MOTOR SERVICE CO., INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. YELLOW TAXICAB CO., INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

On March 12, 1952, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to recover from the defendants the sum of P1,842.55, plus
interest at twelve per cent per annum and twenty-five per cent of P1,842.55 as
attorneys’ fees and costs of suit The basic allegations of the complaint are as
follows:

“1. That plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines, with principal office in the City of
Manila; and the defendant Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., is also a corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws in the Philippines, and
defendant Felipe Monserrat is of legal age, and that both defendants have their
offices at 1338 Arlegui St., Manila, where they may be served with summons;

“2. That from June 1, 1951, prior thereto, defendant Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc., maintained an open account with the plaintiff whereby said defendant would
from time to time, buy automobile spare parts and other merchandise on credit
from the plaintiff, and make periodic payments thereon;

“3. That pursuant to the said agreement, defendant Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc.,
bought and received from plaintiff automobile spare parts and other merchandise
covered by the invoices listed on the attached Itemized Statement, marked Annex
‘A’ and made an integral part on the complaint;

“4. That copies of said invoices lifted in Annex ‘A’ have been furnished the
defendants;

“5. That defendant company’s account with the plaintiff has an outstanding
balance of P1,842.55 as shown by the attached Itemized Statement, marked Annex
A;

“6. That said balance is long overdue;

“7. That it is agreed upon by the plaintiff and defendant Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc., that said defendant would pay to the plaintiff 12% interest per annum in
all overdue accounts and 25% of the amount due as Attorney’s fees in case of
suit;

“8. That defendant Felipe Monserrat has assumed to fulfill jointly and
severally with defendant Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., the obligation of the latter
to the plaintiff;

“9. That defendants have failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay
the plaintiff the amount of P1,842.55 in spite of repeated
demands.”

On March 21,1952, the defendants filed an answer which, aside from admitting
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint, alleged as
follows:

“2. That they admit that the defendant Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc.,
bought and received from plaintiff automobile spare parts and other merchandise,
but defendants cannot now admit the correctness of the Itemized Statement
mentioned in Annex ‘A’ of the Complaint on the ground that defendant Manila
Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., is still checking on the correctness of the same for
which reason defendants specifically deny the said allegation;

“3. That the defendants admit having received the invoices listed on Annex
‘A’ of the complaint but they do not admit the correctness of the same in view
of the fact that as previously averred, defendant Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc., is still checking on the correctness thereof, for which reason they
specifically deny the correctness of the said invoices;

“4. That the defendants have not yet finished checking the correctness of the
outstanding balance of the company’s indebtedness with the plaintiff for which
reason the defendant specifically deny the allegations contained in paragraph 5
of the complaint;

“5. That the defendants’ specifically deny the allegations in paragraphs 6
and 7 of the complaint;

“6. That the defendants admit the allegation in paragraph 8 of the
complaint;

“7. That although the defendants admit that the defendant company has failed
to pay its outstanding obligations with the plaintiff, it however specifically
denies the allegation to the effect that it has refused to pay the said
obligation; that the defendant company has failed to pay the said obligation up
to this date because it is still checking on the correctness of the amount which
the plaintiff now seeks to collect.”

On April 3, 1952, the plaintiff served on the defendants a request for
admission worded as follows:

“Plaintiff through undersigned counsel, request the defendants to make the
following admissions for the purpose of this action only and subject to all
(sic.) pertinent to admissibility-which may be interposed at the time;

“1. That the ‘Itemized Statement’ marked Annex ‘A’ of the complaint, copy of
which had been furnished the defendants, and each and every item thereof, are
true and correct;

“2. That each and every invoices referred to in said Itemized Statement,
copies of which defendants admit having received in paragraph 3 of their answer,
are true and correct;

“3. That on each and every invoices furnished the defendants, there appeared
the following stipulation, to wit:

‘Terms: 30 days. Interest of 12 per cent per annum will be charged to the
vendee on all overdue accounts, plus a sum equal to 25 per cent of the amount
due for attorney’s fees in case of suit;’

and, that defendants never interposed any objection to said terms.

“It is further requested that said admission be made within ten days from
receipt of tills request.”

As the defendants had failed to make any answer to fhis request for admission
within the ten-day period fixed therein, the plaintiff filed on April 16, 1952,
a motion for summary judgment, to which the defendants filed an opposition,
followed by a reply on the part of the plaintiff. On June 26, 1952, the Court ef
First Instance of Manila rendered a decision sentencing the defendants jointly
and severally to pay to the plaintiff the sunl of P1,842.55, plus interest at
the rate of twelve per cent per annum, and twenty-five per cent of the aforesaid
amount as attorneys’ fees, with costs. The court ruled that the defendants’
silence on the plaintiff’s request for admission amounted to an implied
acceptance of the facts set forth therein, with the consequence that plaintiff’s
claim stood undisputed.

It is contended that the appellants were not bound to comment on the request
for admission, because they had already filed an answer denying the facts
recited in said request, and tfie denial in the answer is effective at all
stages of the case. Section 2 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides that
“Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted
unless within a period designated in the request, not less than ten days after
service thereof” or within such further time as the court may allow on motion
and notice, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the
matter of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons
why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters.” On the other hand,
section 1 of Rule 23 provides that a request for admission may be served “at any
time after the pleadings are closed.” The result is that section 2 must be given
full force even if an answer has already been filed. In other words, the party
upon whom a request for admission is served, whether or not an answer has been
presented, is bound to serve upon the party requesting the admission “a sworn
statement either denying specifically the matters of which an admission is
requested or setting forth in details the reasons which he cannot truthfully
either deny or admit those matters.” Otherwise, such matters will be deemed
admitted, as in the case at bar. At any rate, a perusal of appellant’s answer
readily shows that the denials contained therein are not absolute, in that they
are premised merely on the condition that the appellants were still checking on
the correctness of the material facts alleged in the complaint. Between the
filing of the answer on March 21 and the service for the request for admission
on April 3, a reasonable time had elapsed, perhaps sufficient for the appellants
to have already determined whether they could admit or deny the facts in
question. This procedural step was conceived in a way to shorten litigations. It
was easy for the appellants to answer the request for admission, thereby
definitely apprising the court and the adverse party as to the genuine issues,
if any.

It is also argued for the appellants that the motion for summary judgment was
fatally defective because it was not supported by affidavits as required by
section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. It is sufficient to note that, aside
from the fact that said motion is under oath, supporting affidavits were indeed
superfluous, for the reason that it was already a matter of record that by their
failure to answer appellee’s request for admission, the appellants had admitted
all the material facts necessary for judgment against them. As commented by
former Chief Justice Moran, “depositions or admissions of parties are still
better than, and may be used instead of, affidavits.” (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. I, p. 727.)

Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed and it is so ordered with costs
against the appellants.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.