THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLANT, VS. MAKADATO ALAMADA, ACCUSED, WALIA USONG AND LATIP KUSA, BONDSMEN AND APPELLEES.

People versus Alamada

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Makadato Alamada, the accused, and against Walia Usong and Latip Kusa, his bondsmen. The action concerns the forfeiture of a bail bond: the accused failed to appear for trial on a theft charge, the trial court confiscated the bond, and the real dispute is whether the bondsmen may later be relieved of their undertaking after they surrendered the accused but only after the thirty-day period had already run. The case matters because it fixes the rule that once that period lapses, the court may no longer discharge the sureties entirely; it may only mitigate or lessen their liability, and the Court here shows how far that power of mitigation reaches.

Procedural History

The case began in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, before Judge Juan A. Sarenas. When the accused failed to appear for trial, the judge confiscated the bond and gave the bondsmen thirty days to produce the body of their principal and to explain why judgment should not be rendered against them. After the thirty days expired without any explanation, the fiscal moved for judgment, and the judge issued a decree requiring the bondsmen to satisfy the amount of the bond, plus interest and legal expenses. The bondsmen were notified of that decree on February 4, 1948. On February 10, 1948 they appeared, asked for relief, explained their failure, and surrendered the person of the accused. The judge found the explanation satisfactory and lifted the order of confiscation, overruling the opposition of the provincial fiscal. The fiscal brought the matter up to the Supreme Court by way of appeal.

Facts

On December 15, 1947, the case of People versus Makadato Alamada, for theft, was called for trial in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The accused was on bail but did not appear, although proper notice had been given to him and to his bondsmen. On motion of the fiscal, the judge confiscated the bond of 2,000 pesos and gave the bondsmen Walia Usong and Latip Kusa thirty days within which to produce the body of their principal and to explain why judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their undertaking.

The thirty-day period expired and the bondsmen offered no explanation, so the fiscal moved for judgment against them. On January 31, 1948 the judge issued a decree requiring the bondsmen to satisfy the amount of the bond, plus interest and all legal expenses to be incurred in the execution. They were notified of this directive on February 4, 1948.

On February 10, 1948 the bondsmen appeared, asked for relief, explained their failure, and surrendered the person of the accused. They alleged under oath that the offended party, Mrs. Beltran, and Datu Macabangan Alamada had represented to them and to the accused that both would assume the responsibility of dismissing the case, with the assurance that the accused and the bondsmen should leave the matter to them for final dismissal. Relying on this in good faith, they believed the case was already finally quashed until they received the order on February 2, 1948. The judge regarded the explanation as satisfactory and lifted the order of confiscation.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court acted within its discretion in accepting the bondsmen's explanation as satisfactory.
• Whether or not the trial court could entirely discharge the sureties after the thirty-day period had elapsed.
• Whether or not the Court should reduce the amount of the bondsmen's liability.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision; it rests on the settled rule on forfeiture of bail bonds as stated in the Court's own rulings. The governing principle, as the Court articulates it, is that in the forfeiture of bail bonds courts are liberal in accepting the explanation of bondsmen, provided the body of the defendant is produced, and that the question whether the explanation is satisfactory generally lies within the discretion of the court. This principle bears on the first issue, because it supplies the standard against which the trial judge's acceptance of the explanation is measured.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial judge did not err in accepting the explanation. The Solicitor General contended that the excuse was unsatisfactory because the bondsmen ought to have known that it was the fiscal who had the right to discontinue the prosecution, and so should not have relied on the assurances of Datu Macabangan Alamada and Mrs. Beltran. The Court conceded that technically the Government is right, but observed that cases are possible wherein the alleged theft is merely a matter of civil liability which could be compromised, and considering the tendency of the courts in the exercise of their discretion, it could not say that the judge mistakenly accepted the explanation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the judge had no power to discharge the sureties entirely, because the thirty-day period had elapsed. He could only mitigate or lessen their liability. The Court relied on its earlier ruling in People versus Calabon, where, after the thirty-day period, a complete discharge may not be granted, but the court is not deprived of its inherent discretionary power to relieve the bondsmen from a part of their liability according to the circumstances of the particular case, where the accused had already been apprehended. In that case the Court lowered the sureties' liability from 12,000 pesos to 3,000 pesos.

On the third issue, following the Calabon precedent and others in similar vein, the Court reduced the sureties' monetary obligation to 200 pesos.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, in the forfeiture of bail bonds, courts are liberal in accepting the explanation of bondsmen, provided the body of the defendant is produced, and the question whether the explanation is satisfactory generally lies within the discretion of the court. Second, once the thirty-day period granted to the bondsmen has elapsed, the court may no longer grant a complete discharge of the sureties; it may only mitigate or lessen their liability. Third, the court retains its inherent discretionary power to relieve the bondsmen from a part of their liability according to the circumstances of the particular case, especially where the accused has already been apprehended. These rules tie directly to the principle the Court articulated on forfeiture and to the Calabon doctrine it applied.

Disposition

The bondsmen prevailed in part: the Court reduced their monetary obligation to 200 pesos and modified the appealed order accordingly, with no costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: after the thirty-day period, the court cannot discharge the sureties entirely; it can only mitigate or lessen their liability. Examiners use this case to test the extent of a court's discretion in bail forfeiture proceedings and the distinction between complete discharge and mere mitigation of the bondsmen's obligation.