ZAMBALES CHROMITE MINING COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ, RESPONDENTS. PHILEX MIN…

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Minister (now Secretary) of
Natural Resources and the Director of Mines from enforcing Presidential Decree
No. 1214 dated October 14, 1977 requiring all locators under the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, to apply for mining lease contracts under
the provision of Presidential Decree No. 463 better known as the Mineral
Development Resources Decree of 1974 and to declare Presidential Decree No.
1214 unconstitutional since its enforcement would deprive petitioners of its
property without due process and without just compensation.

Petitioner Zambales Chromite
Mining Company, Inc. is a mining corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.

Petitioner claims that it is the owner and holder of sixty (60)
mineral claims which it acquired through purchase in good faith and for value
43 years ago.  Said claims situated at
the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, were located
and registered in 1934 under the Act of U.S. Congress of July 1, 1902 (known as
the Philippine Bill of 1902).  (Petition,
p. 2; Rollo, p. 3); that from 1934 to 1977 it has to
its credit a total investment of over P1,222,640.00 for the mining exploration,
development and operation of its said sixty mining claims (Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4); that on June 14, 1977 it actually and duly
filed its application for patent for each claim of said sixty (60) mineral
claims (Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 5); that respondent
Director of Mines issued an order dated July 13, 1977 approving the application
of petitioner for availment of rights on said claims
under Presidential Decree No. 463 (Petition, p. 5; Rollo,
p. 6); that the aforesaid sixty (60) lode mineral claims are already private
property of petitioner, following the doctrinal rule laid down in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil.
749; 753-754) and Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, et al. (66 Phil.
259) which had already been segregated from the public domain to which petitioner is entitled to the exclusive possession and
enjoyment against everyone; that the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1214
on October 14, 1977 which declared open to lease subsisting and valid
patentable mining claims, lode or placer, located under the provisions of the
Act of U.S. Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended, already segregated from the
public domain and owned and held by it for over 43 years and requiring it
without fail and against their will to file a mining lease application with the
Mines Regional Office concerned within a period of one year from October 14, 1977
is a deprivation of petitioner’s rights to the
ownership of said claims without due process of law nor just compensation and
therefore, unconstitutional.

The Court in its resolution dated November 3, 1978, gave due
course to the petition and required respondents to comment (Rollo,
p. 33).  The Solicitor General as counsel
for public respondent, filed his comment on March 26,
1979 (Rollo, pp. 58-71-A).

On May 10, 1979, petitioner filed a reply (Rollo,
p. 83) to the comment in compliance with the resolution of April 10, 1979.  But on May 9, 1979, Baguio
Gold Mining Company, Philex Mining and Regalian Mining Corporation filed with the Court two
separate motions for leave to intervene (Rollo, p.
120).

On February 10, 1981, Baguio Gold
Mining Company, Philex Mining Company and Regalian Mining Corporation filed with the court a Joint
Petition for Intervention (Rollo, p. 171) raising the
same issues brought
up by petitioner Zambales Chromite
Mining Company regarding the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1214 based on the doctrinal mandates of the
ruling cases of McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil. 749
[1922] and Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 [1939];
Salazar Mining Co. v. Rodriguez, et al. 67 Phil. 97, insofar as it invests inter alia, private ownership in patentable mining claims to have survived to date
due to a faithful compliance with the various
requirements of applicable mining laws to include the land surface of said
mining claims.  Petitioner’s memorandum
was adopted by intervenors as to the factual and
legal showing of the unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1214 (Rollo, pp. 455-456).

The Solicitor General as
counsel for public respondent submitted his memorandum on February 12, 1982 (Rollo, pp. 468-­499) while petitioner filed its reply to
said memorandum on April 3, 1982 (Rollo, pp.
505-560).

Counsel for petitioner on August 20, 1982 filed a motion to refer
this case to the Court En Banc for action and decision (Rollo,
p. 536) and on September 8, 1982, the Court resolved to issue a temporary
restraining order, effective as of said date and continuing until otherwise
ordered by the Court (Rollo, p. 562).

On February 11, 1988 the Court acting on the motion for
intervention filed by counsel for intervenor
Francisco N. Calinisan dated January 6, 1988, and
considering that this case has long been submitted for decision, resolved to
deny the aforesaid motion for having
been filed late (Rollo, p. 597).

The principal issue raised by the petitioner and by the erstwhile
intervenors, is: 
whether or not under the provision of P.D. No. 1214 there was
deprivation of property without due process of law and just compensation which
makes said decree
unconstitutional.

Their contention that a perfected and valid appropriation of
public mineral lands operates as a withdrawal
of the tract of land from the public domain and is deemed to be already private
property, is without basis in fact and in law
(Comment, Rollo, p. 61).

This issue has been resolved in a recent decision of this Court
in Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc. v. Leido, Jr. (156 SCRA
1 [1987]) where it was held that while rulings in McDaniel v. Apacible (42 Phil. 749 [1922]) and Gold Creek Mining Corp.
v. Rodriguez (66 Phil. 259 [1938]) cited by the petitioner, true enough,
recognize the right of a locator of a mining claim as a property right; such
right is not absolute.  It is merely a possessory right more so if petitioner’s claims are still unpatented.  It can be lost through abandonment or
forfeiture or they may be revoked on valid legal grounds.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner has
complied with all the terms and conditions prescribed by law prior to November
15, 1935; that there should be not only a valid and subsisting location of the
mineral land but that there should be, thereafter, continuous compliance with
all the requirements of law such as the
performance of annual assessment works and payment of real estate taxes.  In fact, petitioner filed its application
only in 1977 for a patent, or 43 years after it allegedly located and
registered the mining claims (Rollo, p. 63).

As to the  issue of constitutionality, the Court
categorically stated that P.D. No. 1214 is constitutional.

The Court ruled:

“x x
x It is a
valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands
of the public domain, of which petitioner’s mining claims still form a part,
and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable
asset.  It may be underscored, in this
connection, that the Decree does
not cover all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only
those claims over which their locators had failed to obtain a patent.  And even then, such locators may still avail
of the renewable twenty-five year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No.
463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.

“Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the
affected land or the mining claim.  It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring
other would-be locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves
the minerals found therein.  To rule
otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and
maintain rights over a located mining claim. 
This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the
intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently
comply with the requirements for annual work and improvements in the located
mining claim.” (Santa Rosa Mining Co., Inc. v. Leido,
Jr., supra, pp. 8-9)

P.D. No. 1214 is in
accord with Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution and
presently in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution where the same
constitutional mandate is restated.

On June 2, 1988, the Court granted a motion filed by counsel for
petitioner dated May 20, 1988 to admit a manifestation and motion wherein
petitioner prayed that the “Court allow the petitioner to change the
original prayer in its petition dated October 10, 1978 with a new prayer
directing public respondents to dispose of petitioner’s application on its own
merit unaffected and without regard to the provision of P.D. 1214 x x x.” (p.
631, Rollo)

Records show that petitioner Zambales Chromite filed its patent application over its 60 mining
claims on June 14, 1977 and
to order such disposal of said “application on its own merit” is not
within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court.  For, even assuming claimant to be a holder of
a subsisting and valid patentable mining claim, this Court has held that it can
no longer proceed with the acquisition of a mining patent in view of P.D. No.
1214, issued on October 14, 1977, directing holder of subsisting
and patentable mining claims, lode or placer,
located under the provisions of the Act of Congress on July 1, 1902, as
amended, to file a mining lease
application x x
x within one year from the approval of the
Decree and upon the filing thereof, holders of said claims shall be considered
to have waived their rights to the issuance of mining patents therefor:  Provided,
however, that the non-filing of the application for mining lease by the holders
thereby within the period herein prescribed shall cause the forfeiture of all
his rights to the claim”.  (Director of Lands v. Kalahi Investments,
Inc., G.R. No. L-48066, January
31, 1989).  (Underscoring
supplied)

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is DENIED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa,
Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.