PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DIONISIO DELA CRUZ, ALIAS “DISIONG”, ALIAS “TILAY” AND JULIO DELA CRUZ, ALIAS “LALONG”, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Dionisio dela Cruz and Julio dela Cruz,
father and son, respectively, appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District,
Branch XI, convicting both of the crime of double murder.

In the morning of 18 April 1975, by a saltbed situated along a creek in Barrio Lawis, Labrador, Pangasinan, lying
just a few meters away from their hut, the contorted bodies of the spouses Meliton and Emilia Abobon were found, victims of a brutal slaying. 
The autopsy conducted by the Labrador Municipal Health Officer yielded
the following findings on the extent of the injuries sustained by the
deceased:

“Meliton Abobon

Head —

(1) Deep incised wound beginning from the left ear up to the
nose.

(2) Deep incised wound beginning from back of the neck up to left
ear.

(3) Deep incised wound back of the neck.

(4) Incised deep wound from left ear to the
neck.

Shoulder —

(1) Deep incised wound of the Anterior
right shoulder.

(2) Deep incised wound lower right shoulder.(3) Deep
punctured wound anterior shoulder.

Mrs. Emilia Quejado Abobon

(1)Very deep incised wound of the neck.

(2) Punctured wound right side of the chest.

(3) Incised deep wound at the back.” (Exhibits “A” and
“A-1”)

The investigation that followed produced three main
suspects, namely the accused Dionisio dela Cruz and Julio dela Cruz, and
one John Doe (a stranger whose identity could not then be ascertained and who
even now remains unidentified and at large).  On 28 April 1975,
warrants for the arrest of the two identified suspects were issued, and Dionisio was arrested the following day. 
Julio, on the other hand, accompanied by his
lawyer, surrendered himself to the
Labrador police authorities on
24 May
1975.

On 10
June 1975, a “Petition to Bail” was filed with Branch XI
of the Court of First Instance of Lingayen. 
The court, through Judge Romeo D. Magat, denied
this petition on 23 June
1975.  Upon motion for reconsideration, and
upon re-raffle of the case to Branch I of the same court, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun set the bail
application for hearing.

In the meantime, an Information
was filed on 30 June 1975 charging the accused with
double murder:

“That on or about the 17^th day of April, 1975, at night
in barrio Lawis, municipality of Labrador, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Dionisio dela Cruz, alias
“Disiong” alias “Tilay“, and Julio dela Cruz,
alias “Lalong“, together and in connivance with
one whose identity has not as yet been fully ascertained, conspiring together
and mutually helping one another, armed with boloes
and with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there, wilfully, and unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and hack Meliton Abobon and Emilia Abobon thereby inflicting upon them multiple fatal wounds
and injuries which caused their death as a consequence.”

Upon request of counsel for the defense, the proceedings on the
hearing on the petition for bail were consolidated with and treated as part of
the trial on the merits.

At this hearing on 21 August 1975, the prosecution
presented Abraham Malong and Rebecca Acosta, both
residents of Barrio Lawis and neighbors of the
deceased spouses.

Briefly, Malong’s testimony
disclosed that at around seven o’clock in the evening of 17 April 1975, he
noticed that Meliton and Emilia Abobon were at their hut
situated along the northern bank of the Lawis
Creek cooking salt (i.e., evaporating sea water), an activity which the
couple regularly carried out at least once every week.  Sometime
between ten o’clock and midnight of that same evening, while he was on his way
back to his hut, Malong heard a man’s agonizing voice
scream “Oh my lord, they are killing us” coming from the direction of where the
Abobons were cooking salt.  He proceeded
towards the source of the screams, taking care to conceal himself, until he was
approximately 25 to 30 meters away from the Abobon
hut, where he saw the whole incident take place.  Malong from his hiding place watched in horror as the
bolo-wielding trio of Dionisio, Julio and their
unidentified companion assaulted and hacked away at the defenseless couple and,
after their deadly mission had been accomplished, fled toward the northeast in
the general direction of the accused’s hut. 
Malong was so filled with fear by what he had
just witnessed that, except for his wife, he told no one else about it until
after the passage of ten days.  During this period, he stayed home,
feeling ill.  More importantly, Malong
testified that he recognized both accused as two of the assailants because it
was a bright and moonlit night and their faces were further illuminated by the
light from a lamp hanging outside the deceased’s hut and from the flames heating
the ovens (kawa) used by the luckless spouses
in cooking salt.^[1]

For her part, Rebecca Acosta testified at the 21 August 1975 hearing that at
approximately eleven o’clock of that
fateful evening, she was asleep inside her hut when she was suddenly awakened by
an “agonized voice” which twice screamed “Ay katawan ay“, accompanied
by the barking of dogs.  She then got up and peered
outside her window, and there she saw three men on the other side of the creek
clad only in shorts (carsunsillo), and
wielding boloes, hurriedly running away from the
general area where the Abobon hut was situated. 
Although she was approximately 70 meters away, she asserted
that she was able to identify positively Dionisio and
Julio as two of the men she saw hurrying away, for the same reasons given by
Malong — i.e., it was a bright and moonlit
night, and a clear view was further afforded by the light from a nearby lamp and
by the flames from the four ovens on which the spouses were cooking salt. 
She further testified that, as to the motive behind the slayings, father
and son were driven by their vengeful desire to rid themselves of
the Abobons whom they believed to be “witches” whose
“witchcraft” had brought about the death of Dionisio’s
son and the idiocy of his grandson.^[2]

Describing the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses as
“incredible” and “unbelievable” and noting “inconsistencies” between their
statements, Judge Fortun granted the petition for bail
in a resolution issued on 25
August 1975.  However, Norma Abobon, a daughter of the deceased, urged in a “Motion
Ex-Parte for Inhibition” that Judge Fortun
had prejudged the case and was hence not capable of rendering an impartial
decision therein.  Thereupon, Judge Fortun while rejecting Norma Abobon’s assertion nevertheless inhibited himself and the
case was once more re-raffled to the sala of Judge
Magat.

Upon arraignment on 30 March 1976, both accused entered a
plea of “not guilty” to the charge of double murder.

On 1
December 1976, the trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which
reads:

“WHEREFORE, with these considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
finding both the accused, Dionisio dela Cruz and Julio dela Cruz,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Murder as charged in the
Information and are hereby sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the death of Meliton Abobon, another penalty of reclusion perpetua for
the death of Emilia Quijado-Abobon; to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs
of Meliton Abobon in the
amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and another indemnification of
Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) to the heirs of Emilia Quijado-Abobon, with
costs.”

The accused filed with this Court a “Petition to Bail”
pending appeal which was denied on 25 April 1977.  Their
“Motion for Reconsideration” was likewise denied on 3 June
1977.

The judgment of conviction being now before us on appeal,
the accused assign the following errors:^[3]

I“

JUDGE MAGAT OF THE
LOWER
COURT ERRED IN
MISREPRESENTING THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE BY MAKING IT APPEAR STRONG AND ON THE
BASIS THEREOF, IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS KILLED THE SPOUSES
ABOBON.

“II

JUDGE MAGAT OF THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF
ALLEGED “EYE-WITNESSES” ABRAHAM MALONG AND ENRICO ACOSTA.

“III

JUDGE MAGAT OF THE LOWER
COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

“IV

JUDGE MAGAT OF THE LOWER
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING, FOR ITS OWN SAKE,
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.”

In their brief, appellants focus much attention on the separate
testimonies of Abraham Malong and Enrico Acosta, presenting in lengthy excerpts several
alleged inconsistencies in the effort to impeach the credibility of those
witnesses.

With respect to Malong, appellants contend that several inconsistencies
pervaded the separate statements which he gave on 21 August 1975 at the hearing
of the petition for bail, and on 21 and 26 July 1976 at the regular
trial, the most notable of which were:  (a) although
Malong earlier claimed that he positioned himself in a
place 25 to 30 meters away from where the killings took place, he later
testified that he was just 7 to 8 meters away at his saltbed when he witnessed the incident; and (b) in his
previous statement, he had claimed that Meliton
Abobon was screaming “Oh my lord, they are killing
us”, however, a year later he changed this to “Dionisio dela Cruz and Julio dela Cruz are killing us” — a definitely more precise and
incriminating version.  Furthermore, since the incident supposedly
took place at around midnight, and considering that he allegedly viewed the
killings from “across a 4 to 5 meter creek along both sides of which grow all
kinds of bushes and trees”, the appellants urge that Malong could not have possibly seen, much less identified,
them.  Finally, drawing attention to the fact that the children of
the slain spouses were close neighbors of Malong, and
in view of his assertion that his alleged presence at the scene of the crime was
neither noticed nor detected by the perpetrators thereof, appellants question
why it took this witness all of ten days before he reported the
killings to the authorities.  Such silence, appellants claim, was
“highly unnatural” and indicative of fabrication and falsity.

We are unable to agree with the accused-appellants’
contentions.

A careful examination of the record discloses that the supposed
“inconsistency” regarding the exact distance from which Malong viewed the killings is not properly attributed to the
witness himself.  In the first statement this witness gave on
27 April 1975 to Sgt. Romeo
B. Colet of the Philippine Constabulary investigating
unit, the following question-and-answer sequence is found:

“Q:  How far were you at the time that you claimed to
have seen and/or witnessed this incident?

“A:   From this place where I am now standing up to
that place where the post is standing.  (Affiant
pointing an approximate distance of about 25 to 30 meters.)”^[4]

It thus appears that the approximation of “25 to 30 meters”
was actually given by PC Sgt. Colet (or by some third
person), and not by the witness, so that when Malong
was later asked during the hearing on the petition for bail to estimate the
distance from which he had witnessed the slaying, he simply repeated Sgt. Colet’s (or the third person’s) estimation of the same,
which he must have presumed to be correct.  The record also shows
that at the trial on 21 July 1976 Malong was again
asked to indicate the distance at which he viewed the
killings by referring to an object some distance away,
which was then estimated by the trial court and by
both counsel for the prosecution and for the defense to
be 7 to 8 meters away from the witness stand.^[5] Thus, the “inconsistency”
arose.

From the foregoing, it is far from clear that Malong was responsible for whatever discrepancy arose in
respect of this particular matter.  Being a simple farmer and saltmaker, he could not be expected to give an accurate
quantitative statement of how far he was
from the scene of the crime, and this is presumably why he was
instead requested to relate this distance to an object visible to the
witness which then became the basis of the second approximation. 
But regardless of which of the two divergent estimates was (or is) more
accurate, one thing remained constant in Malong’s mind
and testimony — the fact that he saw Dionisio and
Julio dela Cruz, along with their unidentified
companion, hack to death Meliton and Emilia Abobon.

The discrepancy regarding exactly what Malong heard Meliton Abobon scream is immaterial as it refers only to a
relatively minor detail.  Again, what is important is that Malong steadfastly testified he had witnessed the actual
commission of the crime that evening and made positive identification of the
perpetrators thereof.  Even if we were to accept his first version
over the second, this fact will not change and his
testimony on this point was not successfully controverted and rebutted.

The defense stresses heavily Malong’s failure, for ten days after discovery of the crime,
to report to anyone, save his wife, what he had seen.  We do not
believe that sinister implications must necessarily be drawn from such failure
on the part of Malong.  We tend to
believe that his silence for ten days is not an unexpected reaction to the
outrage which had taken place and which Malong was
unfortunate enough to have witnessed.  Simply put, Malong was frightened out of his wits.  Barrio
Lawis is a small place where everyone knows everyone
else.  Once he reported what he had seen, the
accused-appellants would sooner or later learn from whence the report
came.  Malong admitted in open court that
he was not a particularly brave man, an admission not frequently
made in today’s world.  Thus, keeping in mind Malong’s humble position in life, it is not difficult to see
why it took time before he was able to gather his wits together and
take his courage in hand and to report what he had witnessed to the
authorities.  At the very least, an ordinary human being who had
witnessed the bloody slaying of the Abobons would have
been as horrified and as apprehensive as Malong
evidently was.  Not a few might well have gotten ill over or become
much disturbed by such a heinous murder and the implicit
possibility of reprisal (from the unidentified third man, if not from the
accused) that a formal report to the municipal authorities would commonly raise
for one living, as Malong lived, in a small and remote
barrio.  Finally, it may be noted that Malong, like most of the other witnesses, is not a highly
educated person.  It is doubtful whether he fully understood all
the questions asked of him; he was candid enough to admit that he had not.^[6]

In their defense, all that the appellants offered was the bare
assertion that they were in their hut sleeping while the Abobons were attacked and slain.  On their
defense of alibi, it should suffice to note that appellants’ hut was
only 150 to 200 meters away from the saltbed where the Abobons were boloed to death, a
distance easily covered within minutes even by a leisurely walk. 
Given these circumstances, the appellants’ defense of alibi can scarcely
be given much weight.  “Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that
can be resorted to by an accused”, this Court has held,^[7] and “as a minimum requirement for the
theory of alibi to be accepted, the accused must also demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to be in the scene of the crime”.^[8] “It is a well-settled rule,” this Court
has also said, “that against the positive identification of the accused, alibi
is unavailing”.^[9] Where, as here, the
tendered alibi is sought to be established exclusively by testimony of the
accused themselves, especial caution must be exercised in accepting it.^[10]

Another principal prosecution witness, Enrico Acosta, a stepson of Meliton Abobon, testified that
sometime before midnight of 17 April 1975, he
was awakened by the barking of dogs and unusual
activity outside his hut, which is situated some eight to ten meters away from
where Meliton and Emilia were cooking salt.  Having been
awakened, Enrico peeped through the walls of his nipa hut and saw both Dionisio and
Julio dela Cruz, together
with a man he had not seen before, hurriedly running away from the area where
the couple were cooking salt towards the northeast, in the general direction of
their own hut.  Like Malong and Rebecca
Acosta, Enrico testified that he was able to discern
the faces of the accused because it was a moonlit night, and their figures were
illuminated by the fire from the oven of the deceased and the light from a
kerosene lamp hanging outside the latter’s hut.

In seeking to refute Enrico
Acosta’s testimony, the defense calls our attention in their brief to the
statements given by his wife, Rebecca Acosta, at the hearing of the “Petition to
Bail” on 21 August
1975.  There Rebecca had stated that her husband, Enrico, was asleep when she had been awakened by the barking
of dogs and that Enrico was not awakened by the
barking and the agonized screams.^[11]

It may be noted at the outset that the defense refrained from
presenting Rebecca Acosta /as a witness, albeit a hostile one, for the accused
after Enrico Acosta had given his testimony. 
The defense also refrained both from recalling Rebecca Acosta for further
cross-examination after Enrico’s testimony, and from
cross examining Enrico on the basis of
Rebecca’s statements during the hearing of the petition for
bail.  We can only assume that the defense did not consider
Rebecca’s testimony concerning her husband being “fast asleep” as important and
material as it now contends it is.  What appears to us as important
is that Enrico and Rebecca Acosta had each positively
identified the accused Dionisio and Julio dela Cruz, along with a yet unidentified third person,
fleeing from the direction of the scene of the killings towards the accused’s hut.  Equally important is the fact
that the testimony of Enrico as well as that of
Rebecca corroborated the eye-witness testimony of Malong on the identity of the accused as the slayers of the
Abobon spouses.  In other words, if one
must choose between the testimony of one and that of the other, the testimony of
either Enrico or Rebecca was sufficient corroboration
of the testimony given by Malong.  We
tend to believe that both Enrico and Rebecca were
awakened (though not necessarily at the same time) by the howling of the dogs
and the screams of agony and peered fearfully at the men hurrying
away.  We are left to speculate why Rebecca stated that Enrico was not awakened by the noise.  But it
is not necessary to rest our conclusion on this point upon speculation. 
The trial judge found the testimony of Enrico
Acosta to be worthy of credence.  We do not believe that Rebecca’s
statement that Enrico was fast asleep is sufficient,
by itself and in the circumstances of this case, to overthrow the
trial court’s finding on this point.

Regarding the other assigned errors, appellants aver the
following:  (a) although there is no evidence on record to show
that Judge Magat had in fact conducted an ocular
inspection of the scene of the crime, he described the area as “open
country”,^[12] quite contrary to the scene
depicted by the several picture exhibits (Exhibits “4” and series, to “8” and
series) submitted in evidence by the defense, which “clearly show the thick
foliage in the area along the creek where the crime was allegedly committed …
along which grow all kinds of trees including acacia trees”^[13]; (b) since it was consistently alleged
that the killings took place sometime around midnight, “it cannot be bright
since there is no evidence that it was a moonlit night”^[14]; (c) the oven fire “could not have
sufficiently illumined the place to permit positive identification”^[15] of the defendants, or anyone else for
that matter, as the culprits; and (d) the supposed motive of the accused was
simply “provided”^[16] for by Judge Magat, who had already prejudged the case and was “bent [on]
convict[ing]”^[17] the accused.

Exhibit “4” and Exhibit “7” do suggest that “thick foliage”
and “all kinds of trees” abound in the fishpond area where the
deceased’s hut was located.  However, the plants and
trees referred to in said photographs have not been shown to pose
any obstruction to Malong’s line of vision
between the place from where he claims he viewed the killings
and the spot where the Abobons were
slain.  In fact, Exhibit “5”, a picture of the scene of the crime
which was evidently taken
from the general direction and area from where Malong
said he had situated himself, and Exhibit “6”, which shows from the obverse
side the scene depicted in Exhibit “5”, indicate that
a clear and unobstructed view was afforded Malong,
such that recognition and identification of the defendants as the
assailants of the couple were quite possible, as was precisely done by Malong.

In respect of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
that the fatal night was a “bright and moonlit night”, the defense presented as
its witness Mrs. Elvira Vinluan, the Oficer-in-Charge of
the PAGASA Weather Bureau at Dagupan
City. 
Unfortunately, the testimony of this witness on direct examination was
neither informative nor supportive of the appellants’
case.

On the other hand, upon cross-examination, Mrs. Vinluan testified that as far as
Dagupan
City was
concerned, as per the Bureau’s three-hourly observation check on the tragic
evening of 17 April
1975, the condition of the sky at ten minutes before
eleven
o’clock was clear, with the moon and the stars shining
brightly.  Although she did state that weather conditions in
Labrador could have been different, she did not
deny the possibility that the conditions therein could have in fact been
similar, if not identical to those prevailing in Dagupan
City.  Mrs. Vinluan also could not state with certainty whether at that
particular time the moon was high enough over Labrador to
escape being covered by the mountains in the area (which mountains, it may be
noted, are located south of the part of Barrio Lawis
where the killings took place).  However, she agreed that from an
area removed from the mountains, (e.g., by the beach) the moon would
still be visible.  Furthermore, when asked whether at ten o’clock that evening the moon would have
been “a little bit higher” in the sky, she answered, “It would be
logical.“, implying that better visibility could have
been afforded at such time.^[18]

On the question of the sufficiency of the light produced by the
oven flames, appellants presented no evidence whatsoever to show that the ovens
were not actually lit or, if lit, produced light too dim or insufficient for
Malong and Enrico and/or
Rebecca Acosta to see and identify the two defendants.  In fact,
they did not deny or contest the statement given by Rebecca Acosta that
four ovens, and not just one, were utilized by the Abobons that night in cooking salt.^[19]

Mindful of the circumstances enumerated above, the trial court
summed up:

“…In fact, the night was bright, there
was even the fire that came from the ovens of the Abobons and that of Abraham Malong.  So that, the accused
could not have been mistakenly identified by Abraham Malong and Enrico Acosta.”^[20]

We see no reason to disturb these
findings of the trial court.

Coming now to the motive for the commission by the defendants of
the crime charged, the same was not plucked out of thin air, as it were, by the
trial judge.  The trial court’s finding on the motive for the crime
rests on separate statements given by five witnesses (Enrico Acosta, Rebecca Acosta, Rogelio Abobon, Norma Abobon, and Santiago
Resoso^[21] all of whom
testified that both Dionisio and Julio dela Cruz resented the Abobons,
especially Emilia Abobon, for having allegedly caused the death of Dionisio’s
son and the feeblemindedness of Julio’s only son, through sorcery and
withcraft.  In fact, both Enrico Acosta and Rogelio Abobon
testified that in the afternoon of 17 April 1975 and on the previous day they
had been approached separately by the accused and warned that “something
would happen” to Meliton and Emilia Abobon if they did not
cease their practice of “witchcraft”.^[22] The defendants denied
having made such ominous threats.^[23] The
trial court was unable to accord substantive weight to such denials, in the face
of the mutually corroborative and supportive testimony of the prosecution
witnesses.  We find no reversible error on the part of the
trial court on this point.

Turning finally to the circumstances attending the
commission of the offense charged, treachery, having
been alleged and proved, qualified the killing of the unfortunate spouses as
murder.  The circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nocturnity which were also proven at the trial, are absorbed in treachery.^[24] Evident premeditation, which was also
alleged in the Information, might have been taken into account as a generic
aggravating circumstance had it been clearly
proven.  The trial court, however, did not make a specific finding
of evident premeditation, correctly, in our view, since the evidence of record
would not support such a finding.

So far as concerns Dionisio dela Cruz, there being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance properly appreciable, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each murder committed was correctly
imposed.

In the case of Julio dela Cruz,
however, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been
appreciated in his favor by the trial court.  The evidence of
record shows that the accused Julio dela Cruz, after
the funeral of the Abobon spouses in Labrador, Pangasinan, left Labrador and returned to San Miguel, Pasig, Rizal, where he had a
job.  The trial court construed the departure of Julio as a “flight
to Pasig, Rizal — to evade the strong arm of the law which, by
then, was catching up on him.  Otherwise, he could (sic) not have
brought along his family with him.”^[25]
The trial court did not indicate why the return of Julio to
Pasig, Rizal, constituted flight from justice.  The
court also failed to indicate why it regarded Julio’s bringing along his family
with him to where he had been earning his livelihood as indicative of an intent to evade the law. In any case, approximately four
weeks later, having come to learn of the issuance of the warrant for the arrest
of both his father and himself, Julio came back to
Labrador, Pangasinan and, accompanied by his lawyer, went to the
Labrador police authorities and
presented himself.  There is no evidence in the record to show that
Julio dela Cruz, before returning to
Labrador, had actually been
served with a copy of the warrant for his arrest, or that such warrant had been
returned unserved for failure to locate him.  In People versus Braña,^[26] the Court held that the fact that the
surrender is effected sometime after issuance of the
warrant of arrest does not detract from the voluntary character of the
surrender, in the absence of proof to the contrary.  The decision
of the trial court went on to say that

“Even if Julio dela Cruz were to [be]
liberally considered as having legally surrendered, yet, his penalty remains
the same as that of his co-accused, Dionisio dela Cruz, there being fully established
conspiracy.”^[27]

Here, the trial court is in
error.  The fact that conspiracy is established does not mean that
the penalty imposed upon one must be imposed upon the rest of the
conspirators.  Proof of conspiracy does not prevent the
appreciation of a mitigating circumstance exclusively in respect of the
co-conspirator to whom such circumstance may relate^[28].  Thus, appreciating in
favor of Julio dela Cruz the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender without any generic aggravating circumstance to offset
it, the correct penalty imposable upon him is the minimum period of the penalty
for murder:  i.e., reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, for each murder.^[29]

WHEREFORE, except for the penalty
applicable to Julio dela Cruz which, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, we hereby modify to an indeterminate penalty of from
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, for each murder, and the further modification
that the indemnity to be paid is increased to P60,000.00 (P30,000.00 to the
heirs of Meliton Abobon and
another P30,000.00 to the heirs of Emilia Quejado Abobon)
the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz,
and Gancayco,
JJ., concur.

---

^[1] Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN), 21 August 1975, pp.
125-163, Original Exhibits for the Defense.

^[2] Id., pp. 4-123.

^[3] Brief for Accused-Appellants, p.
180, Rollo.

^[4] Sworn Statement of Abraham Malong, p. 26, Original Records.

^[5] Original TSN, 21 July 1976, p.
118.

^[6] Original TSN, 26 July 1976
, pp. 166 and 169.

^[7] People v. Lumantas, 28
SCRA 764 (1969).

^[8] People v.
Dondoy, G.R. No. 63728, 15 September 1986 ; People v.
Bihasa, 130 SCRA 62 (1984); People v. Sambangan, 125 SCRA 726
(1983); People v. Munoz, 107 SCRA 313 (1981); and People v.
Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812 (1970).

^[9] People v. Terrobias, 103
SCRA 321 (1981); People v. Legones, 69 SCRA 210
(1976); People v. Cariño, 55 SCRA 516 (1974); and People v.
Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236 (1971).

^[10] People v. Brioso, 37
SCRA 336 (1971); People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94 (1985); People v.
Bagiscan, 6 SCRA 400 (1962).

^[11] TSN, 21 August 1975, pp. 10-11, Original Exhibits for the
Defense.

^[12] Brief for Accused-Appellants, p.
226, Rollo.

^[13] Id., p. 227, Rollo.

^[14] Ibid.

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] Ibid.

^[17] Id., p.
226, Rollo.

^[18] Original TSN,
26 October 1976, pp. 357-360.

^[19] TSN, 21 August 1975, p. 27,
Original Exhibits for the Defense.

^[20] Decision, p. 13, Rollo.

^[21]
Enrico Acosta:  Original TSN, 20 July 1976, pp. 31-33 and
37-39; Rebecca Acosta:  TSN, 21 August 1975, pp. 62-63, Original
Exhibits for the Defense; Rogelio Abobon:
 Original TSN, 21 July 1976, pp. 73-77; Norma Abobon:  Sworn Statement, 19 April 1975, p.
14, Original Records;
Santiago
Resoso:  Sworn Statement,
28 April 1975, p. 24,
Original Records.

^[22] Ibid.

^[23] Original TSN, 29 September 1976 pp. 267-269; and 11 October 1976, pp.
329-331.

^[24] People v. Dueño, 90 SCRA 23 (1979).

^[25] Decision, p. 7, Criminal Case
no. L-1007, Rollo, p. 85.

^[26] 30 SCRA 308 (1969). 
See also People v. Diva, 23 SCRA 332 (1968) and People v.
Valera, 5
SCRA 910 (1962).

^[27] Italics supplied; Decision, p. 7,
Criminal Case No. L-1007, Rollo, p. 85.

^[28] People vs. Valdellon, 46
Phil. 245 (1924).  See in this connection, Article 62 (3), Revised
Penal Code.

^[29] We cannot condone by
passing sub silentio the extravagant language used by counsel for the
defense in referring to the trial judge (Judge Romeo D. Magat) and the manner in which the latter heard and decided
the case.  Defense counsel described Judge Magat as rationalizing “a judgment he knew to be wrong”
(Appellants’ Brief, p. 3).  Judge Magat
is further accused of convicting “for its (sic) own sake, the
accused-appellants” (Appellants’ Brief, p. 7) and as “misrepresenting the
evidence of the prosecution by making it appear
strong” (Appellants’ Brief, p. 9).  Further down, defense counsel
refers to Judge Magat as “a judge bent to convict”
(Appellants’ Brief, p. 54). 
Finally, defense counsel charges Judge Magat with convicting the appellants to “satisfy (his)
personal whims and caprices” (Appellants’ Brief, p. 60). 
The language used by defense counsel goes beyond the merely
vigorous or exuberant expressions which, in a passionately fought courtroom
battle, may well be overlooked.  We refer here to language used in
a brief which is presumably written after careful thought. 
Judging from the appellants’ brief and from the record of this case, the
statements of defense counsel against Judge Magat were
made without basis and hence deplorable.  Epithets,
whether directed at the judge or at the witnesses, have no place in proceedings,
oral or written, before our courts.