CARLITO GALVEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION – SIXTH DIVISION, PHILIPPINE PLAZA HOLDINGS, INC. AND ALEX GORAN, RESPONDENTS.
GONZALES-SISON, M., J.:
Briefly, the facts of the case, are as follows:
Private respondent Sofitel Philippine Plaza Holdings is the owner/operator of Sofitel Hotel (private respondent Hotel), a five-star resort hotel located at CCP Complex, Roxas Blvd., Pasay Manila and is represented by private respondent Alex Goran as its general manager.
Petitioner Carlito Galvez (petitioner), meanwhile, is a licensed personal trainer and was hired as such by private respondent Hotel to serve in the hotel’s gym or health and fitness center with a monthly salary of P30,000.00 inclusive of tips. Thereafter, petitioner became a member of the worker’s union named NUWHRAIN.
Sometime in April 2012, private respondent Hotel accepted several students from different schools for an on-the-job training (OJT), six (6) of which are female students who were assigned to the hotel’s fitness center under petitioner’s area of responsibility.
Later on, the six (6) female students complained to the hotel management that petitioner exhibited lewd, immoral and indecent conduct against them on several occasions. In response, private respondent Hotel, on 29 May 2012, issued a notice to petitioner to explain why no disciplinary action must be taken against him for conduct unbecoming and at the same time placing petitioner under preventive prevention for fifteen (15) days while an investigations is undergoing.[2]
In his written explanation,[3] petitioner vehemently denied the charges against him and reasoned out that the same must have been prompted by his strictness towards the six (6) female students who displayed boorish behavior at work.
On 8 June 2012, an administrative hearing was then conducted which was attended by petitioner, the six complaining students, as well as representatives from the management of the hotel and the union. On said hearing, the complaining students reiterated their claim that petitioner sexually harassed them.
Subsequently, on 11 June 2012, private respondent Hotel issued a termination notice against petitioner.[4]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, incentive leave pay, vacations and sick leave pay, ECOLA, 13th month pay, holiday pay, backwages and payment of attorney’s fees.[5]
After the submission of the respective position papers from the parties, the Labor Arbiter,[6] to whom the case was assigned ruled in favor of the private respondents. The Labor Arbiter ratiocinated that there was just ground leading to the termination of petitioner from service as the positive and categorical assertions of the female students that petitioner engaged in indecent, lewd or immoral conduct deserve more credence than the general denial interposed by petitioner. As to the procedural compliance, the Labor Arbiter likewise ruled in the affirmative finding that private respondent Hotel furnished petitioner two notices; the first one, apprising him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel if he desires, and the second one, informing petitioner of his dismissal. With respect to the allegation of petitioner that his case should have been first referred to grievance machinery, the Labor Arbiter found that the same was not substantial to declare petitioner’s dismissal as illegal considering that there were five (5) union members present during the administrative hearing. Finally, as to the monetary claims of petitioner, the Labor Arbiter struck them down after finding that private respondent Hotel either paid them or that petitioner was not entitled to them. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 22 October 2012 reads:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the complaint for Illegal Dismissal is DISMISSED for Utter Lack of Legal and Factual Basis.
The rest of the Complainant’s monetary demands are also DENIED for Lack of Basis.
SO ORDERED.”[7]
On appeal, petitioner maintained that he was illegally dismissed as the first notice sent to him by the private respondent Hotel did not categorically state that he could be dismissed if the charges against him were proven true citing the case of Maquiling v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc.[8] Also, petitioner insisted that the controversy should have been first referred to the grievance machinery as provided for by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). As to the monetary claims, the petitioner asserted that he was entitled to them as he actually rendered, among others, overtime work and holiday work. Further, petitioner claimed that private respondent Hotel was engaged in the unlawful practice of offsetting overtime work against undertime work.
Nonetheless, public respondent National Labor Relations Commission 6th Division (public respondent) denied the appeal of petitioner. The public respondent explained that there was no need for the first notice to explicitly mention that petitioner could be dismissed as it was enough that petitioner was properly apprised of the charges so he could properly prepare his defenses citing this time the case of Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club, Inc.[9] As to the non-referral to the grievance machinery, the public respondent reasoned that it would be just a repetitive exercise if allowed considering the same proceeding conducted during the administrative hearing would be followed. As to overtime pay, the public respondent explained that petitioner was not able to prove that he was required to work or was suffered to work beyond the his regular hours to be entitled to such benefit. There was also no basis for the allegation that private respondent Hotel allowed the offsetting of overtime against undertime. Regarding ECOLA, the public respondent found that petitioner was not entitled to it as the same is only granted to minimum wage earners. As to holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, vacation and sick leave pay and 13th month pay, the public respondent was satisfied that private respondent Hotel was able to prove that the said benefits were appropriately accorded to petitioner. The fallo of the Decision of the public respondent reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED and the October 22, 2012 Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”[10]
When petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, the same was also flatly denied by the public respondent in
a Resolution dated 30 August 2013, the decretal portion of which states:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.
No further motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.”[11]
Unperturbed, petitioner now comes to this Court for relief and in support thereof filed this instant Petition for Certiorari with the following issues at hand, thus:
I. RESPONDENT NLRC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER GALVEZ’ APPEAL/PRAYER CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PETITIONER GALVEZ WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED WHEN RESPONDENT CORPORATION FAILED TO SUFFICIENTLY COMPLY WITH THE TWO-NOTICE-RULE BY ATTACHING THE 29 MAY 2012 MEMO (ANNEX “1”) IN THEIR POSITION PAPER, THE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES EFFECTIVELY ADMITTED THAT THE CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE IS THAT STATED IN Maquiling v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc., RATHER THAN THE ERRONEOUSLY CITED Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club, Inc., WHICH TOOK EFFECT ONLY ON 13 JUNE 2012.
B. THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY (i.e., Committee on Decorum for Sexual Harassment) ESPECIALLY WHEN PETITIONER GALVEZ’S MEMBERSHIP TO A LABOR UNION (i.e., NUWHRAIN) AND THE NON-REFERRAL TO THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY ARE DISPUTED FACTS.
C. THE CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY AFTER IT HAS BEEN DENIED BY THE LABOR ARBITER OF AFTER THE APPEAL HAS BEEN DENIED BY RESPONDENT NLRC.
D. RESPONDENT NLRC SHOULD HAVE AWARDED PETITIONER GALVEZ’ MONETARY CLAIMS, PARTICULARY OVERTIME PAY, INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY, VACATION LEAVE PAY, SICK LEAVE PAY, ECOLA, 13th MONTH PAY, HOLIDAY PAY, BACKWAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.
At the outset it bears to stress that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law. There is “grave abuse of discretion ” when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[12]
After sifting through the facts of the case and guided by the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds that the public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution.
As to the first assigned issue, petitioner once again insists that he was not accorded due process because at the time the first notice was sent by the private respondent Hotel, the rule as enunciated in the case of Maquiling v. Phil. Tuberculosis Society, Inc., was that it must inform outright the employee that an investigation will be conducted on the charges specified in such notice which, if proven, will result in the employee’s dismissal. We do not agree.
At the time the Labor Arbiter and public respondent promulgated their respective Decisions, the Supreme Court in the case of Esguerra v. Valle Verde Country Club, Inc., has already held that there is no requirement that an intention to terminate one’s employment should be included in the first notice. It is enough that employees are properly apprised of the charges brought against them so they can properly prepare their defenses; it is only during the second notice that the intention to terminate one’s employment should be explicitly stated.
It bears to state that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that the law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of the Court is overruled and the Court adopts a different view, and more so when there is a reversal of the doctrine, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.[13]
The qualification however is not applicable in the case at bar. It is inconceivable that petitioner could have relied in good faith to the case of Maquiling, granting that he was aware of that case, because at the time the first notice was sent, he was not yet terminated much less a case has been filed by him for illegal termination. Simply put, the case Maquiling was not yet applicable to the situation of petitioner, thus it is impossible that he was already banking on it to fight off his eventual dismissal.
Moreover, in the case of De Jesus v. Aquino[14] and Galang v. Cityland Shaw Tower, Inc.,[15] the Supreme Court ruled that there is no error if a court was to fully apply the law and jurisprudence applicable at the time of its rendition of the judgment, which in this case is the ruling in Esguerra.
Anent the second and third assigned issues, petitioner reiterates his clamor that his case should have be first referred to the Committee on Decorum for Sexual Harassment as part of the grievance machinery. Again, we are not convinced.
As correctly pointed by the public respondent a referral to the grievance machinery would only duplicate the hearing conducted that was already attended to by union members. It is worth mentioning that procedure for the dismissal of an employee need not be observed to the letter, but at least, it must be done in the natural sequence of notice, hearing and judgment.[16] Here there is no doubt that the requirements of due process were substantially complied with considering that petitioner was duly notified and given an ample opportunity to be heard and to rebut the charges against him before he was dismissed. Verily, the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.[17]
We also do not find merit in the allegation of petitioner that he and the other union members were not present during the administrative hearing on 8 June 2012 because there were no signatures beside their names in the minutes of the hearing.[18] We are aware that the typewritten minutes of any proceeding usually comes after the actual proceeding itself and that the lack of the signatures in the typewritten form does not preclude the attendance of said people. At any rate, the petitioner could easily prove his absence and that of the union members by asking the latter to execute an affidavit attesting to such fact. However, it is significant that none of the union members much less the union itself gave any support to corroborate petitioner’s claim. For this reason, we are convinced that the names mentioned in the minutes were present especially since they were specifically cited therein as to have actively participated in the administrative hearing by either asking questions or answering inquiries.
With respect to the last assigned issue, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the public respondent that petitioner is not entitled to his monetary claims.
Indeed, petitioner failed to prove that he was required to work or was suffered or permitted to work beyond his regular hours to claim overtime pay. As proven by the private respondent Hotel, its employees must first secure a written authorization from the management before being allowed to render overtime work.[19] Unfortunately, petitioner could not present even a single written authorization to back-up his claim.
There was also no proof that there private respondent Hotel was engaged in offsetting of undertime hours against the overtime hours as the Memo[20] cited by petitioner is blank and unsigned.
As to Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA), petitioner is not entitled thereto as he was not a minimum wage earner. His payslips indicate that he was earning P431.00 per day which is beyond the P404.00 per day, the figure mandated for minimum wage earners.[21]
With respect to service incentive leave pay, Article 95 of the Labor Code states that this benefit is not applicable to employees who are already enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days. On this score, the private respondent Hotel was able to prove through the CBA,[22] that its employees are given 15-19 vacation leaves depending on the length of service hence petitioner is not entitled to any service incentive leave pay.
Incidentally, the private respondent Hotel through petitioner’s payslips, was also able to establish that the latter was paid the monetary value of his unused vacations and sick leaves.[23] In the same manner, private respondent Hotel was able to show that petitioner was paid his corresponding 13th month pay.[24] Finally, as to holiday pay, the same was paid to petitioner though denominated as overtime pay in petitioner’s payslips.[25]
All told, it has consistently been held that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, which have acquired expertise in matters entrusted to their jurisdiction, are accorded not only respect but also finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Thus, in the absence of proof that the Labor Arbiter or the public respondent had gravely abused their discretion, this Court shall deem conclusive and will not overturn their particular factual findings.[26]
Evidently, with the above discussion, petitioner is not entitled to backwages or attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission, 6th Division respectively dated 16 May 2013 and 30 August 2013 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carandang, and Sorongon, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 3.
[2] Annex “1”, Respondents’ Position Paper, Rollo, pp. 114-115.
[3] Annex “2” Respondents’ Position Paper, Rollo, p. 116.
[4] Annex “5”, Respondents’ Position Paper, Rollo, pp. 124-125.
[5] Annex “I”, Rollo, pp. 68-69.
[6] Labor Arbiter Eric V. Chuanico.
[7] Rollo, p. 204.
[8] G.R. No. 143384, 4 February 2005.
[9] G.R. No. 173012, 13 June 2012.
[10] Rollo, p. 43.
[11] Rollo, p. 46.
[12] People’s Broadcasting v. The Sec. of the Department Labor and Employment, etc., G.R. No. 179652, 08 May 2009.
[13] De Jesus v. Aquino, G.R. No. 164662, 18 February 2013.
[14] Id.
[15] G.R. No. 173291, 8 February 2012.
[16] Ruffy v. NLRC, G.R. No. 84193, 15 February 1990.
[17] Perez v. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company, G.R. No. 152048, 7 April 2009.
[18] Annex “4”, Respondents’ Position Paper, Rollo, pp. 118-123.
[19] Annexes “B-B8”, Supplemental Reply, Rollo, pp. 176-180.
[20] Annex “D”, Rollo, p. 60.
[21] Wage Order No. NCR-16, effective date: 10 May 2011.
[22] Annex “8” of Respondent’s Position Paper, Rollo, p. 130.
[23] Annexes “D-D4”, Supplemental Reply, Rollo, pp. 182-186.
[24] Annex “C”, Supplemental Reply, Rollo, 181.
[25] Annex “B-2”, Rollo, p. 50, Annexes “5-5-A”, Respondents’ Reply, Rollo, pp. 159-160.
[26] Philippine National Bank v. Velasco, G.R. No. 166096, 11 September 2008. citing Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. Dela Serna, G.R. No. 88538, July 25, 1991.