G.R. No. L-2800. May 30, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE. VS. TEOPISTA CANJA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
BENGZON, J.:
Canja was convicted of parricide by the court of first instance of
Antique, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life, plus indemnity of
P2,000, and costs.
The spouses resided at Barrio Badiangan, Patnongon, province of
Antique. Squandering the family funds in gambling and even keeping a
paramour, Pedro got the drinking habit that sometimes led him to lay
violent hands on his wife.
The slaying occurred at night, about ten o’clock, May 25, 1948, in
the conjugal home, where the family had gone to bed earlier in the
evening, the husband sleeping in one small room, and the wife with the
children in another.
The eldest daughter Exuperia, twenty years old, declared
substantially as follows: “That night my mother woke me up and told me
my father was dead. She told me she had killed him otherwise he would
kill her. At her indication I helped carry the corpse to the creek
where we left it. Before we retired that evening my parents had a
discussion. They often quarrelled before. I am aware that my testimony
may send mother to jail for life, but what I say is the truth. I am
displeased with her because she killed my father”.
Leonardo Reluta, chief of police of the town, testified that at
noon of May 26, 1948, he proceeded to the barrio in company with the
sanitary inspector and the justice of the peace; that they found
Pedro’s corpse in the creek; that the health officer examined the body;
that after conferring with Exuperia he arrested Teopista Canja; that
the confession Exhibit C was signed by her, and that he prepared such
exhibit, which contains the statements she made to him.
Manuel Flores, the health officer, ratified the contents of the
post-mortem examination he conducted (Exhibit D). According to him the
man died of “Internal hemorrhage, the concussion and compression of the
brain as the result of blows of hard instrument such as a hammer which
fractured or crushed the ethmoid or nasal bone, the right molar or
cheek bone and the upper and lower jaw bones. The dental arches were so
smashed that there were no more teeth left. There are 11 face incised
wounds of 1 1/2 inches wide with exception of 1 1/2 inch on the left
side of the forehead and 5 inches at left side behind the ear. The
wounds penetrated up to the bones of the head.”
Benjamin Valente, the justice of the peace, declared that on May
27, 1948, the accused appeared before him accompanied by the chief of
police and one policeman; that answering his questions, she stated that
she had signed the Exhibit C freely and voluntarily; that he read to
her the entire document and after reading it asked her whether the
contents were true, and she answered “yes”; that she swore to the same
in the presence of the witnesses Juan Victoriano and Carlos Tandoy.
This official further said that before talking with tine accused, as
above related, he took the precaution of excluding the police officers
from the room.
The pertinent part of the confession Exhibit C reads as follows:
“That on Tuesday, May 25, 1948 at about six o’clock in the evening,
my husband Pedro arrived from the tuba-drinking place and he was very
drunk. And when he was already inside our house, because he was drunk,
he immediately boxed in my stomach and I immediately fainted. When I
gained consciousness, I asked him why he boxed me. And he answered me
that if I will still resist he will do it again. So I just kept quiet
and immediately prepared our supper. While we were eating our supper
with our children, he did not eat but instead threw away the rice from
the plate. After we had [eaten, he went down according to him to look
for tobacco-to-chew in the house of my brother. In a short while, he
returned, he again boxed.me because according to him I am always
jealous of him. From that moment, I felt a resentment moreover because
he sold all our lands to other people and gambled and I knew he was
keeping a mistress. That is why while our children[and he (Pedro) were
sleeping, I immediately got the hammer and chisel near his head and
struck his head and face until he was dead. When I knew that he was no
longer breathing, I immediately wrapped him with the mat where he slept
land went to my daughter who is the eldest of all who was still
sleeping. She was reluctant to help me but I threatened her.
* * * * * * *
“Q. Why did you have to kill your husband?
“A. Because of his maltreatment of me, I felt as though the Evil Spirit
has possessed me and I lost control .of myself, and I forgot my
children who are still small.”
Declaring in her defense, Teopista swore that that night she
suddenly awoke when a man was strangulating her; that she grabbed a
piece of wood and gave the assailant two blows on the face; that she
thereby was able to free herself; that she then lighted a lamp and
found to her amazement that she had killed her husband.
This self-defense version was correctly rejected. Firstly, because
the wounds found1 on the dead man could not have been the effect of two
strokes with a blunt instrument. There were eleven incised
wounds. Secondly, because she never mentioned that piece of wood to the
chief of police, and there is enough evidence; that she signed the
confession Exhibit C voluntarily, with full knowledge of its contents.
Thirdly, because she pleaded guilty at the preliminary investigation on
June 2, 1948. Fourthly, if the facts had really happened as she
relates, there is every reason to expect that she had given the same
explanation to her children, who would undoubtedly have absolved her;
and yet we have Exuperia declaring against her mother, and openly
resentful of her.
After reading the record, we have no hesitation to affirm the
verdict of guilt. Our opinion arises not only from the view that her
explanation is non-acceptable, but from the conviction that her
declarations before the police chief and the justice of the peace in
Exhibit C reflected the true facts, and were uttered at a time when the
culprit overwhelmed by remorse had not yet had the opportunity to yield
to ideas evolved by the irresistible instinct of self-preservation.
Appellant must be declared to have feloniously extinguished the
life of her husband. He may have been unworthy. He may have been a
rascal and a bully; but that is no excuse for murdering him. His
badness is not even a mitigating circumstance.
Wherefore, inasmuch as the penalty imposed on appellant is in
accordance with law (Article 246, Revised Penal Code), the appealed
judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Tuason and Reyes, JJ., concur.
MONTEMAYOR, J., concurring:
I agree with the majority as to the guilt of the appellant and the
correctness of the penalty imposed according to the provision of law
pertinent to the case. But I wish only to add that if a person properly
convicted and sentenced according to law was ever’ deserving of
executive clemency, then the herein appellant is that one.
The very majority opinion pictures her as a martyr in her marital
life. Her deceased husband not content with squandering away the family
substance, and not satisfied with keeping a mistress upon whom he must
have spent some of the money that properly belonged to his own family,
including his wife, got into the habit of drinking until he became a
habitual drunkard. In other words, lie developed and indulged in all
the major vices, and to cap it all, when he came home, drunk, he would
even beat up his wife. That the poor wife, the appellant could put up
with all this, still keep house for that kind of a husband, thriftless,
faithless, vicious, and brutal and continue to be a wife to him, speaks
volumes for her. It implies patience, forbearance, devotion and
sacrifice in the extreme. In countries inhere divorce laws are more
liberal, one in her place would, long ago, have divorced her worthless
husband, set up a home of her own to live her remaining years at least
in peace, if not in moderate contentment free from fear and brutality,
and keep her self-respect.
On the very day that she killed her husband, according to her own
confession on which her conviction was baseds he came home,drunk,
forthwith laid hands on her, striking her on the stomach until she
fainted, and when she recovered consciousness and asked for the reason
for the unprovoked attack, he threatened to renew the beating. At the
supper table instead of eating the meal set before him, he threw the
rice from his plate, thus adding insult to injury. Then he left the
house and when he returned he again boxed his wife, the herein
appellant. The violence with which appellant killed her husband reveals
the pent-up righteous anger and rebellion against years of abuse,
insults and tyranny seldom heard of. Considering all these
circumstances and provocations, including the fact as already stated,
that her conviction was based on her own confession, I repeat that the
appellant is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of
a substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation of her life
sentence.