MATEO CASELA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND EXEQUIEL MAGSAYSAY, RESPONDENTS.

This is an appeal by way of certiorari from the decision of
the Court of Appeals of August 31,
1966 in CA -G. R. 35593-R, de­nying a petition for a writ of certiorari
brought against an order of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch III of the
Third Regional District at lba, Zambales.  This latter order, promulgated on October 1,
1964 in CAR 5666-R-Z-55, set aside an earlier order of the same court denying a
motion for a writ of execution of the final judgment
in the said CAR case.

The following findings of
the Court of Appeals are not dis­puted.

“In CAR Case No. 5666-R-Z of the Court of Agrarian Relations
of Iba, Zambales, Mateo Casela, the petitioner herein, was the defendant, and Exequiel Magsaysay, now one of
the respon­dents, the plaintiff.  On
October 26, 1956, after due trial, the said Court decided the case against the
defendant, who was ordered ejected; and de­cision thereon having become final
and executory the Court on August 12, 1957, issued a
writ of exe­cution commanding the defendant to vacate the pre­mises and remove
his house therefrom. 
The defen­dant, however, refused to comply with the said writ; so, the
Court issued another writ on May 6, 1958, and still
another on April 14, 1959.

“Instead of obeying the writ, however, the defendant
instituted Civil Case No. 2142 before the Court of First Instance of Zambales asking that the plaintiff be condemned to pay him
the value of his house in the amount of P5,000.00,
improve­ments of P2,000.00, in addition to damages in the sum of
P1,600.00.  At the same time, the
defendant filed a motion for suspension of the implementa­tion of the writ of
execution pending the final out­come of the said civil case.  Against this motion for suspension, the
plaintiff filed a countermotion to declare the defendant and the provincial
Sheriff in contempt of Court.  After hearing
the respective motions of the parties, the Court granted the defendant’s motion
for suspension until after the said Civil Case No. 2142 would have been
disposed of on the merits.

“Civil Case No. 2142 eventually reached the Court of Appeals,
which, on October 6, 1965, rendered a decision dismissing the defendant’s
appeal.  In said decision, the appellate
Court ruled once and for all that the claims of the defendant for in­demnity
for the value of his house and improvements were in the nature of compulsory
counterclaims that should have been pleaded before the agrarian court and not
in the Court of First Instance where they were brought.  Consequently, the plaintiff could not be
compelled to pay said claims and the demolition of the defendant’s house could
be done without pay­ment of indemnity. 
By reason of this categorical pronouncement of the Court of Appeals,
respondent Magsaysay filed a motion dated December 6,
1963 and another dated February 11, 1964 praying for the issuance of an alias
writ of execution attaching there­to a copy of the appealed decision.  The agrarian court, however, in an order
dated March 5, 1964, denied the motion, holding that its decision dated October
26, 1956 could no longer be executed on mere motion for the reason that a period
of five (5) years had already elapsed from the said date.

“On April 10, 1964,
the plaintiff moved for a reconsideration of the order
of denial of March 5, 1964;
this was granted by the Court in its order of October 1, 1964, which forthwith directed the execution
of its judgment of October 26, 1956.”

That the decision of October 26, 1956 of the Court of Agra­rian
Relations became final and executory on December 17,
1956, is not controverted.  Counting five years from December 17, 1956,
the plaintiff Exequiel Magsaysay
had until December 17, 1961 within which to move for execution of the said
decision.  It would thus appear that
Magsaysay’s motion for execution
of December 11, 1963, having been filed beyond the five-year reglementary period, was time-barred.

The peculiar circumstances of this case, however, would, to our
mind, indicate that the said motion for execution was filed on time.  The record indubitably shows that Magsaysay had per­sistently and consistently moved the
court to execute the decision of October 26, 1956 which became final and executory on Decem­ber 17, 1956.  In point of fact he succeeded in securing a
writ of execution for no less than three times, which writs were however not executed because of the stubborn refusal
of the petitioner Casela to vacate the premises and
because of the lower court’s order sustaining Casela’s
motion for suspension of execution.  Magsay­say obtained a writ of execution as early as August
12, 1957.  This was not served on account
of Casela’s refusal to comply with the writ.  On Magsaysay’s
motion, the court issued an alias writ on April 14, 1959, which writ
explicitly directed the sheriff to eject Casela and
to demolish the latter’s house.  This
second writ was however not implemented because the court, upon Casela’s own motion, ordered the suspension of the writ two
times.  The first suspension was effected by order of September 22, 1959 and lasted until
April 22, 1960.  This suspension was occasioned by the pen­dency
of civil case 2142 between Casela and Magsaysay before the Zambales
Court of First Instance.  The second
suspension, which was effected by the lower court’s order of July 11,
1960, lasted until October
6, 1963.  These two suspensions which all told co­vered
a period of three years, nine months and twenty-five days were granted on
motions of Casela, to await the final disposition of
civil case 2142.

It thus appears that Magsaysay had not
incurred in the least delay in the enforcement of the judgment which had become
final and executory. 
He exhausted all legal means within his po­wer to eject Casela from his land. 
But the writs of execution is­sued by the lower court were not complied with and/or were sus­pended
by reason of acts or causes not of Magsaysay’s own
making and against his objections.

From December 17, 1956
when the decision in question
became final and executory, to December 11, 1963, the date when Magsaysay’s motion for execution was filed, a period of six years,
eleven months and twenty-four days elapsed. 
From this period must be subtracted the time during which the writs of
exe­cution could not be served, or a period of three years, nine months and
twenty-five days.  Consequently, only
three years, one month and twenty-nine days can be charged against the
five-year reglementary period.  Undoubtedly, therefore, Magsaysay’s motion for
execution of December 11, 1963
was filed well within the five-year reglementary
period.

Conscience and equity should always be considered in the
construction of statutes.  The courts are
not to be hedged in by the literal meaning of the language of the statute; the
spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter.  This rule of construction is especially
applicable where adherence to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and
injustice.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of appeals of August
31, 1966, which
upheld the order of the Court of Agrarian Relations of October
1, 1964, is
affirmed, at petitioner’s cost.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., on official
leave.