LEOPOLDO MORALES AND PRINCESITA SANTERO MORALES, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BR. V, ATTY. ROLANDO DIAZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF SI…

Morales versus Court of First Instance of Cavite

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition brought by Leopoldo Morales and Princesita Santero Morales against the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch Five, against Atty. Rolando Diaz in his capacity as administrator of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti, and against the sheriff who enforced the questioned orders. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul three orders of a probate court: the order of January 13, 1977 upholding the validity of a redemption of a saltbed fishpond, the order of May 17, 1977 directing the petitioners to surrender possession of that property, and the order of June 16, 1977 directing the administrator to break open the bodega standing on it. The case matters because it draws the boundary of probate jurisdiction: a probate court may decide whether property belongs in the inventory, but it may not decide who owns it when outsiders claim it.

Procedural History

The controversy began in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch Five, sitting as a probate court over three consolidated intestate estates, those of Pascual Santero, Pablo Santero, and Simona Pamuti. In that court, the administrator filed a motion asking that the Provincial Sheriff of Cavite be ordered to issue a certificate of redemption. The probate court granted the motion on January 13, 1977, ruling that the administrator had complied with the requirements of law for redemption. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing that the probate court had no jurisdiction to resolve the validity of the redemption, that there was no valid redemption, and that the motion had been resolved without giving them a chance to be heard. That motion was denied on August 18, 1977. The probate court then ordered the petitioners to turn over possession on May 17, 1977, and on June 16, 1977 ordered the administrator to break open the bodega. The petitioners came directly to the Supreme Court by a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, and on October 27, 1977 the Court issued a temporary restraining order against enforcement of the questioned orders.

Facts

The property is a saltbed fishpond in Dulongbayan, Bacoor, Cavite, described in a tax declaration as owned by Simona Pamuti. On February 12, 1968, Simona mortgaged the property in favor of the petitioner Princesita Santero Morales for 15,000 pesos. On July 26, 1974, after extrajudicial foreclosure, the property was sold at public auction to Princesita for 15,452 pesos. The certificate of sale was registered on August 4, 1974, and the redemption period was set to expire on August 4, 1975.

Simona was the spouse of Pascual Santero, with whom she had a son, Pablo Santero. Pablo, during his lifetime, cohabited with three women and had children with each of them. Princesita is Pablo's eldest natural child with Feliberta Pacursa. Simona survived both her husband Pascual and her son Pablo. In January 1974, petitions for letters of administration over the estates of Pascual and Pablo were filed, and the respondent Clerk of Court, Atty. Rolando Diaz, was appointed special administrator and later regular administrator. Princesita opposed those proceedings. The same clerk of court was also appointed legal guardian of Simona, and as guardian he moved to use estate funds to redeem the property sold at auction to Princesita. Over Princesita's opposition, the probate court granted that motion on July 11, 1975, and on August 4, 1975, the very day the redemption period was to expire, reiterated the order and directed the clerk of court to redeem the property immediately.

On August 6, 1975, a deputy sheriff tendered a Prudential Bank check for 16,342 pesos as redemption. Princesita refused it, on the grounds that it was not a certified check, that the amount was insufficient, and that the tender came after the redemption period had lapsed. On August 8, 1975, the petitioners executed an affidavit of consolidation and asked the sheriff for a final deed of conveyance. The sheriff issued neither a final deed in their favor nor a certificate of redemption in favor of Simona's guardian. Simona died intestate in January 1976, and her estate was placed under the same administrator; the three estates were eventually consolidated. In June 1976, the administrator moved to compel the sheriff to issue a certificate of redemption, alleging that payment had been tendered and accepted before the redemption period expired. The probate court granted that motion on January 13, 1977, and later ordered the petitioners to surrender possession and to open the bodega by force.

Issues

• Whether or not the probate court had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of the redemption of the property, where that question determines ownership and the property is claimed by parties outside the estate.
• Whether or not the probate court could order the petitioners to surrender possession of the property to the administrator.
• Whether or not the respondent Clerk of Court could serve as administrator of the estate.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the settled rule on probate jurisdiction, stated in Cuizon versus Ramolete and quoted by the Court:

It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

This rule bears directly on the case because the redemption question was, in substance, a question of ownership between the estate of Simona and the petitioners.

The decision also cites the rule on the sheriff's duty upon redemption, from Atega versus Ortiz:

We are of the opinion and so hold that Section 27 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in relation to the provisions of Act 3135 as amended by Act 4118 is decisive of the above issue. It provides that the payment of the redemption money should be made to the purchaser or redemptioner, or for him to the officer who made the sale. And it has been held in this connection that it is the duty of the officer who made the sale to accept the tender of payment and execute the corresponding certificate of redemption provided such tender is made within the period for the purpose.

This rule bears on the case because the sheriff's ministerial duty presupposes a tender made within the period and in the correct amount, which is precisely what the petitioners disputed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction. The validity of the redemption determined who owned the property, and the order of January 13, 1977 upholding it was effectively a judgment that the property belonged to the estate of Simona. The Court held that the order was not a mere implementation of the earlier orders of July 11 and August 4, 1975, because by then the petitioners had already asserted ownership through their affidavit of consolidation, while the administrator had asserted redemption, and the sheriff had issued neither a final deed nor a certificate of redemption. There was, therefore, a clearly existing ownership contest. The Court stressed that the controversy was not whether the redemption was done, but whether it was valid as done, and that such a controversy lies outside probate jurisdiction. The Court also noted the doubtful factual basis of the order: the sheriff could not have issued a receipt dated July 17, 1975 for an amount determined only on August 25, 1975.

On the second issue, the Court held that the order to surrender possession could not stand. It quoted Bolisay versus Alcid, observing that it appeared strange for the probate court to say it did not rule categorically on ownership and then order the petitioners to surrender possession. The Court declared the orders of January 13, 1977, May 17, 1977, and June 16, 1977 void for having been issued beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court.

On the third issue, the Court had earlier required the respondent judge and the clerk of court to explain the appointment of the clerk of court as administrator, in violation of the Court's memorandum circular prohibiting such appointments, and on December 6, 1977 ordered the respondent judge to discharge the clerk of court as administrator and to appoint a special administrator within five days from notice.

Doctrine

A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed by outside parties. Its power extends only to determining whether a property should or should not be included in the inventory, and even that determination is provisional and subject to a separate action for ownership. Where the validity of a redemption determines ownership, the probate court has no jurisdiction over that question; the parties must resort to an ordinary action. The sheriff's duty to issue a certificate of redemption is ministerial only where the tender is made within the period and in the correct amount.

Disposition

The petition was granted: the three questioned orders were declared void, the restraining order was made permanent, and the administrator was left free to file a separate action to determine the redemption, within thirty days from finality of the decision.

Remember This

Memorize the line: a probate court may decide what goes into the inventory, but it cannot decide who owns contested property. Examiners use this case to test the limits of probate jurisdiction and the provisional character of an inventory inclusion.