of the suit was also awarded, despite the lack of prayer for interest in the
plaintiffs’ complaint.  The grant of
interest is not necessarily error, for under the Civil Code –

“ART. 2211. 
In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest
as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the
discretion of the court.”

The findings and conclusions of negligence on the part of the de­fendants-appellants,
and not on the part of the plaintiffs-appellees, show
the lack of merit of the last assignment of error about the denial of
appellants’ counterclaim for the fees of their own counsel.

Appellants stress that the trial court
should be held disqualified because the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees had been a classmate of the trial judge.  Admittedly, this is not a legal ground for
disqualifica­tion.  To allow it would
unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be
transferred.  Ultimately, confusion would
result, for under the rule advocated, a judge would be barred from sitting in a
case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have many) appeared.  Nor have the appellants successfully shown
here that bias distorted the judgment or conduct of the challenged trier of the case. 
That he should question defense witnesses more closely than those of the
plaintiffs is but natural, since defendants’ evidence varies from proof already
on record.  A desire to get at the truth
is no proof of bias or prejudice.

FINDING NO REVERSIBLE ERROR, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed.  Costs
against the appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur. 

Makalintal and Makasiar, JJ.,
took no part. 

^[1]
De Leon vs. Juyco, 73 Phil. 588, citing 1 Wigmore on Evidence, section 277, pages 566-568).

^[2] Exhibits “LL” & “MM”.