IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REPATRIATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, TRINIDAD GUILLERMO, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR.

Appeal by the Government from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of the City of Baguio the dispositive part of which reads:

“* * * Finding the Petition meritorious, Petitioner
is hereby allowed to regain her Filipino citizenship as a result of the
death of her Chinese husband, and she may take her oath of allegiance
upon the finality of this decision. Once again a Filipino citizen, this
will operate to confer Filipino citizenship on her minor children.”

On December 14,1959, Trinidad Guillermo filed with said court a
petition alleging that she was born in Laoag, Ilocos Norte, on May
18,1931; that she was formerly a Philippine citizen; that she had lost
her af ormentioned citizenship by marriage to Ngo Kim Po, a Chinese
citizen, who died in the City of Baguio on November 24, 1959; that she
had begotten him five children, namely, Charles Ngo, Quezon Ngo,
William Go, Benito G. Go Jr. and Susan Go, all born in said city on
February 11, 1950, August 19, 1952, June 11, 1954, August 7, 1957 and
September 17, 1959, respectively; and that she desires to reacquire her
Philippine citizenship, and to renounce all allegiance and fidelity to
any foreign state or sovereignty, “particularly to Nationalist China of
which” she is “a subject or citizen.” She prayed, therefore, that,
after due hearing, said petition be granted.

Attached to the petition was the affidavit of Vicente Gaerlan and
Alfredo Lapitan, dated December 14, 1959, to the effect that they are
of age, citizens of the Philippines and residents of the City of Baguio
and that they had known the petitioner for the last 12 years, and
confirming the allegations of the petition, with respect to her
marriage, the death of her husband and the existence of their
aforementioned children.

At the hearing of said petition, on January 30, 1960, petitioner
testified, in answer to the questions propounded by her counsel, that
her husband Ngo Kim Po died on November 24, 1959, as attested to by his
death certificate, Exhibit A; that they had been married before a
Judge, their marriage contract being Exhibit B; that her father was
Segundo Guillermo, a Filipino citizen, who died on January 3, 1959;
that her mother is Bernardina Salvador, another citizen of the
Philippines, now in Laoag,. Ilocos Norte; and that she was, prior to
her marriage, a Philippine citizen. On cross-examination, she added
that she is now living with her children. This testimony and said
Exhibits A and B are the only evidence in this case.

Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the lower court rendered the
decision adverted to above. Copy of said decision was served upon the
City Attorney of Baguio, who seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration, relying upon the case of Villahermosa vs.
Commissioner of Immigration (80 Phil., 541). Upon denial of this
motion, said officer interposed the present appeal. He now maintains
that the lower court erred:

1) in finding that “from the union of petitioner with her Chinese
husband, five children were born, Charles Ngo, Quezon Ngo, William Go,
Benito G. Go, Jr. and Susan Go—all of whom are minors;” and

2) in declaring that petitioner’s repatriation operated to confer Philippine citizenship upon her minor children.

With respect to the above-quoted finding of fact, the record
discloses that there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, in her direct testimony, petitioner did not even make any
reference to her children. On cross-examination, the only question
propounded to her was: “Are you living with your children,” to which
she answered in the affirmative. As a consequence, there is not an iota
of proof as to the names, dates and places of birth of her children,
and , hence, of their respective age or status. Said finding is,
therefore, clearly erroneous.

As regards the effect of petitioner’s repatriation upon the
political status of her children, appellant maintains that the
conclusion of law reached by the lower court contravenes the rule laid
down in VillaHermosa vs. Commissioner of Immigration (80 Phil., 541,
543, 544), in which it was held:

“* * * Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that
upon repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine
citizenship. It would he illogical to consider Delfin as repatriated
like his mother because he never was a Filipino citizen and could not
have reacquired such citizenship.’

“While his Chinese father
lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was not a Filipina; she
was Chinese. After the deathof such father, Villahermosa continued to
be a Chinese, until she re-aquired her Filipino citizenship in April,
1947. After that re-acquisition Delfin could claim that his mother was
a Filipina within the meaning of paragraph 4, section 1 of Article IV
of the Constitution; but according to that same Organic Act, he had to
elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority. Until he
becomes of age and makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that
he was at the time of his father’s demise.”

Appellant, likewise, invokes an opinion of Secretary of Justice
(Opinion No. 166, S. of 1956) to the same effect. We do not deem it
necessary, however, to pass upon the merits of the disputed conclusion
of law of His Honor, the trial Judge, for we note that, in her
petition, Trinidad Guillermo merely expressed a “desire to reacquire”
her “Philippine citizenship.” She did not ask that a pronouncement be
made on the citizenship of her children upon her repatriation. In fact,
her petition does not contain the usual prayer “for such other relief
as the court may deem meet and proper.” In making the aforementioned
pronouncement, the lower court went, therefore, beyond the issues
raised by the pleadings and exceeded its jurisdiction. Moreover, since
there is no evidence on the age or minority of petitioner’s children,
said pronouncement is devoid of factual basis, and, hence, doubly
erroneous.

Wherefore, the above quoted finding of fact made in the body of the
decision appealed from and the aforementioned conclusion of law or
ruling appearing in the dispositive part of said decision are hereby
set aside, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,, JJ., concur.