GREEN BASE/ALEX AMOR, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. VIOLETA ORTIZ BANTUG, HON. JULIE C. RENDOQUE AND HON. JOSE G. GUTIERREZ, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONERS, NATIONAL L…
INGLES, G. T., J.:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents’ appeal is DISMISSED as We find no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED reiterating complainants’ constructive dismissal and adjusting the amounts awarded as backwages and attorney’s fees temporarily computed until the promulgation of this Decision on 30 August 2013. Thus, respondents are ordered to pay complainants the total amount of P588,852.00 consisting of separation pay, backwages, 13th month pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.”
Likewise assailed is the Resolution[2] promulgated on October 31, 2013 denying herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the August 30, 2013 Decision.
The respective claims of the parties, as summarized by the NLRC in its assailed decision, are as follows:
“Complainants (private respondents herein)[3] state that they were all hired and employed by respondents on various dates with various rates of pay.
Respondents (petitioners herein) operated a fertilizer production business. The proprietor and manager of the establishment is Alex “Jun” Amor, Jr.
All complainants were working on agricultural waste, manure, molasses, earthworms, and other materials to form into a commercial ‘organic’ fertilizer which was sold by respondents to big farms and to local and international markets. Respondents also sold their products to the Department of Agriculture. Complainants’ works were likened to the Discovery Channel series ‘Dirty Jobs.’
Unfortunately, even with their odd jobs, respondents intermittently paid their very low and inhuman wage to the point that complainants were driven to hunger. One could just imagine a daily wage of P95.00 which, at the end of the pay period, would only be given in half or sometimes none at all.
Complainant Rosalie Cadungog complained about this partial wage payment, but she was just countered to look for another job. In short, complainant Cadungog was terminated verbally.
The rest of the complainants were constructively terminated due to non-payment of wages. Their feet were too weary to go to work again unpaid of previous wages and probably in the incoming days also.
Complainants also claim that they were not paid of their holiday pay, premium pay for rest day, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay. Complainants likewise allege not being given privilege of SSS and Philhealth benefits. Most importantly, complainants manifest that they are entitled to the minimum wage differentials as they were oppressively paid below the minimum.
For their part, respondents state that the company is engaged in the production of cheap fertilizer with the use of cultured earthworms.
Complainants were not dismissed, much less illegally.
Respondent Amor states that in the early morning of 18 September 2012, complainants were given their salaries, but after being paid their salaries, instead of reporting to work, they left and went to a radio program known as ‘Kandos’ and there spread lies that they were dismissed from employment. The allegation of a dismissal cannot be possible when complainants were even paid their salaries on that day.
Respondent Amor never told complainants to stop working. Complainants themselves did not report for work. Much as respondents wanted to send complainants letters for them to report back to work, their hands were already allegedly tied as complainants immediately filed a case on 19 September 2012.
Respondents alleged that, in fact, complainant Lastimoso owed the company the amount of P3,750.00 as cash advance.
As for complainant Jason Bantanganan, in the last week of May 2012, he never reported for work. Thereafter, he re-applied and started work with respondents again on 10 September 2012. However, for reasons known only to him, Bantanganan immediately filed a case eight days after he was re-employed.
Complainant Jomar Bantanganan, for his part, stopped working in March 2011 as he went to Luzon. He came back to work only on 01 July 2012.
Complainant Jerry Olpos, on the other hand, is already back to work with respondent company.
For complainants Cadungog and Redoble, they simply stopped working. For complainant Cadungog since 14 January 2012 and since 10 November 2007 for complainant Redoble.
On complainants’ claims that they were not paid the minimum wage, respondents counter that respondent company is registered under the Barangay Micro Business Enterprise (BMBE). Relative to such registration, respondent company is exempted from compliance with the requirements of the minimum wage law and other concomitant benefits.
Other benefits, however, were all given to complainants such as 13th month pay. Complainants were even being given extra monetary benefits known as production incentive. Complainants were also provided free accommodation with free water and electricity and free medical coverage with the in-house physician. In fact, respondents allege that one of the complainants, Welbert Enquilino, and his whole family, is still living in the quarters provided for them.”
After the filing of the parties respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter found the following issues to be resolved: (1) whether there is constructive dismissal and (2) whether the complainants are entitled to their monetary claims. Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the complainants per Decision[4] dated May 29, 2013, the dispositive portion thereof is hereunder quoted, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby declared that the complainants were constructively dismissed. Respondent Alex J. Amor Jr. is hereby directed to pay the complainants the sum of P328,905.00 per computation shown at the immediately preceding paragraph, plus ten percent (10%) attorney’s fees. Other claims are denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”
Herein petitioners Green Base / Alex Amor, Jr. appealed[5] the above said decision with respect to the award given in favor of herein private respondents, Brian Lastimoso, Jomar Bantangan, Jerry Gomez, Welbert Enquilino, Julito Amper and Jason Bantangan to the National Labor Relations Commission – 7th Division but the same was dismissed per the assailed decision.
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration[6] of the above decision but the same was denied per Resolution[7] promulgated on October 31, 2013.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and raised the following issues, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY:
1. DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED;
2. DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE MONETARY AWARD THEY PRAYED FOR.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In Siemens Philippines, Inc. v. Domingo,[8] the Supreme Court defined constructive dismissal as follows:
“The gauge for constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would feel compelled to give up his employment under the prevailing circumstances. Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely as the offer of employment involves a demotion in rank or diminution in pay.[9] It exists when the resignation on the part of the employee was involuntary due to the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. It is brought about by the clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain shown by an employer which becomes unbearable to the employee. An employee who is forced to surrender his position through the employer’s unfair or unreasonable acts is deemed to have been illegally terminated and such termination is deemed to be involuntary.[10]”
Private respondents bewailed the intermittent release of their meager wages. At the end of the agreed period, their employer either pay them in half or at times, do not pay them at all. This has driven them to hunger, prompting them not to go to work anymore.
In doing so, petitioners clearly acted with insensibility or disdain towards private respondents which compelled them to forgo their continued employment. Indeed, petitioners’ act has compelled herein private respondents to give up their employment. Hence, petitioners are clearly liable for constructive dismissal.
Petitioners’ contention to the effect that private respondents were not able to prove the grounds for constructive dismissal inasmuch as the latter did not give any affidavit or other supporting documents to support their claim, is bereft of merit.
Our perusal of the records of the case reveals that in the position paper[11] of the private respondents which was submitted to the Labor Arbiter, it was categorically stated that:
“4. Unfortunately, even with their odd jobs, respondents (petitioners herein)[12] intermittently paid their very low and inhuman wage to the point that they were driven to hunger. One could just imagine a daily wage of P95, at the end of their agreed pay period, they would just be given half of that or sometimes none at all. How could a very lowly paid employee succumbed to such employment? Respondents were earning lucratively due to the high demand for organic fertilizers and due to the very low pay for labor which can be described as exploitation.”[13]
The rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC. Their decisions may be based on position papers only. This is in accordance with the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.,[14] to wit:
“The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that ‘the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.’
In Rase v. NLRC, this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. And Construction Co. vs. NLRC succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People vs. Sorrel that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.”
Moreover, we also note that herein petitioners were given ample opportunity to prove before the Labor Arbiter that they paid their employees properly and on time. Unfortunately, the payroll they presented did not show that the weekly pay of the employees were indeed paid on time because the same did not contain the signatures of the employees signifying that they received their weekly pay. As stated by the Labor Arbiter in its decision, “it is but logical that the respondent (herein petitioner)[15] would require them to sign once they receive their pay.”[16]
With regard the contention of petitioners that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the monetary claims and benefits of the private respondents, we likewise find the same bereft of merit.
Petitioners argued that the necessary benefits required by law were given to private respondents as shown by the documents attached to their memorandum on appeal. Our perusal of the said documents reveal that the same are handwritten entries that did not also contain the signatures of the employees. Worst, the same was not signed by petitioner Amor nor by any of his authorized representative. In a similar case entitled ABDULJUAHID R. PIGCAULAN vs. SECURITY and CREDIT INVESTIGATION, INC. and/or RENE AMBY REYES,[17] the Supreme Court has ruled that:
“The handwritten itemized computations are self-serving, unreliable and unsubstantial evidence to sustain the grant of salary differentials, particularly overtime pay. Unsigned and unauthenticated as they are, there is no way of verifying the truth of the handwritten entries stated therein. Written only in pieces of paper and solely prepared by Canoy and Pigcaulan, these representative daily time records, as termed by the Labor Arbiter, can hardly be considered as competent evidence to be used as basis to prove that the two were underpaid of their salaries. We find nothing in the records which could substantially support Pigcaulan’s contention that he had rendered service beyond eight hours to entitle him to overtime pay and during Sundays to entitle him to restday pay. Hence, in the absence of any concrete proof that additional service beyond the normal working hours and days had indeed been rendered, we cannot affirm the grant of overtime pay to Pigcaulan.”
Likewise, we are not unmindful of the ruling of the Supreme Court in KAR ASIA, Inc. v. Corona,[18] where the Supreme Court admitted in evidence unsigned payrolls pursuant to Rule 130, Section 43[19] of the Rules of Court.
Section 43, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states:
“SEC. 43. Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.”
The requisites for admission in evidence of entries in the course of business are: (1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.[20] These requisites were not established in the instant case.
Hence, the imputation of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent NLRC is unfounded.
Resort to judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined only to issues of want or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal passing upon them.[21] Petitioners failed to show that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the assailed decision and resolution. In the absence of any indication that public respondent NLRC has exercised its power in a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical manner, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission, 7th Division, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Lagura-Yap, M.B., and Lopez, J.Y., JJ. , concur.
[1] Rollo at pp. 133-141.
[2] Rollo at pp. 159-160.
[3] Words in parenthesis supplied.
[4] Rollo at pp. 67-77.
[5] Rollo at pp. 79-88.
[6] Rollo at pp. 142-153.
[7] Rollo at pp. 159-160.
[8] G. R. No. 150488, July 28, 2008.
[9] New Ever Marketing, Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 140555, July 14, 2005, 463 SCRA 284, 297.
[10] Aguilar vs Burger Machine Holdings Corp., G. R. No. 172062, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 266, 273.
[11] Records at pp. 30-33.
[12] Words in parenthesis supplied.
[13] Words in parenthesis supplied.
[14] G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003. Citations omitted.
[15] Words in parenthesis supplied.
[16] Words in parenthesis supplied.
[17] G.R. No. 173648 , January 16, 2012.
[18] 480 Phil. 627, 636 (2004).
[19]
[20] Canque v. Court of Appeals ; 365 Phil. 124, 131 (1999).
[21] Quebec, Sr. v. NLRC, 301 SCRA 627.
[22] C. Planas Commercial v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 49.