MARINA B. VARGAS AND SEGISMUNDO VARGAS, SR., PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO ALCANTARA, LADISLAWA INQUIMBOY AND ZACARIAS ANTONIO, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 11, 1972 reversing the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, which sustained the right of herein
petitioners to repurchase, and ordered herein private respondents to reconvey,
portions of the homestead, particularly Lots 1346-D and 1346-E, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-9557 and T-9558, respect­ively, of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, for the same amount of P28,128.50
as appearing in the deed of sale with pacto de retro.

On September 27, 1951, petitioner Segismundo Vargas, Sr., husband
of Marina B. Vargas, was issued Homestead Patent No. V-241 by the Office of the
President covering a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1346, Pls-209-D, situated
at Lagao, General Santos (formerly Buayan), Cotabato, containing an area of
9.2523 hectares.  Two years after, or on
May 1, 1953, Original Certificate of Title No. V-1733 covering the said parcel
of land was issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cotabato in favor
of the said patentee.

On December 26, 1957, petitioners subdivided the home­stead into
five portions, denominated as Lots 1346-A, 1346-B, 1346-C, 1346-D and
1346-E.  Even before the issuance of the
patent and title, petitioners disposed a portion of the home­stead.  Thus, on August 5, 1950, petitioners sold a
portion with an area of 1.9997 hectares, later identified as Lot 1346-C to
Congressman Luminog Mangelen for P3,000.00. 
The amount of P1,600.00 was paid on the date of the execution of the
deed of sale and the balance of the purchase price in the amount of P1,400.00
was later paid in 1963 by Datu Samad Mangelen, brother of the late
Congressman.  On July 21, 1952, petitioners
sold another portion with an area of 1.1093 hectares, indicated as Lot 1346-B,
to Magno Mateo.  Dispositions of the
homestead continued after the issuance of the patent and title.  On June 14, 1957, petitioners ceded another
portion containing an area of 5,176 square meters, known as Lot 1346-A, to
Atty. Eugenio Millado in concept of attorney’s fees for the case of
petitioners’ daughter.  Finally, on
September 29, 1962, peti­tioner sold the lots in question, Lots 1346-D and
1346-E to the herein private respondents spouses Conrado Alcantara and
Ladislawa Inquimboy for a price of P28,128.50. 
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, Zacarias Antonio, also
impleaded as respondent herein, issued Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos.
T-9557 and T-9558 to private respondents-vendees.

Petitioners filed an action to repurchase Lot 1346-C from Datu
Mangelen.  The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 611 of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato.  However, petitioners withdrew the complaint
in consideration of 1,200 square meters of said lot that Datu Mangelen ceded to
the petitioners.  One-half of that
portion was given by the petitioners to their counsel, Atty. Arturo Peralta, as
attorney’s fee.

On June 10, 1965, petitioner Marina Vargas, by virtue of a power
of attorney from her husband, filed the present case against herein private
respondents and the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, for the purpose of
repurchasing Lots 1346-D and 1346-E, pursuant to Section 119^[1]
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The Public Land Act.

The lower court, in its order dated June 20, 1968, upheld the
rights of the petitioners to repurchase and ordered the private respondents to
reconvey Lots 1346-D and 1346-E covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos.
T-9557 and T-9558, respectively, of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cotabato, for the same amount of P28,128.50 as appearing in the deed of
sale.  Petitioners were given thirty (30)
days from the finality of the decision to exercise their right of repurchase,
otherwise said right shall be deemed forfeited.

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals and as
earlier mentioned, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the order of the
lower court and dismissed the complaint; hence this appeal on certiorari,
petitioner assigning the following errors:

“I.    THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE REAL
RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH SUSTAIN THE RIGHT OF THE PETI­TIONERS TO
REPURCHASE THE LAND IN QUESTION HEREIN.

II.    THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED IMPORTANT
FACTS CONTAINED IN VARIOUS ADMISSIONS OF RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS, IN
DIS­POSING OF PORTIONS OF THEIR HOMESTEAD, ACTED UNDER FINANCIAL PRESSURE
RATHER THAN IN A SPIRIT OF SPECULATION.

III.   THE COURT OF APPEALS ARRIVED AT CONCLUSIONS
OF SPECULATIVE INTENT ON THE PART OF PETITIONERS ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT ARE EQUIVOCAL.”

1.  In the first assignment
of error, petitioners anchor their right to repurchase on the basis of the
rulings of this Court on the cases of Santander vs. Villanueva (103 Phil. 1)
and allegedly reiterated in Simeon vs. Peña (36 SCRA 610).  They urged this Court that said cases sustain
their right to repurchase the land in question.

We do not agree.

In the Santander case, the homesteaders were allowed to recover
their homestead upon payment of the price for which they sold it, because the
sale was null and void ab initio under Section 118^[2]
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, it being made within the initial prohibitory five
year period from the date of the issuance of a homestead patent.  In the present case, the homestead patent was
issued on September 27, 1951 and the sale of the lots in question to private
respondents was executed on September 29, 1962 which clearly was beyond the
initial prohibitory five year period.

As regards the case of Simeon vs. Peña, petitioners ought to know
that petitioner therein was not allowed to repurchase because the lower court
found that his purpose was only speculative and for profit.  In the present case, the Court of Appeals
found that herein petitioners’ purposes and motives are also speculative and
for profit.

It might be well to note that the underlying principle of Section
119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is to give the homesteader or patentee every
chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had
gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating
it.  (Simeon vs. Peña, 36 SCRA 617.) As
found by the Court of Appeals, the motive of the petitioners in repurchasing
the lots in question being one for speculation and profit, the same therefore
does not fall within the purpose, spirit and meaning of said section.

2.  Petitioners claim in
their second and third assignment of errors is that the finding of the Court of
Appeals of speculative and profit-making motive of petitioners in effecting the
repurchase, is contrary to evidence.

We also find no merit in this contention.

The undisputed and admitted fact found by the Court of Appeals is
that after the issuance of the homestead patent and the original certificate of
title, petitioners subdivided the home lot into five parts and subsequently
disposed all of them.  What is more
glaring is that even before the issuance of the patent and before the
expiration of the initial five year prohibitory period, petitioners already
alienated portions of the homestead.  The
patent was issued on September 27, 1951, but as early as August 5, 1950,
petitioners already sold Lot 1346-C with an area of 1.9997 hectares to the late
Congressman Luminog Mangelen.  And again,
on July 21, 1952, or less than a year after the patent was issued, petitioners
sold Lot 1346-B to Magno Mateo with an area of 1.1093 hectares.  These acts, according to the Court of
Appeals, in which We agree, are highly indicative of a lack of intent on their
part to preserve the homestead for their family, as could further be gleaned
from the fact that petitioners never took steps to recover Lot 1346-B from
Mateo Magno or Lot 1346-A from Atty. Eugenio Millado.  Petitioners abandoned their action to
repurchase Lot 1346-C from Datu Luminog Mangelen when the latter agreed to cede
to them 1,200 square meters thereof. 
But, after receiving that area from the Datu, petitioners immediately
conveyed away one-half of that portion to their lawyer, Atty. Arturo Peralta.  Again, these acts according to the appellate
court strongly negate an intention on the part of petitioners to preserve the
homestead for themselves.

With respect to the two lots in question which are sought to be
repurchased by the petitioners, the appellate court found out that petitioner
Marina Vargas candidly admitted that if they (petitioners) succeeded in their
action to repurchase, they will convey a portion of the two lots to their
lawyer, Atty. Arturo Peralta in accordance to the demand of their counsel.

Moreover, upon testimony of witness Amanda Malonjao, a realtor,
it was established that petitioner Marina Vargas has offered to the former to
resell the two lots involved in the present case at a higher price even before
the case has been finally decided by the lower court.  Petitioner Marina Vargas denied the same and
claimed that her only purpose in going to the house of Amanda Malonjao in 1965
was to accompany a certain Francisca Provido for the latter to redeem the title
of a lot she had previously mortgaged to Amanda Malonjao.  Petitioner Marina Vargas presented Francisca
Provido to buttress her denial.  The
Court of Appeals, in resolving the question of fact as to which of the two
testimonies should be upheld, gave full credence to the testimony of Amanda
Malonjao.

All these, together with the fact that petitioners do not reside
in Cotabato but in San Miguel, Bulacan, and that they do not have a house in
any part of the homestead, the Court of Appeals found basis for the conclusion
that the purpose of bringing this case was not in order to keep and preserve
the homestead, if they succeed in recovering it, but their motives are for
speculation and for profit.

In the present appeal, petitioners dispute the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals, which did not resolve any legal question.  The only question raised on appeal before the
Court of Appeals is one of fact–whether petitioners’ purpose and motive in
seeking to repurchase from the private respondents the two lots in question is
to preserve the home­stead for themselves or whether their purpose and motive
are for speculation and for profit. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals observed:

“It is thus obvious in the light of the foregoing
circumstances that the heart of the case at bar is whether or not plain­tiffs
(petitioners herein) are repurchasing the lots in question in order to preserve
the homestead for their family.

Therefore, to resolve the vital issue, we are constrained to look
into the past and present actuations of the plaintiffs.  For thru them, we can glean plaintiffs’
intent, scheme or cause of action.”

It is a well-established rule as to make it trite to say that in
appeal to the Supreme Court only questions of law may be raised.  This Court has held in numerous cases that
findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are in general final and conclusive
(Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737; Ramirez Tel. Corp. vs. Bank of
America, 29 SCRA 191; Castro vs. Tomporong, 78 Phil. 804; Goduco vs. Court of
Appeals; 14 SCRA 282; Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 54, to name a few),
except when:

1.  the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation;

2.  the inference made is manifestly mis­taken,
absurd or impossible;

3.  there is a grave abuse of discretion;

4.  the judgment is based on a misapprehen­sion of
facts;

5.  the Court of Appeals in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission
of both appellant and appellee.

None of the above exceptions, however,
exists in the case at bar; hence, there is no reason for Us to disturb the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied and the decision
of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed is affirmed.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Section 119.- Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the
date of the conveyance.

^[2]
Section 118.  – Except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under
free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, x x x.