DAMASO RACOMA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. MAXIMINA FORTICH, FRANCISCO ALESNA AND HIS WIFE FLORENCIA LOFRANCO DE ALESNA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Direct appeal,^[1]
on points of law, from the dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a complaint filed therein by the
plaintiff-appellant Damaso Racoma
against the defendants-appellees Maximina
Fortich, Francisco Alesna
and Florencia Lofranco de Alesna, docketed as Civil Case No. 1930, for reconveyance and possession on the
ground of mistake or fraud, of a parcel of land of 62,881 square meters, in Sagbayan, Bohol,
the grounds for the dismissal being the affirmative defenses (lack of cause of
action and res judicata) alleged in the answer.

The proceedings held in the court a quo are narrated in
the dismissal order, as follows:

“A brief history of the pleadings filed by the parties in the
instant case is in order.  The defendant
(Maximina Fortich)
submitted a motion to dismiss the original complaint.  Before said motion to dismiss could be
resolved by the Court, the plaintiff submitted a FIRST Amended Complaint,
hence, the Court, in its order dated June
15, 1967, denied the motion to dismiss.  Thereafter, the defendant submitted a
responsive Answer to the First Amended Complaint, alleging therein, among other
things, as affirmative defenses the grounds averred in the aforecited
motion to dismiss the original complaint. 
On October 23, 1967,
the plaintiff filed a SECOND Amended Complaint by impleading
therein, in compliance with the order of the Court dated October 27, 1957, two (2) additional new de­fendants,
namely:  spouses Francisco Alesna and Florencia Lofranco de Alesna.  In an order dated December 16, 1967 the Court admitted the SECOND
Amended Complaint; hence, their responsive Answer to the FIRST Amended
Complaint shall be considered reproduced as a responsive answer to the SECOND
Amended Complaint (Section 3, Rule 11, Revised Rules
of Court).  As elsewhere stated hereinbefore,
the Court, in the aforequoted order dated January 5,
1968, set the case at bar for January 17, 1968 for preliminary hearings on the
affirmative grounds averred in defendants’ Answer to the FIRST Amended
Complaint which appear to be indubitable grounds for a motion to dismiss,
pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 16 of the
Revised Rules of Court.  Such were the
status of the pleadings of the parties herein as of the January 17, 1968 hearings of this case when
counsel for plaintiff prayed for the admission of his THIRD Amended Complaint.

“For purposes, therefore, of the present pre­liminary hearings
the averments stated in the SECOND Amended Complaint shall, as it were, be the
ones considered for the reason that the ORIGINAL and the FIRST AMENDED
Complaint shall, by the rules, be considered to have disappeared from the
records of the case as judicial admissions because they have been superseded by
the SECOND Amended Complaint (Lucido vs. Calupitan, 27 Phil.
148; Bastida vs. Menzi, 58
Phil. 188).  It is also obvious that
neither can the averments in the THIRD Amended Complaint be considered, for the
purpose of the present preliminary hearings, for the simple reason that the
same has not yet been admitted by the Court.”

A substantial part of appellant’s brief is impertinent, for its
statement of facts and assignment of errors are erroneously predicated upon the
third amended complaint, which had not been admitted and not passed upon by the
lower court and is not the subject of the appealed order of dismissal.  What the court considered in dismissing the
complaint is not the third but the second amended complaint and the answer of
the defendants to the first amended complaint, in the hearing mentioned by the
court, in accordance with Section 5, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:

“Section 5.  Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.  – Any of the grounds for dismissal pro­vided
for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative
defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss
had been filed.” ….

in relation with
Section 3, Rule 11, which provides:

“Section 3.  Answer to amended complaint.  – If the complaint is amended, the time fixed
for the filing and service of the answer shall, unless otherwise ordered, run
from notice of the order admitting the amended complaint or from service of
such amended complaint.  An answer
filed before the amendment shall stand as an answer to the amended complaint,
unless a new answer is filed within ten (10) days from notice or service as
herein provided.” (emphasis supplied)

Despite the impertinence in the statement
of facts and in the assignment of errors in appellant’s brief, the portion
thereof which is pertinent, and the record on appeal afford ample basis for the
determination of whether the order of dismissal based on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and res judicata
was legally justified or not.

In holding that the complaint (second amended complaint) does not
allege a sufficient cause of action, the court below observed that while the
complaint alleged that the defendant Maximina Fortich, either by mistake or fraud, obtained title to the
land which the plaintiff seeks to be reconveyed to
himself, the complaint failed to state with particularity the ultimate facts and circumstances constituting the
alleged mistake or fraud and that such failure is fatal to the sufficiency of a
cause of action, the general averment of mistake or fraud being merely a conclusion
of law, not an allegation of ultimate facts. 
The court is in error.  Examining
the allegations of the complaint (second amended complaint) filed with and
admitted by the lower court, a cause of action is sufficiently alleged.  The plaintiff has defined his primary right,
which is, that he is the owner and possessor of a parcel of land for some 30
years; that he had applied for a free patent to it in 1952 and the Director of
Lands has approved his application (Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Second Amended Complaint).  The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant
had violated his right by including his land in the bigger parcel of land over
which the defendant had obtained a certificate of title in 1964 (paragraphs 5
and 6), and that the defendants, claiming adverse ownership, wanted to oust the
plaintiff from his land (paragraphs 7 and 9). 
The allegations even particularized fraud, in view of paragraphs 10 and
11 of the Second amended complaint (Record on Appeal, page 30) reading:

“10.  That the herein plaintiff has no knowledge
whatsoever of the application for registration filed by defendant Maximina Fortich and the order of
decree of registration issued in favor of the defendant Maximina
Fortich by this Honorable Court until on February 25,
1967, when defendant Maximina Fortich,
thru her representative Francisco Alesna, attempted
to enter into the land of the plaintiff which is above described, in order to
gather the products therefrom, claiming that the
parcel of land now in question belongs to her and is included in her
application for re­gistration as above-stated;

 11.  That the defendant Maximina
Fortich, either by mistake or fraud and with the
intention of depriving the plaintiff of his right of ownership and possession
of the parcel of land in question together with all the improvements therein,
filed her application for registration knowing full well that at the time she
filed her application for re­gistration, the parcel of land now in litigation
belonged and still belongs to the herein plaintiff as lawful owner and
possessor thereof;

Clearly, therefore, the two (2) factors
that a cause of action must consist of, namely, (1) plaintiff’s primary right
and (2) the defen­dant’s delict or wrongful act or
omission which violates plaintiff’s primary
right,^[2] were alleged in the complaint; and the al­legations
thereof could meet the test of sufficiency of stating a cause of action,
because a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were
admitted or proved.^[3]

The other ground upon which the lower court dismissed the
complaint is res judicata.  It is stated in the order of dismissal that
the plaintiff had admitted that the property in controversy was applied for by
defendant Maximina Fortich
in a cadastral proceeding and under Act 496; that the proceedings were in rem and, therefore, the whole world, including the
plaintiff, were parties thereto and bound by the judgment thereon.  This statement of the court was more
specifically restated in its denial for reconsideration to the effect that the
plaintiff and the defendant were contending adversary parties in Cadastral Case
No. 15, G.L.R.O. Record No. 1469.  Since
no evidence was taken to support such stated finding but the orders depended
only on the consideration of the allegations of the parties in the second
amended complaint and the answer, it is obvious that the lower court was
referring to the legal effect of the conclusiveness against all persons of the in
rem decision in the cadastral case rather than
the actual fact that the plaintiff was a claimant who appeared in the said
case, for he alleged in his complaint that he “has no knowledge whatsoever
of the application for registration filed by defendant Maximina
Fortich and the order of decree of registration
issued in favor of the defendant Maximina Fortich by this Honorable Court until on February 25, 1967 …”
(Record on Appeal, page 30).  Such being
the case, then an action for reconveyance is
available to the plaintiff, the decree of registration notwithstanding, for …

“…, it is now a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction
that the existence of a decree of registration in favor of one party is no bar
to an action to compel reconveyance of the property
to the true owner, which is an action in personam,
even if such action be instituted after the year fixed by Section 38 of the
Land Registration Act as a limit to the review of the registration decree,
provided it is shown that the registration is wrongful and the property sought
to be reconveyed has not passed to an innocent third
party holder for value (Cabanos vs. Register of
Deeds, 40 Phil. 620; Dizon vs. Lacap,
50 Phil. 193; Bagaya vs. Guilao,
64 Phil. 347, and cases cited therein; Escobar vs. Locsin,
74 Phil. 86; Sumira vs. Vistan,
74 Phil. 138; Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712; Aban vs. Cendana, L-11989, May
23, 1958).”^[4]

The reason was stated in People vs. Cainglet, L-21493-94, 29 April 1966, 16 SCRA 748, citing previous cases, as
follows:

“However, this conclusiveness of
judgment in the registration of lands is not absolute.  It admits of exceptions.  Public policy also dictates that those
unjustly deprived of their rights over real property by reason of the operation
of our registration laws be afforded remedies. 
Thus, the aggrieved party may file a suit for reconveyance
of property or a personal action for recovery of damages against the party who
registered his property through fraud, or in case of insolvency of the party
who procured the registration through fraud, an action against the Treasurer of
the Philippines
for recovery of damages from the Assurance Fund.  Through these remedial proceedings, the law,
while holding registered titles indefeasible, allows redress calculated to
prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of others.  Necessarily, without setting aside the decree
of title, the issues raised in the previous registration case are relitigated, for purposes of reconveyance
of said title or recovery of damages.”

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby
reversed, and the case remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings.  Costs
against the appellees.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Ruiz Castro, J., did not take
part.

^[1]
The records were received in the Supreme Court on 25 July 1968 (Rollo,
page 1).

^[2]
Pomeroy Code Rem., Sec. 519.

^[3]
Amedo v.
Rio y Olabarrieta, 92 Phil. 214.

^[4]
Caladiao, et al. v. Santos Vda. de Blas, L-19063, 29 April 1964, 10 SCRA 691, 694.