ABELARDO APORTADERA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. MANUEL C. SOTTO, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

In
the general elections held on November 10, 1959, petitioner Abelardo
Aportadera and respondent Manuel C. Sotto obtained 66,209 and 78,346
votes respectively for the office of Vice-Governor of the province of
Davao. Accordingly, on December 16, 1959, the corresponding board of
canvassers proclaimed respondent as the candidate elected for said
Office.

In due time, petitioner instituted this quo warranto
proceedings, upon the ground that, at the time of said election,
respondent was not a qualified voter of the Province of Davao, for he
was a voter duly registered in Precinct No. 16-A of the fourth
legislative district of Manila, in the election years 1953, 1955, 1957
and 1959; that on October 3, 1959, respondent registered as a new voter
in Precinct No. 9 of Davao City without first “securing the transfer to
Davao Province or City or the cancellation of his registration as a
voter” in said Precinct No., 16-A of Manila; that he belatedly filed,
with the office of the City Treasurer of Manila, an application for
such cancellation on October 30,1959, or 34 days beyond the period
prescribed by law therefor, for which reason, said application should
be considered illegal and void; that in order to register as a new
voter in Davao, respondent subscribed a voter’s affidavit stating that
he was “not at present actually registered in any other precinct”, thus
committing a felony punishable under Article 172, in relation to
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and that by committing such
crime, respondent disqualified himself as a voter, and, hence, became
ineligible to the office of Vice-Governor of Davao.

Respondent
moved to dismiss the petition for the reason that it does not state a
cause of action. After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Davao granted the motion and, accordingly, dismissed the petition, with
costs against petitioner. Hence, the latter has interposed the present
appeal which is before this Court, only questions of law being raised
by him.

Section 2071 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1095, provides:

“No
person shall be eligible to a provincial office unless at the time of
the election he is a qualified voter of the province, has been a bonafide resident therein for at least one year prior to the election, and is not less than twenty-five years of age.”

This
case hinges on the question whether or not respondent is a “qualified
voter” of Davao province. Petitioner maintains the negative view upon
two (2) grounds, namely: (1) that respondent is not a duly registered
voter of Davao, because, before being registered as such, he had failed
to apply for the cancellation of his registration as a voter in the
City of Manila; and (2) that, having committed the aforementioned
felony in registering himself as a voter in Davao, he had become
disqualified to vote, and, consequently, to run for Vice-Governor.

The
first ground is predicated upon the theory that registration as a voter
is a condition essential to be a “qualified voter”. There is no merit
in this pretense, which has already been rejected in Yra vs Abano (52
Phil., 380), Vivero vs. Murillo (52 Phil., 695), and Larena vs. Teves (61 Phil., 36). Registration is essential to the exercise of the right of suffrage, not to the possession thereof. Indeed, only those who have such right may be registered. In other words, the right must be possessed before the registration. The latter does not confer it.

It is argued that the cases cited are no longer controlling because section 431 of the Old Election Code provided:

“Every
male person who is not a citizen or subject of a foreign power,
twenty-one years of age or over, who shall have been a resident of the
Philippines, for one year and of the municipality in which he shall
offer to vote for six months next preceding the day of voting, is
entitled to vote in all elections if comprised within either of the
following three classes:

“(a) Those who, under
the laws in force in the Philippine Islands upon the twenty-eight day
of August, nineteen hundred and sixteen, were legal voters and had
exercised the right of suffrage.

“(b) Those who
own real property to the value of five hundred pesos, or who annually
pay thirty pesos or more of the established taxes.

“(c) Those who are able to read and write either Spanish, English or a native language.”

whereas section 98 of the Revised Election Code reads:

“Every
citizen of the Philippines, whether male or female twenty-one years or
over, able to read and write, who has been a residient the Philippines
for one year and of the Municipality in which he has registered during
the six months immediately preceding, who is not otherwise
disqualified, may vote in the said precinct at any election.”

Petitioner
lays stress upon the clause “in which he had registered,” in this
section 98, to bolster up the claim that registration is one of the
qualifications to be a voter. He overlooks, however, the fact that
registration in a given precinct is mentioned in said provision, in
order that a person “may vote in said precinct.” In any
event, said section 98 cannot be construed as adding registration to
the original requirements of a qualified voter, for, otherwise, it
would conflict with Article V of the Constitution, pursuant to which:

“Suffrage
may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are
able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for
at least six months preceding the election. The National Assembly shall
extend the right of suffrage to women, if in a plebiscite which shall
be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of this
Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand women possessing the
necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the question.”

Inasmuch as registration is not
essential, under this Article, for the possession of the right of
suffrage, defendant’s contention cannot be sustained without holding
that section 98 of the Revised Election Code seeks to amend said
provision of our fundamental law, and, hence, without becoming
unconstitutional.

It is unnecessary, therefore, to pass
upon the validity of respondent’s registration in Davao, owing to his
failure to seasonably apply for the cancellation of his registration in
Manila, for even if he had not been registered at all in Davao,
this could not decisively affect the question whether or not he is a
“qualified voter,” if he meets the condition prescribed in said Article
V of the Constitution, and, in addition thereto, has the age and
residence required in section 2071 adverted to above, which are not
impugned by petitioner herein.

Upon the other hand, the
disqualifications to vote are set forth in section 99 of the Revised
Election Code, which is of the following tenor:

“The following persons shall not be qualified to vote:

(a)
Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year
or more of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon.

(b) Any person who has been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property.

(c) Any person who has violated his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

(d) Insane or feeble-minded persons.

(e) Persons who cannot prepare their ballots themselves.”

Admittedly, subdivisions (c), (d), and (e)
of this section are inapplicable to the case at bar. Neither does the
offense allegedly committed by respondent fall under subdivisions (a) and (b),
inasmuch as a “final judgment” of conviction is necessary for the
application thereof, and, admittedly, no such judgment has been
rendered against him.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant, Abelardo
Aportadera. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.