G.R. No. L-25177. October 31, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. NICOLAS LAYSON, CEZAR RAGUB, CEZAR FUGOSO AND JOVENTINO GARCES, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of
First Instance of Davao in criminal case 8495
imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar
Fugoso and Joventino Garces.
On January 17, 1964
when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates of the Davao Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction for the
following crimes:
“Nicolas Layson –
kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and theft;
“Cezar Ragub – frustrated murder and homicide;
“Cezar Fugoso – robbery in an inhabited house and theft;
“Joventino Garces – robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited
house.”
In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o’clock, the four accused, armed with
bladed weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim, prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the
door of the room. Without warning and
acting in concert they then swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded themselves,
refusing to surrender to the trustees who had come to the scene of the crime,
agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the
supervising prison guard. Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of
their safety, whereupon they handed their weapons through the hole of the
barricaded door and surrendered themselves.
Gasang died shortly after being brought
to the prison hospital. Death was
caused by severe internal and external hemorrhage and shock, all secondary to
multiple stab wounds.
Layson, Ragub
and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a
number of times. Garces
stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat
on him a week before. The four plotted
to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual
slaying.
On March 25, 1964
all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder. The information recites:
“The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson,
Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces of the crime of
Murder, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 160, of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
“That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao
Penal Colony, Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-mentioned accused, while then being convicts serving in the
said Davao Penal Colony their corresponding sentences
of conviction by reason of final judgment imposed upon them, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, armed with sharp-pointed instruments,
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said weapons Regino Gasang, their co-inmate in
the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon him serious injuries which caused his
death; with the aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the
accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar
Ragub, and (2) all of them with two or more prior
convictions.”
Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de
oficio, freely and spontaneously pleaded
guilty. Notwithstanding the plea of
guilty, the court a quo proceeded to receive testimony because
of the gravity of the offense. On September 30, 1965 the court rendered
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance
of plea of guilty in favor of all of them and the aggravating circumstances of
recidivism and having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which
the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, the aggravating circumstance of having been punished
with two or more offenses to which the law attaches a lighter penalty with respect
to the accused Cezar Fugoso
and Joventino Garces and
the aggravating circumstances consisting of any two of the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to qualify
the crime to murder and the special aggravating circumstance of having
committed the crime charged while serving the penalty imposed upon them for
previous offenses as regards all the accused and conformably with Article 160
of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences all of them to DEATH, to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Regino
Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of
the penalty imposed and to pay the costs proportionately.”
For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the
one hand, the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery
and the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, and, on
the other, the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.
We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation be considered in favor of
all the accused. For this circumstance
to exist, it is necessary that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation be
not removed from the commission of the offense by a considerable length of
time, during which period the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.[1]
Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling
against Gasang because the latter urinated on their
coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten days before the
actual slaying. Gasang
spat on Garces a week before the day of the
killing. All of the accused plotted to
kill Gasang a few days before January 17, 1964.
In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time
had elapsed during which the accused regained their equanimity. They moved their evil scheme forward to consummation
after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid they had
solicited. The aforenarrated
circumstances negate the presence of passion and obfuscation; upon the
contrary, they prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation.
Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy report (exh.
I) and the diagram (exh. J), plus the testimony of
Dr. Guillermo de Guzman, conclusively prove that the victim was killed in a
manner insuring utter suddenness and complete surprise in the execution of the
offense, with resultant incapability of the victim to offer resistance. That there was abuse of superior strength
would suffice to qualify the crime to murder, but this circumstance must be
considered as absorbed in treachery.[2]
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;[3]
evident premeditation becomes a mere generic aggravating circumstance[4]
which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. A qualifying circumstance not only gives the
crime its proper and exclusive name but also places the author thereof in such
a situation as to deserve no other penalty than that specially prescribed for
said crime.[5]
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism
(art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly considered against all the accused,
who, at the time of the commission of the offense, were undoubtedly serving
their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect
the punishment of the accused with the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.[6]
When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused
admitted all the material facts and circumstances alleged in the
information. The crime of murder is
punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Because of the attendance of the
special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is left
with no alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the court a
quo.
It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused
the aggravating circumstance of having been previously punished for two or
more crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties because the said
aggravating circumstance of “reiteracion”
requires that the offender against whom it is considered shall have served out
his sentences for the prior offenses.
Here all the accused were yet serving their respective sentences at the
time of the commission of the murder.
Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given
by Attorney Potenciano Villegas, Jr., counsel de
oficio for the four accused, who unqualifiedly
recommends affirmance of the judgment a quo.
It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance
of a death sentence, but ours is the inescapable duty to enforce the inexorable
mandate of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the
death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar
Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is affirmed.
The indemnification to the heirs of the victim, Regino,
Gasang, is hereby increased to P12,000,[7]
to be paid jointly and severally by the four accused. Costs de oficio.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
[1] U.S.
vs. Pilares, 18 Phil. 87; U.S.
vs. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162; U.S.
vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486; People vs. Alanguilang, 52 Phil. 663.
[2]
People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58; People vs.
Redoña, 87 Phil. 743; People vs. Quesada, 62
Phil. 446; People vs. Jamoralin, L-2257, Feb. 19, 1951.
[3]
Art. 248, Revised Penal Code.
[4] U.S.
vs. Labai, 17 Phil. 240.
[5]
People vs. Ubiña, L-6969, Aug. 31, 1955.
[6]
People vs. Perete, L-15515, April 29, 1961, 1
SCRA 1293; People vs. Peralta, L-19069, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 788.
[7]
People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 469, 473.