JUAN S. BARROZO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MARCELINO T. MACARAEG ET AL, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The plaintiff Juan S. Barrozo, whose properties were sold on
execution in pre-war days desires to repurchase them even after the lapse of the
one-year period specified by law, insisting that the advent of the last war
suspended or extended that period. Such in a nutshell is the gist of this
litigation which was submitted for decision to the court of first instance of
Pangasinan, upon a stipulation of facts reading partly as follows:

“1. That the plaintiff used to be the owner of the parcels of
land described in * * * the complaint.

“2. That on or about January 23, 1941, a complaint was filed by
Tableria B and S against Juan S. Barrozo (civil case No. 438 of the justice of
the peace court of Mangaldan) to recover the amount of P446.41 plus costs; * *
*

“3. That decision was rendered in Civil Case No. 438 aforesaid
sentencing Juan S. Barrozo to pay P446.41 with 12 per cent interest, costs and
attorney’s fees; * * *.

“4. That execution was issued by the J.P. of Mangaldan and the
provincial sheriff of Pangasinan levied on the properties described in the
complaint * * *.

“5. That pursuant to the levy and notice of sale at public
auction (Exhibit C), the provincial sheriff of Pangasinan sold the properties
levied upon, at public auction on April 28, 1941, to Jose B. Biagtan as the
highest bidder;

“6. That on August 21, 1942, the provincial Sheriff executed a
deed of final sale of the said properties in favor of Jose S. Biagtan, copy of
th said deed is hereto attached as Exhibit E and made a part hereof;

“7. That Jose S. Biagtan sold and transferred, all his rights,
title and interests, over all of the properties described in Exhibit E in favor
of the defendant spouses Marcelino T. Macaraeg and Asuncion V. Sison-Macaraeg on
November 21, 1942;

“8. That the eight parcels of land levied upon and sold at
public auction were mortgaged by the plaintiff Juan S. Barrozo on February 15,
1940 to the Agricultural & Industrial Bank for P1,400 payable under the
terms and conditions stipulated in the deed of mortgage and the promissory note
which are marked respectively as Exhibits “G” and “G-1” and made parts
hereof;

“9. That the defendant spouses paid the mortgage credit and
interests to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank on February 26, 1943 in the
amount of P1,646.51 under Receipt No. 73043 which is attached hereto and marked
as Exhibit H;”

* * * * * * *

“12. That the possession of the properties situated in
Mangatarem, Pangasinan, were delivered to the defendant spouses on November 25,
1942 by the provincial sheriff;”

It will be observed that as the realties of plaintiff had been
sold on April 28, 1941 the redemption term should have expired in regular course
on April 28, 1942. Now then, what effect did the war have upon such term? The
trial judge, Hon. Eugenio Angeles, held that the Japanese occupation did not
suspend the redemptory rights of the plaintiff, who should have tried to
repurchase on time. His Honor also held that after the Japanese occupation, the
courts of Pangasinan began to function regularly in May 1942, and therefore even
if the, intervening period of confusion caused by the invasion should be
deducted (January to May 1942), still plaintiff was late because he moved to
repurchase by filing, this complaint only in February 1943.

Appellant claims, the lower court erred in not relieving him
from his failure to redeem by reason of the difficulties occassioned by the war,
citing authorities upholding the discretionary power of courts of equity to
permit redemption after the Statutory period has expired. However, under the
circumstances disclosed, we fail to see how to impute abuse, of discretion to
the trial judge whose knowledge of local conditions must be reckoned with in the
matter of facilities of the judgment debtor to repurchase, or the lack thereof.
And supposing that fairly normal conditions in the province were restored
only in May 1942, His Honor was entirely right in declaring the plaintiff
had “slept too long.” Remember that from May 1942 to February 1943 the periods
for soliciting relief under Rule 38 on the ground of equitable circumstances
have elapsed.

In this connection the appellant argues that he had exerted
every effort to redeem as early as December 1942, “as is admitted by defendants’
answer.” This argument is adequately met by appellees, who point out that
although appellant talked about repurchase in December 1942, he merely requested
for an extension of time within which to make it without tendering payment of
the redemption price.

It is quite probable that because of the conflagration
plaintiff found it difficult to get the necessary money. But it should be clear
that financial hardship is no excuse for non-redemption, in the same manner as
shortage of funds does not prevent a sale on execution.

Another point raised by appellant is that the price paid at the
auction sale was so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court.
Supposing that this issue is open even after the one-year period has
expired and after the properties have passed into the hands of third persons who
may have paid a price higher than the auction sale money, the first thing to
consider is that the stipulation contains no statement of the reasonable value
of the properties; and although defendant’s answer avers that the assessed value
was P3,960 it also avers that their real market value was P2,000 only. Anyway,
mere inadequacy of price—which was the complaint’s allegation—is not sufficient
ground ito annul the sale. It is only where such inadequacy shocks the
conscience that the courts will intervene (Warner Barnes & Co. vs. Santos 14
Phil., 446; National Bank vs. Gonzales, 45 Phil., 693; Jalandoni vs. Ledesma, 64
Phil., 1058). Another consideration is that the assessed value being P3,960 and
the purchase price being in effect P1,864 (P464 sale price plus P1,400 mortgage
lien which had to be discharged) the conscience is not shocked upon examining
the prices paid in the sales in National Bank vs. Gonzales, 45 Phil., 693^[1] and Guerrero vs. Guerrero, 57 Phil;
445,^[2] sales which were left undisturbed
by this Court.

Furthermore, where there is the right to redeem—as in this
case—inadequacy of price should not be material, because the judgment debtor may
re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any,
loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution
sale.

The third, point raised in this appeal is that “the lower court
erred in not holding that under the debt moratorium proclaimed in Executive
Order No. 32 the payment in forced sales of the redemption money was suspended.”
But the debt moratorium merely prohibited the enforcement by act ion of the
debts’ therein included; and in this case no one is attempting to force anybody
to pay his debt. The judgment debtor whose property has been sold is not in debt
for the redemption money. He could not be required by action to redeem. Hence,
he is not entitled to invoke the suspension. At any rate the moratorium, even if
applicable to the right to repurchase would not logically have the effect of
reviving a period that had expired long before its promulgation.

Wherefore, finding no substantial error in the appealed
decision dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, we hereby affirm it, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Tuason,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

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[1] Property assessed at P45,900 sold for P15,000.

[2] Property assessed at P8,505 sold for
P3,463.