MARIA ANGELES DE MACALINAO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. URSULA VALDEZ VDA. DE ANGELES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

In land registration case No. 469 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Ursula Valdez Vda. de Angeles et al., are the applicants, and
Maria Angeles de Macalinao the oppositor, the subject matter being two
parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pasig. During a
pre-trial counsel for Maria Angeles de Macalinao manifested that she
would file intestate proceedings before the same court with a view to
determining the ownership of the two parcels of land in question, and
this led the court to issue the following order:

“The parties in this case are sisters and near
relatives. The Court, in its efforts to have the parties come into an
amicable settlement of the case in accordance with the provisions of
the new Civil Code, called the parties to a pre-trial, but in spite of
the diligent efforts exerted by the Court and the attorneys for both
parties the litigants failed to reach an amicable settlement of the
case. The attorney for the oppositor manifested to the Court that an
intestate proceeding would be presented to this Court in connection
with the same property involved in this registration proceeding.

“In
view of that manifestation of counsel for the oppositor, the hearing of
this case is hereby suspended until the real owner of the properties
involved in this case is decided in the intestate estate proceedings to
be filed in this court.”

On February 4, 1952, Maria Angeles de Macalinao and her husband
Sergio Macalinao, instead of filing intestate proceedings, instituted
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Ursula Valdez Vda. de
Angeles et al., an action for accounting, liquidation and partition of
a conjugal estate” involving the aforementioned two lots. The basic
facts of this action are as follows:

“* * * plaintiff-appellant, Maria Angeles de
Macalinao, is the only child of the deceased Jose Angeles by his first
marriage to Engracia Antonio; that during the existence of the first
marriage of Jose Angeles to Engracia Antonio they acquired the property
described in paragraph 4 of the complaint; that sometime in 1902
Engracia Antonio, mother of plaintiff-appellant, Maria Angeles de
Macalinao, died intestate, and Jose Angeles, the surviving spouse,
instead of effecting the liquidation and partition of the dissolved
conjugal property as described in paragraph 2 of the complaint kept the
said property pro-indiviso, thereby giving rise to a community of
ownership between himself and plaintiff-appellant, Maria Angeles de
Macalinao; that thereafter, Jose Angeles contracted a second marriage
to Gregoria Antonio, sister of Engracia, and out of such union they
acquired another property, that which is described in paragraph 8 of
the complaint, and of which defendants-appellees in representation of
Ernesto Angeles, Sr. now deceased, are the heirs, Ernesto Angeles, Sr.,
being the only child of Jose Angeles by his second marriage to Gregoria
Antonio; that Jose Angeles and Gregoria Antonio died intestate in the
years 1913 and 1943, respectively, leaving the two properties undivided
between the heirs, who in this case are the plaintiffs-appellants and
defendants-appellees.”

The defendants Ursula Valdez Vda. de Angeles et al., filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint for accounting, partition and liquidation, on
the ground that the directive in the land registration case was for the
filing by Maria Angeles de Macalinao of an intestate proceeding. This
motion to dismiss was granted by the lower court, which also denied a
subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs Maria
Angeles de Macalinao and Sergio Macalinao. The latter have appealed.

Section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act 3176,
provides that: “When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered and liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid, in
the testamentary or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, in
accordance with the provisions of this Code relative to the
administration and liquidation of the estates of the deceased persons, or in an ordinary liquidation and partition proceeding,
unless the parties being all of age and legally capacitated, avail
themselves of the right granted to them by this Code of proceeding to
an extra judicial partition and liquidation of said property.” (Italics
supplied). Expressly recognized by this legal provision, the ordinary
action instituted herein by the appellants is even preferred to an
intestate proceeding, when the heirs are of age or duly represented,
and the estate has no debts. “When the heirs are all of lawful age and
there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened
with the cost and expenses of an administration.” (Ilustre vs. Alaras
Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs.
Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 867). As repeatedly held, “when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court … It has been uniformly
held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment
of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings” (Utulo
vs. Pasion, 66 Phil., 302, 306 citing other cases).

The fact that the lower court suspended the land registration case
upon appellant’s manifestation that an intestate proceeding would be
filed, did not legally deprive them of availing themselves of the
proper judicial (and for that matter less burdensome) remedy,
especially in the absence of any law requiring that the estates of
deceased persons must always be brought to the courts for
administration and liquidation. At any rate, the essential basis of the
order suspending the registration case was the necessity for
determining the ownership of the controverted land. The theory of the
lower court in dismissing the present case, would prefer form to
substance.

Appellees’ contention that the action at bar is not any better than
the land registration case wherein the question of title could as well
be decided, finds an easy answer in the fact that the appellants seek,
in addition to their ownership, an accounting and liquidation of the
conjugal estate of their predecessors in interest.

Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and set aside, and the
case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. So ordered,
with costs against defendants-appellees.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.