PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDUARDO VERZOSA Y GASELO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Verzosa

The Case

This is People versus Verzosa, a criminal case of two counts of rape, in which a fourteen-year-old girl accused her own father of sexually assaulting her on two occasions — first in May 1996, and again in June 1999. The accused, Eduardo Verzosa, denied the charges, and the case rose to the Supreme Court on automatic appeal from a judgment of death. It matters for the bar because it gathers in one decision the core rules on rape: what the prosecution must prove, how force and intimidation are measured between a father and his daughter, why the lone testimony of the victim can convict, and how the supervening abolition of the death penalty by Republic Act Number 9346 operates on a final judgment of conviction.

Procedural History

Two separate informations for rape were filed against Verzosa on September 3, 1999 before the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro. He pleaded not guilty to both, pre-trial was unproductive, and the two cases were tried jointly. The trial court convicted him on both counts, sentenced him to death for each, and ordered him to indemnify the victim in the amount of 50,000 pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Because the penalty imposed was death, the records were elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic appeal. By the time the appeal was decided, Republic Act Number 9346 had taken effect and forbade the imposition of the death penalty; the Court noted that the judgment had been overtaken by that law, but that the automatic appeal already entered stayed.

Facts

Eduardo Verzosa and Anecitas Madrona lived as spouses without the benefit of marriage in Sitio Aklejo, Barangay Villapag-asa, Bansud, Oriental Mindoro, and raised four children: Mary Jane, Richard, the complainant Mary Grace, and Rosemarie. Mary Grace was born on February 4, 1984. In 1994 her mother died, and only Verzosa, Richard, and Mary Grace continued to live in the family house.

According to Mary Grace, at about seven o'clock in the evening of May 15, 1996, while they were alone in their residence, her father crept upon her, removed her shirt and shorts, and by force inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her pain and bleeding. The same thing happened in the same place at about the same time on June 12, 1999, when Verzosa threatened to kill her and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her, again making her bleed and causing her pain. The following day she reported the rapes to her maternal aunt Nenita Calingasan and to Candida Madrona, who advised her to go to the authorities. With the help of the Department of Social Welfare and Development she was investigated by the local police and examined by the municipal health officer, Doctor Preciosa Soller, whose medico-legal report noted complete old healed lacerations of the hymen and stated that physical virginity was lost.

For his part, Verzosa denied ever raping his daughter. He claimed that in 1996 he was living with Mary Grace in Fort Bonifacio because of his work delivering rice, and that on June 12, 1999 Mary Grace left the house at six in the evening to watch a movie and did not return; three days later policemen and barangay officials came and brought him to the police station. Asked whether he knew of any reason why his daughter would testify against him, he said he did not know of any, but then suggested it might be because he had spanked her on June 13, 1999 for selling rice he was supposed to deliver.

Issues

• Whether or not the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the lone testimony of the complainant, without corroboration, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape.
• Whether or not the supervening enactment of Republic Act Number 9346, which forbids the imposition of the death penalty, affects the penalty to be imposed on the accused.

Applicable Provisions

The informations charged the crime as contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 7659 and Republic Act Number 8353. The trial court relied on Section 11 of Republic Act Number 7659 in imposing the death penalty, which provides:

Article 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death. When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

This is the provision that defines the crime and supplies the qualifying circumstance of the victim's minority and the offender's relationship as her parent, which the trial court invoked to impose death.

Republic Act Number 9346, which took effect after the judgment, provides:

Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 7659, entitled "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. 8177, entitled "An Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection as the Manner by which Capital Punishment Shall Be Carried Out, Amending for that Purpose Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, and for Other Purposes," is likewise repealed.

This is the supervening law that saved the accused from the death penalty and reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua for each count.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the prosecution succeeded in proving both elements of rape beyond reasonable doubt: that there was carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused, and that the accused achieved the act through force or intimidation. Mary Grace testified clearly and convincingly that in both instances they were alone in the house when her father, by force and threats, inserted his penis into her vagina, making it bleed and causing her pain. Her claim was corroborated by the medical examination showing healed lacerations of the hymen and the loss of physical virginity. The Court explained that the force or threat necessary in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the persons involved but also on their relationship to each other; here the tender years, sex, and physical attributes of Mary Grace made it a mismatch, and on top of that was the moral and economic ascendancy of her father.

On the second issue, the Court held that corroboration is not indispensable to a conviction for rape. The lone testimony of the complainant is enough to sustain conviction, provided it meets the test of credibility — that it comes from a credible witness and is itself credible and reasonable, candid, straightforward, and in accord with human experience. The Court gave great respect to the trial court's evaluation of credibility, and found it inconceivable that a daughter would concoct a story of repeated rape by her father when family honor was at stake and the story would send her father to jail. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserved full credit, and her willingness to face police investigation and the humiliation of a public trial was eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. Against this, the accused offered only denial, which the Court described as essentially the weakest form of defense and which could never overcome affirmative testimony from a credible witness; his own account of the dates tripped over itself.

On the third issue, the Court held that although the appeal was without merit, the accused was saved from the death penalty by the supervening Republic Act Number 9346, which prohibits the imposition of death. In lieu of death, he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count.

Doctrine

A bar candidate should retain these rules. First, to sustain a conviction for rape, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused, and that the accused achieved the act through force or intimidation upon the victim. Second, the force or threat necessary in rape is a relative term that depends not only on the age, size, and strength of the persons involved but also on their relationship to each other; the moral and economic ascendancy of a father over his young daughter supplies the intimidation. Third, corroboration is not indispensable in rape; the lone testimony of the complainant, if credible and reasonable in itself, candid, straightforward, and in accord with human experience, is enough to convict. Fourth, denial is the weakest form of defense and cannot overcome affirmative testimony from a credible witness. Fifth, where the qualifying circumstance of the victim's minority and the offender's relationship as a parent is alleged and proven under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty would have been imposed, but Republic Act Number 9346 prohibits the imposition of death and reduces the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

Disposition

The appeal was denied and dismissed; the joint decision of the trial court was affirmed, but by reason of Republic Act Number 9346, the accused was sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each of the two counts in lieu of the death penalty.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the lone testimony of a credible complainant is sufficient to convict for rape, and that the supervening prohibition on the death penalty reduces a death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Examiners like to use this case on the sufficiency of the victim's uncorroborated testimony, on force and intimidation measured by the father's moral ascendancy, and on the retroactive effect of Republic Act Number 9346 on judgments of conviction.