DANILO DAVID, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ALASKA LUMBER COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
sentencing defendant Alaska Lumber Company to pay to plaintiff, Danilo
David, the sum of P2,379.20, with interest thereon, at the legal rate,
from the date of the filing of his complaint, plus P299.52, as and for
attorney’s fees, and the costs.

In said complaint, which was filed with said court, on June 2, 1960,
plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant the sum of P4,000, as
compensation for injuries sustained by the former on April 15, 1959, in
the course of his employment as laborer of the defendant, aside from
attorney’s fees and costs. In its answer, defendant admitted several
allegations of the complaint, denied other allegations thereof, and
alleged, by way of affirmative defense, that plaintiff’s claim is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. After due trial, said court rendered the aforementioned
decision. Defendant moved for its reconsideration upon the ground,
among others, that the court had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case, not only because, due to its nature, plaintiff’s claim is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
but, also, because the amount sought to be recovered is within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Manila. Said
motion having been denied, defendant appealed directly to this Court,
reiterating the objection to the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, as well as assailing the manner in which it had
applied the Workmen’s Compensation Act to this case. Moreover,
defendant moved in this Court for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the execution of the decision of the lower court during the
pendency of the appeal. Upon the filing of a P3,000 bond, we granted
the motion and issued said writ.

Defendant maintains that pursuant to section 46 of said Act, which provides that:

“The Workmen’s Compensation Commission shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court,
in the same manner and in the same period as provided by law and by
rules of court for appeal from the Court of Industrial Relations to the
Supreme Court.”

plaintiff’s cause of action is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

Upon the other hand, plaintiff contends that the court of first
instance had jurisdiction to hear and decide this case, for, pursuant
to paragraph 12 of Article III of Reorganize tion Plan No. 20-A:

“The jurisdiction herein conferred upon the
Commission shall not be construed to bar a workmen’s recourse to a
court of com-petent jurisdiction, but he cannot prosecute his claim
both in the Commission and in the ordinary courts.”

However, this provision virtually amends said section 46 of Act No.
8428, iti that the “exclusive” jurisdiction of the Commission
thereunder “to hear and decide claims for compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act”, has been reduced by said Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A to the category of “concurrent” jurisdiction with
ordinary courts of justice. Again, said provision of Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A in effect, confers upon such courts a Jurisdiction which
the same did not have prior thereto. Obviously, Republic Act No. 997,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, upon the authority of which said
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was formulated and adopted, did not confer
upon the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission created in
said Act the power either to amend said section 46 of Act No. 3428, or
to confer said jurisdiction to courts of justice. At any rate, both
powers are essentially and necessarily legislative in nature, and,
consequently, a grant of said authority would constitute an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.

Lastly, inasmuch as plaintiff’s claim is for P4,000, plus
“attorney’s fees in such sum as may be deemed just and equitable” by
the court—without stating any specific sum, which was later fixed by
the court at P299.52—it results that the amount-of the demand in his
complaint did not exceed P5,000, exclusive of interests and costs,
which is within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court of Manila (Sec. 88, Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic
Act No. 2613).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is set aside, this case is
dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is
hereby made permanent, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is
so ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.