MARIO C. RONQUILLO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROSENDO DEL ROSARIO, AMPARO DEL ROSARIO AND FLORENCIA DEL ROSAR…

Ronquillo versus Del Rosario

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Mario Ronquillo against the Court of Appeals, the Director of Lands, the Development Bank of the Philippines, and the del Rosario family. The del Rosarios sued Ronquillo in the Court of First Instance of Manila, asking to be declared the rightful owners of the dried-up bed of Estero Calubcub in Sampaloc, Manila, which adjoins their titled lot. Ronquillo, who had built his house on that dried-up bed, resisted on the ground that the land is public domain. The case matters because it draws the line between the riparian owner's right to an abandoned river bed under the old Civil Code and the State's ownership of land of the public domain — and it turns on one factual question: was the abandonment caused by nature, or by man?

Procedural History

The del Rosarios filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila. Ronquillo moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the dried-up bed is public land subject to the Director of Lands; the court deferred the motion until after trial. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Ronquillo to deliver to the plaintiffs the portion of their titled lot he occupied, to pay five pesos a month for its use and occupation, and declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub abutting their property.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full, holding that the estero had dried up in 1930 through a natural change in the course of the waters, so that under Article 370 of the old Civil Code the abandoned bed belonged to the del Rosarios as riparian owners and was private land. On Ronquillo's motion, the Court of Appeals amended its decision, setting aside the order to surrender the portion covered by the Torrens title because Ronquillo had already vacated it, but affirming the declaration that the del Rosarios own the dried-up bed.

Ronquillo then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Court required the Solicitor General to comment on behalf of the Director of Lands, who had not been impleaded, and later considered him impleaded. The Development Bank of the Philippines was also impleaded as a respondent after it acquired the adjacent property.

Facts

Rosendo del Rosario owned Lot 34, Block 9, Sulucan Subdivision, Sampaloc, Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34797. Adjoining that lot was a dried-up portion of the old Estero Calubcub. The del Rosarios claimed that long before 1930 Rosendo had possessed the lot together with the adjoining dried-up portion, and that in 1935 Isabel Roldan occupied the titled lot with his tolerance. In the early part of 1945, Ronquillo occupied the eastern portion of the titled lot and the dried-up portion of the estero abutting it. After a relocation survey in 1960, the del Rosarios learned of the occupation and demanded that he vacate; he refused.

Ronquillo, for his part, claimed that in 1945 he built his house on the dried-up portion with a small part on the titled lot; that the house burned in 1961; and that when he rebuilt it, it stood only on the dried-up portion, which he insisted is land of the public domain. Before trial, the parties stipulated that the del Rosarios are the registered owners of Lot 34; that the lot abuts the dried-up river bed; that Ronquillo claims only the dried-up portion; and that both sides had filed miscellaneous sales applications with the Bureau of Lands over the abandoned river bed, which were still pending.

The pivotal fact emerged from the testimony of Florencia del Rosario herself. Asked how or why the estero dried up, she answered that it had been the dumping place of the whole neighborhood, where the community dumped all its garbage. The relocation plan showed a change in the estero's course but said nothing about what caused it. The Bureau of Lands later reported that the sales applications had been rejected because the City Engineer's Office needed the land for drainage purposes.

Issues

• Whether or not the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters, so as to bring it within Article 370 of the old Civil Code.
• Whether or not the del Rosarios, as riparian owners, are entitled to the dried-up river bed as their private property.
• Whether or not the dried-up portion forms part of the land of the public domain, incapable of private acquisition.

Applicable Provisions

Article 370 of the old Civil Code provides:

Article 370. The beds of rivers, which are abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters, belong to the owners of the riparian lands throughout the respective length of each. If the abandoned bed divided tenements belonging to different owners, the new dividing line shall be equidistant from one and the other.

This is the sole provision on which the del Rosarios' claim as riparian owners rests, and its express condition — a natural change in the course of the waters — is what the Court found missing.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the change in the course of Estero Calubcub was caused not by natural forces but by the dumping of garbage by the people of the surrounding neighborhood. The Court acknowledged the general rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive, but applied the recognized exceptions — among them that the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts — because the conclusion of a natural change rested on no evidence at all. Florencia del Rosario's own testimony admitted the garbage dumping, and the relocation plan was silent on causation. The inescapable conclusion was that the drying up was occasioned through the active intervention of man.

On the second issue, the Court held that Article 370 does not apply, because the law is clear and unambiguous and leaves no room for interpretation. It applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The Court added that the rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions, nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals, esteros, or artificial drainage systems. Hence the del Rosarios cannot be entitled to the dried-up bed as riparian owners.

On the third issue, the Court held that the dried-up portion should be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain, which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. It noted that the land is needed for drainage purposes and so cannot be the subject of a miscellaneous sales application. Finally, the Court held that by filing their sales applications with the Bureau of Lands, both Ronquillo and the del Rosarios made outright admissions that the land is public land, and are now estopped from claiming otherwise.

Doctrine

First, the riparian owner's right under Article 370 of the old Civil Code arises only when the river bed is abandoned because of a natural change in the course of the waters. Where the drying up is caused by human activity, such as the dumping of garbage, the provision does not apply.

Second, the rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions, nor to accretions to lands adjoining canals, esteros, or artificial drainage systems.

Third, a dried-up river bed abandoned through human intervention remains land of the public domain and cannot be acquired by private ownership.

Fourth, parties who file public land sales applications over a parcel acknowledge that it is public land and are estopped from later claiming it as their own.

Disposition

The Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the del Rosarios' claim to the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub as riparian owners was denied.

Remember This

Memorize the line: Article 370 applies only to a natural change in the course of the waters, so a river bed dried up by man's garbage remains public domain. Examiners use this case to test the natural-versus-artificial distinction in accretion and the estopped sales applicant.