ANTONIO SOYANGCO, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ROMEO G. MAGLALANG,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 2, BALANGA,BATAAN, RESPONDENT.

Soyangco versus Maglalang

The Case

This is an administrative case brought by a private complainant, Antonio Soyangco, against a sitting trial judge, Romeo G. Maglalang of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Balanga, Bataan. The complaint charges the judge with gross negligence of duties, misconduct, and clear violation of the provisions of the Judiciary Act, arising from his failure to decide a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law within the period fixed by law. The case matters because it is a clean statement of two enduring principles: that delay in deciding cases is itself an administrative offense, and that a complainant's desistance does not divest the Supreme Court of its power to discipline erring judges.

Procedural History

The complainant filed the administrative complaint against the respondent judge on 31 August 1990. The Supreme Court required the respondent to comment, and he submitted a comment, denominated as an answer, setting out the circumstances he claimed prevented the timely decision of the case. By resolution, the Court referred the matter to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. The investigating Justice conducted a hearing and submitted his report, recommending that the respondent be exonerated in view of the complainant's desistance. The case was then resolved by the Supreme Court sitting en banc, which disagreed with the recommendation and imposed a penalty.

Facts

The criminal case, entitled People of the Philippines versus Lolita P. Luna, was filed by the complainant for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. That case was submitted for decision as early as October 1984. As of the filing of the administrative complaint on 31 August 1990, or for more than five years, no decision had yet been rendered.

In his defense, the respondent judge alleged that the decision had in fact been finished and was ready for promulgation even before he received his copy of the complaint. He explained that he gave priority to subversion and rebellion cases and to other criminal cases where the accused were detained, including violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, which the law entitles to preference. He said that morning and sometimes afternoon trials from Monday to Friday occupied most of his working hours. He was also designated to take cognizance of all cases in another branch for sixteen months, and was appointed Executive Judge, a position with demanding administrative duties. He added that only in 1988, since his appointment in 1983, was he able to hire a legal researcher, and that his court had a dearth of research materials, the only reference being eighty volumes of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated.

The investigating Justice reported that the criminal case had by then been decided, with the accused sentenced to pay a fine of more than 60,000 pesos, and that the complainant acknowledged this. The complainant, after understanding the respondent's situation, expressed his desire to desist from pursuing his complaint, having earlier thought he was entitled to personal indemnity in the criminal case. The investigating Justice gave him time to reflect, and after conferring with his brother-in-law, the complainant affirmed his decision to desist. The investigating Justice found no reason to doubt that the respondent had not deliberately sat on the case and recommended exoneration.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for gross negligence in failing to decide a criminal case for more than five years from its submission for decision.
• Whether or not the complainant's desistance from pursuing the administrative complaint divests the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to discipline the respondent judge.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

This is the source of the Court's supervisory authority over judges, which the complainant's desistance cannot strip away.

Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

This is the constitutional basis for the Court sitting en banc to impose discipline on the respondent judge notwithstanding the complainant's change of heart.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent is administratively liable. It found it clear from his own answer that the allegations of the complaint are true, that he left unattended for more than five years a case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, and that he made no attempt at denial. He was therefore already guilty of dereliction of his duties as judge. The Court acknowledged that the circumstances he recited were beyond his control, but held that while they appear to be valid grounds for a little delay, they can only serve to mitigate and not to erase his administrative liability. The Court ruled that failure to decide a case, particularly one involving a simple violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, for over five years is an inordinate amount of procrastination tantamount to gross negligence. It stressed that it is not enough for judges to pen their decisions; it is also important to promulgate and make them known to all concerned at the earliest possible time and within the mandated period.

On the second issue, the Court held that the complainant's voluntary desistance is of no moment and does not strip the Court of jurisdiction over the respondent. This is so not only because the respondent does not contest the omission imputed against him, which is anyway supported by the public records, but more importantly because the matter rests on constitutional grounds and sound public policy. The Court held that to condition the pursuance of administrative actions upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act is to strip the Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the judiciary, whose anomalous actuations as administrators of justice affect public interest.

Doctrine

First, failure to decide a case within the mandated period, especially a simple case such as one for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, is gross negligence and a ground for administrative liability. Heavy caseload, multiple designations, administrative duties, lack of a legal researcher, and poor research materials may mitigate the penalty but do not erase the liability.

Second, the decision of a case is not complete until it is promulgated and made known to the parties within the mandated period; writing the decision is not enough.

Third, the Supreme Court's power to discipline judges of lower courts, grounded on its constitutional administrative supervision under Section 6 and its disciplinary power under Section 11 of Article VIII, cannot be defeated by the complainant's desistance. Administrative liability is not a private matter that the complainant may condone, because it affects public interest.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent judge administratively liable and penalized him with a fine of 11,000 pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely, and ordered that a copy of the resolution be attached to his record.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that failure to decide a case for over five years is inordinate procrastination tantamount to gross negligence, and that a complainant's desistance does not strip the Supreme Court of its supervisory power to discipline. Examiners use this case to test the constitutional basis of the Court's disciplinary power over judges and the rule that administrative liability cannot be extinguished by the complainant's condonation.