THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. REUBEN PIMENTEL Y DEQUIS, FRANCISCO CABALBAG Y CAPA ALIAS PARAN, PABLO LAZO Y APALES, ARSENIO AQUINO Y CANLAS AND TONY DOE…

Pimentel versus Lazo

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Reuben Pimentel, Francisco Cabalbag, Pablo Lazo, Arsenio Aquino, and a certain Tony Doe, a criminal prosecution for murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority arising from the killing of Corporal Benito Benabese of the Baguio City Police Department on the night of March 19, 1971. The case matters to a reviewee because the Supreme Court, on appeal by one accused alone, dismantles a conviction built purely on circumstantial evidence and on the trial court's inference of conspiracy, and in doing so restates the exacting standard for proving conspiracy and for convicting on circumstantial evidence.

Procedural History

The accused were charged by information dated April 20, 1971 before the then Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet. On arraignment, Pimentel, Cabalbag, Lazo, and Aquino each entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on May 31, 1977, finding Pimentel, Cabalbag, and Lazo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, sentencing them to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim 12,000 pesos jointly and severally, while acquitting Arsenio Aquino.

Only Cabalbag and Lazo appealed. Cabalbag later withdrew his appeal, so only Lazo's appeal was resolved. Lazo assigned four errors: that the trial court based its conviction on mere inferences and probabilities; that it erred in finding conspiracy; that it erred in finding treachery; and that it erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The case reached the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Facts

On the night of March 19, 1971, a Strike Force of the Baguio Police Department, headed by Corporal Benito Benabese, was checking nightclubs for persons carrying illegally possessed firearms. At about eleven o'clock in the evening the team entered the Vista Nightclub. Corporal Benabese approached a table where Francisco Cabalbag and a certain Tony were seated with two hostesses, asked them to stand, and frisked them, finding no firearm. He then invited both men outside, and the Strike Force followed.

Outside, Corporal Benabese angrily told Cabalbag, "You are one of those creating trouble here," and when Cabalbag softly answered, "No, brother," the corporal slapped him and boxed him several times. Cabalbag sent Tony to look for Reuben Pimentel at the nearby Tropical Nightclub. Meanwhile Pablo Lazo, who had been at the Vista Nightclub since eleven o'clock that evening, came out and was confronted by Benabese with the words, "You are also one of them," to which Lazo answered, "No, brother." Benabese then went back inside. After a while Pimentel arrived with a gun tucked in his waistline, followed by Tony, Johnny Gallardo, a Captain Maristela, and a Sergeant Quijencio, and Cabalbag told Pimentel what Benabese had done to him.

Corporal Benabese suddenly reappeared outside holding his firearm and asked Pimentel what he wanted; Pimentel mildly replied, "Nothing, brother." Nevertheless, Benabese cocked his firearm and pointed it at Pimentel. Lazo grabbed the muzzle with his left hand and held the chamber with his right, and Patrolman Ano joined in holding the firearm. In the scuffle the three drifted toward the lobby, with Pimentel following, his drawn gun pointed at Benabese's back, and Cabalbag following as well. A shot was heard, then two more, then successive shots. When the firing stopped, Benabese was found dead on the floor. Pimentel, Cabalbag, Tony, and Lazo went to the Tropical Nightclub, where the first three boarded a taxi driven by Arsenio Aquino and left, while Lazo stayed and drank a bottle of beer.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellant on the basis of mere inferences and probabilities from circumstantial evidence.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the settled rule on the weight of the trial court's findings of fact, which yields to a recognized exception. The Court states the rule and its exception in these terms:

It has been held that, in this jurisdiction, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case.

This rule governs the standard of review, but the Court immediately carves out the exception that decides the appeal.

However, while the foregoing is the established rule, the same does not apply where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered, would affect the result of the case.

On conspiracy, the Court adopts its earlier ruling in People versus Drilon, which fixes the quantum of proof required:

While it is true that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, for it may be established by facts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the crime charged, nevertheless, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.

This is the yardstick against which the trial court's inference of a common design must be measured. The Court also quotes its ruling in People versus Ibañez on the knowledge and participation conspiracy demands:

the accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice, it is, furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime.

Finally, on circumstantial evidence, the Court restates the requisites drawn from People versus Cruz:

there is more than one circumstance; the facts from which the inferences are derived must be proven; and the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

These requisites control whether the web of circumstances against Lazo can sustain a conviction.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that while findings of fact of the trial court are generally entitled to great weight, the exception applies here because the trial court overlooked facts of substance that would change the result. There were no eyewitnesses to the shooting, and the conviction rested on inferences from circumstances interpreted against the appellant; on close scrutiny, the conclusion ran contrary to the evidence.

On the second issue, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. The aggression from the outset was on the side of the victim, who slapped and boxed Cabalbag without provocation. When Benabese cocked his firearm and pointed it at Pimentel, it was Lazo who held the muzzle while Patrolman Ano held the chamber, so that Lazo was helping the law enforcers prevent the crime, not helping criminals perpetrate it. Lazo was pushed inside the nightclub by the scuffle, not by choice, and no overt act in the killing could logically be attributed to him. The Court rejects each circumstance the trial court relied upon: the testimony of Patrolman Talastas was vague and contradicted by the more credible testimony of Patrolman Ano, who stood at the scene; the accosting of Lazo proved he was not with Pimentel's group; and Lazo's staying behind to drink beer, far from flight, negates guilt. The testimony of the victim's wife about the riddling of their house was hearsay and did not even name Lazo.

On the third and fourth issues, with no conspiracy established and no overt act attributable to Lazo, there is no basis to hold him liable for the acts of his co-accused, and the circumstantial evidence does not satisfy the requisites for conviction. The appeal is therefore impressed with merit.

Doctrine

Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt; it may be inferred from circumstances, but the inference must be logical and grounded on proven facts. Mere presence at the scene, or association with the principals, does not make one a conspirator; there must be knowledge of the criminal design and cooperation with moral or material aid. Circumstantial evidence convicts only when there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are drawn are proven, and the combination produces a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight but will be overturned where it overlooked facts of substance and value that would affect the result.

Disposition

The Supreme Court acquitted appellant Pablo Lazo on reasonable doubt and ordered his immediate release.

Remember This

Memorize the line that conspiracy requires the same proof as the crime itself, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that mere presence at the scene does not make a conspirator. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of circumstantial evidence, the quantum of proof for conspiracy, and the exception to the rule on the finality of trial court findings of fact.