ALFREDO C. IGNACIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, JUDGE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT, 7TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

The assignment of respondent Judge to conduct the trial for the
crimes of arson as well as of malversation for which
petitioner Alfredo C. Ignacio was indicted started the train of events that led
to this proceeding for certiorari.^[1]
Petitioner was convicted of arson and sentenced to suffer a penalty of reclusion
temporal.^[2]
In the decision of respondent Judge in the arson case, he stated the
following:  “For instance, it had
been duly established that Wilfredo Ignacio and
Francisco Lara were among those consistently present in the meetings or
conferences called by Alfredo Ignacio wherein his personal problems such as his
substantial shortage and malversation case were
mentioned and discussed, during which meetings or conferences, they agreed to
burn the provincial capitol building of Rizal in
order to destroy all evidences (sic) that may be used against him in his
malversation case and to prevent discovery of his
shortage in his accounts which amounted to P200,000.00, more or less.  This motive for the burning of the capitol
building by the accused Alfredo Ignacio and his henchmen had been duly
established not only by the written statement of Romualdo
Santiago but also by his testimony in court and also by the logical and
inescapable conclusion that because of the big shortage of Alfredo Ignacio in
his accounts and his malversation case, he had
conceived and nurtured, even premeditated on the idea of burning all the
evidences of said shortage and his malversation case
as his last recourse to escape financial accountability and criminal liability therefor.  * * *
Actually, however, thirty (30) of the forty (40) checks issued by accused
Alfredo Ignacio had been encashed to himself and Mr.
Pedro Flores, paying them from Government Funds under their respective custody,
thereby giving rise to his (Alfredo Ignacio’s) malversation
case.  Needless to say, these facts and
circum­stances are mute but eloquent proofs that Alfredo Ignacio and his
cohorts among whom are his own son Wilfredo Ignacio
and Francisco Lara had resorted to the burning of the Provincial Capitol
Building so that all evidences (sic) kept therein and intended to be
used against him in his shortage and his malversation
case may all be destroyed and totally suppressed, and at the same time prevent
the discovery of the shortage in his accounts as Cashier III of the District
Engineer’s Office of Rizal Province.”^[3]

It was mainly on the basis of the above statement that petitioner
moved for the inhibition of respondent Judge “praying that respondent
Judge voluntarily inhibit himself from trying the said malversation
cases pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides that ‘a judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.'”^[4]
He further stated “that because of the above findings made by His Honor in
the arson case, it would be highly improbable to expect his Honor to view the
evidence that petitioner may present in the malversation
cases objectively and impartially inasmuch as whatever evidence petitioner may
present to show his innocence of the charge of malversation,
His Honor, influenced by his earlier pronouncement that the malversation
was the motive for the arson, would find it difficult to reverse the basis of
his judgment of conviction in the arson case, considering that ‘however upright
the judge, and however free from the slightest inclination but to do justice,
there is peril of his unconscious bias or prejudice (Del Castillo v. Javelona, et al., L-16742, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 146, 149-151), and that ‘any former opinion * * * may
still linger to affect unconsciously his present judgment, or lest he may be
moved or swayed unconsciously by his knowledge of the facts which may not be
revealed or stated at the trial, or cannot under the rules of evidence.  No effort of the will can shut out memory;
there is no art of forgetting.  We cannot
be certain that the human mind will deliberate and determine unaffected by that
which it knows, but which it should forget in that process * * *’ (Gutierrez v.
Santos, L-15824, May 30, 1961).”^[5]
Such petition for inhibition was denied by respondent Judge.^[6]
Immediate recourse was taken to this Court as a motion for reconsideration
would be useless and to no avail as respondent Judge had made the parties
understand that his denial was irrevocable.^[7]

This Court required respondent Judge as well as the other
respondent, the People of the Philippines,
to comment.  In the Comment submitted by
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,^[8]
he alleged “that the actuations of the respon­dent Judge in the malversation cases against petitioner do not, by
themselves, constitute sufficient and indubitable grounds to disqualify said
judge from further trying and hearing said cases, * * *.”^[9]
Nonetheless, they submitted that “in view of the close causal connection
between Criminal Cases Nos. 569 to 594 against petitioner for malversation and Criminal Case No. 559 also against the
latter for arson, and wherein the respondent judge, in convicting petitioner of
said crime of arson, found that the motive of petitioner and his co-accused in
burning the provincial capitol building of Rizal was
precisely to destroy all evidences threat that could be used against said
petitioner in the malversation cases against him, are
constrained to agree with petitioner that sufficient reasons exist for him to
entertain serious doubts and misgivings as to the degree of objectivity and
neutrality with which the respondent judge can continue to try, and eventually
decide, said malversation cases against him,
considering that ‘however upright the judge, and however free from the
slightest inclination to do justice, there is peril of his unconscious bias or
prejudice’ (Del Castillo v. Javelona, 6 SCRA 146), so that to insure compliance with the demands of
due process, to which every accused is entitled, and in order that it may be
said that every effort is always exerted to attain the ideal of an impartial
administration of justice, the better alternative under the circumstances would
be for the respondent judge to inhibit or disqualify himself from further
continuing with the trial of said malversation cases,
thus assuring petitioner ‘the cold neutrality of an impartial judge’ (Gutierrez
v. Santos, 2 SCRA 249); * * *.”^[10]  The petitory
portion of such Comment considered as the answer reads as follows:  “[Wherefore], it is respectfully
recommended that an order be issued by this Honorable Court reversing the order
of the respondent judge denying petitioner Alfredo Ignacio’s petition for
inhibition in Criminal Cases Nos. 569 to 594 for malversation;
ordering said judge to desist from further hearing and trying the aforesaid malversation cases; and further ordering that said cases be
raffled among the district judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.”^[11]

The petition must be granted.

It is difficult to understand the reluctance of respondent Judge
to inhibit himself.  In a case where he
was named respondeht, Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz,^[12]
decided in 1973, this Court laid down the principle:  “It is now beyond dispute that due
process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the
part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and
just.”^[13]
It is traceable to Gutierrez v. Santos,^[14]
a 1961 decision, cited in the petition. 
As a matter of fact, in Umale, five cases were
relied upon in support of the conclusion reached, start­ing from Del Castillo
v. Javelona,^[15]
likewise invoked by petitioner and referred to in the Comment of the Solicitor
General.  Such a doctrine has been
consistently adhered to,^[16]
the latest case in point being Bautista v. Rebueno.^[17]

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge denying the
petition for inhibition in Criminal Cases Nos. 569 to 594 for malversation is hereby nullified and set aside, respondent
Judge being ordered to desist from further hearing and trying the aforesaid malversation cases which must be raffled among the District
Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
preferably all such cases to be tried by a single judge.  This decision is immediately executory.  No costs.

Aquino,
Concepcion, Jr., and Santos,
JJ., concur.

Antonio, (Acting
Chairman), J., in the result.

Abad
Santos, J., did not take part.

Barredo,
J., on official leave.

^[1]
Petition, par. 7.  Twenty-six informations for malversation
were filed against petitioner and other persons.

^[2] Ibid,
par. 6.  The penalty imposed was a
minimum of 17 years, 4 months and one day of reclusion temporal
to 20 years, as well as to indemnify the Provincial Government of Pasig, Rizal in the amount of
P660,000.00 and to pay the share of the costs. 
His co-accused likewise convicted were Wilfredo
Ignacio and Francisco Lara.

^[3]
Petition, par. 19, Annex G, 6-8.

^[4] Ibid,
par. 17.

^[5] Ibid,
par. 20.

^[6] Ibid,
par. 21.

^[7] Ibid,
par. 24.

^[8]
He was assisted by the then Assistant Solicitor General Alicia V. Sempio-Diy and the then Trial Attorney Deusdedit
B. Quijano.

^[9]
Comment, 4.

^[10] Ibid,
6-7.

^[11] Ibid,
10.

^[12] L-34756-59,
March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18.

^[13] Ibid,
23.

^[14]
112 Phil. 184.

^[15]
116 Phil. 451 (1962).  The four other
cases are People v. Gomez, L-22345, May 29, 1967, 20 SCRA
293; Pimentel v. Salonga, L-27934, Sept. 18,
1967, 21 SCRA 160; Luque v.
Kayanan, L-26826, Aug. 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 165; Paredes v. Gopengco, L-23710, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA
688.

^[16]
Cf. Umale v. Villaluz,
L-23710, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 688; Paredes v. Abad,
L-36927-28, April 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 522; Palang v. Zosa, L-38229,
Aug. 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 776; People v. Ancheta, L-29993, May 19, 1975, 64 SCRA
90; Marcos v. Domingo, Adm. Case No. 203-CJ, May 29, 1975, 64 SCRA 206; Martinez v. Gironella,
L-37635, July 22, 1975, 65 SCRA 245; Balieza v. Astorga, Adm.
Case No. 202-MJ, April 30, 1976, 60 SCRA 444; Villapando v. Quitain,
L-41333, Jan. 20, 1977, 75 SCRA 24.

^[17]
L-46117, February 22, 1978,
81 SCRA 535.