G.R. No. L-37191. March 30, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HORACIO JARDINIANO, APOLINARIO JARDINIANO AND RODOLFO ORTEGA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Automatic appeal from the Decision of the Court Of First Instance
of Oriental Mindoro, Branch II, in Criminal Case No.
R-57, convicting the accused Apolinario Jardiniano, his son Horacio Jardiniano, and his son-in-law Rodolfo Ortega, of Murder,
and sentencing them to death.
The victim, Balud, a 60-year old Mangyan, was killed
on the night of February 11, 1970 at around 10;00 o’clock outside his house at Sitio Siangi, Barrio Lisap, in the Municipality of Bongabon,Oriental
Mindoro. The
autopsy performed by Dr. Fernando A. Viloria,
Municipal Health Officer of Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, revealed that the victim had suffered
bleeding of the nose and ears, and a lacerated wound, 3 inches long, at the occipital region (Exhibit “A”). Dr. Viloria
declared that the wound could have been caused by the infliction of a blow on
the head with a hard blunt instrument like a piece of wood, causing brain
damage, as indicated by the bleeding of the nose and ears, which resulted in
the death of the victim.[1]
The prosecution presented two eyewitnesses Win-ay, the second
wife of Balud, also a Mangyan,
and Eustaquia Redoma. Win-ay testified that on, the night of the incident,
she and her husband with their four-year–old son Dayao,
were already sleeping, when she was awakened by the sudden entrance of accused,
Horacio Jardiniano, into
their house. She did not see the
companions of Horacio because it was dark. Horacio dragged her
husband outside. Then, one of his
companions tied her hands behind her, bound her to the fence near the door of
the house, and hit her on the head rendering her unconcious. When she came to, she called her son to untie
her, after which, she lit a light and, with the little boy, went to the house
of a certain Ago, whose wife is her relative.[2]
Before they left, she saw her husband lying on his back, about a yard away from
the door of their house, his face
covered with blood, and still breathing.[3]
Eustaquia Redoma
declared that she was in the house of Hignay, the
first wife of Balud, when the incident occurred. That house is only three meters away from Balud’s house where the latter lived with his second wife,
Win-ay, She saw Horacio enter the house of Balud and Win-ay and pull Balud
outside. Accused Apolinario
then tied the hands of Balud behind him, while
accused Rodolfo focussed his flashlight on Balud. Then she saw Horacio box and club the victim who supplicated “Do
not kill me, just get my
chickens.” Terrified at what she witnessed, she fled.[4]
The defense presented an altogether different version, Witnesses Balitang and Ganid, brother and
nephew, respectively, of the deceased, declared that they, together with Lugak, another brother of the deceased, witnessed the whole incident because
they slept that night in the house of Hignay, the
deceased’s first wife, to help the deceased in the clearing of his “kaingin” the following morning. They stated that it was Anao,
another Mangyan, who killed the deceased because of a
boundary dispute. Semaco
Manato, former Barrio
Councilman of Lisap, and Diosdado
Martinez, Barrio Captain of Lisap, confirmed the
alleged boundary dispute between the deceased and Anao.
On their own behalf, the three accused, who are also residents of
Siangi, Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro, individually interposed the defense of alibi. Horacio Jardiniano alleged that on February 11, 1970, he went to Barrio Luna, Bongabon, to repair the roof of the house of his in-laws,
and stayed there up to the fourteenth.
His testimony was corroborated by Francisco Salagubang,
who allegedly went to the same barrio on that date to visit his mother-in-law,
who was dying. Accused Rodolfo Ortega
declared that he went to Masaguisi, Bongabon, on February
9, 1970 to harvest palay and returned to Siangi only on February
20, 1970. Accused Apolinario Jardiniano claimed
that he was in his house at Siangi on the night of
the incident. He confirmed the
respective testimonies of his son, Horacio, and his
son-in-law, Rodolfo, as to their whereabouts that evening.
The trial Court gave credence to the version of the prosecution
and, on June 9, 1973,
rendered its Decision with the following dispositive
portion:
“WHEREFORE, accused, Apolinario Jardiniano, Horacio Jardiniano, and Rodolfo Ortega, are hereby found guilty
beyond reason able doubt of the crime of murder as defined and penalized in
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery-and all the accused
having taken advantage of their superior strength, with all the attendant
aggravating circumstance as enumerated in the
information, without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, consequently,
the Court has no alternative but to impose as it hereby imposes upon all the
accused the capital punishment of DEATH.
They are likewise condemned to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the
victim, Balud Mangyan, the
amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity, with out of course, subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency in view of the nature of the penalty, and to pay the costs.”
In
this appeal, appellants maintain that:
“The lower Court erred in holding that appellants were guilty
of murder in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as disclosed by the facts established by
the evidence on record.”
Appellants insist that they have not been positively identified by prosecution witnesses Eustaquia Redoma and Win-ay, their testimonies being filled with inconsistencies and riddled
with self-contradictions.
The contention is baseless.
Eustaquia Redoma pointed categorically to appellant Horacio Jardiniano as the one who
forcibly dragged the deceased outside his
house and then boxed and clubbed him.
Win-ay attributed the same role to
appellant Horacio.
And although Win-ay did not see the other two appellants, they were
specifically identified by Eustaquia and their
respective participation fully described by her – appellant Apolinario
tied the deceased’s hands behind his back, while appellant Rodolfo focused his
flashlight on the deceased. But even
assuming the existence of a few minor contradictions in the
statements of said witnesses, they would have no effect on the
probative value of their statements as their declarations are consistent in
pointing to the accused as participis criminis in the killing of the victim.[5]
The inconsistencies and contradictions assailed by the defense
are more apparent than real. First, they
maintain that Eustaquia and Win-ay gave different
versions regarding the utterances made by the deceased when he was being
assaulted. Even admitting such inconsistencies,
it is evident that they refer to minor details with respect to which persons
witnessing the same occurrence are bound to disagree in the ordinary course of
events. This is usual among witnesses
and will not affect their credibility.[6]
Secondly, there is no basis either to the alleged inconsistencies
between Eustaquia’s testimony and that of Win-ay as
to the house from where Eustaquia viewed the
incident. Eustaquia
stated that she was in the house of the
first wife (Hignay) of the deceased when she saw the
three appellants commit the crime for which they were indicted.[7] Contrary to the defense posture, Eustaquia did not say that she was in the house of
Win-ay. Win-ay herself declared that Eustaquia was in Hignay’s house
on February 11, 1970. Thus, their testimonies, are, in
fact, consistent with each other.
Thirdly, Eustaquia and Win-ay did not
contradict each other regarding the number of persons staying in the deceased’s
house when the incident took place. Eustaquia said that there were four persons residing in the house
of the deceased at the time of the
incident, which is not incorrect, as Win-ay herself stated that she has two
children with the deceased, a boy and a girl.[8]
Win-ay never stated that there were only three people living in their
house. What she said merely was that her
son Dayao slept with her-and her husband that night.[9]
Fourthly, relative to the house nearest which the deceased was
killed, considering the minimal three-meter-distance between the house of Hignay from where Eustaquia
viewed the incident, and the house of Win-ay from where the deceased was
dragged and clubbed to death, it is not really incorrect to state that the
deceased was killed outside Hignay’s house. But, again, this is but an inconsequential
matter.
Fifthly, appellants, further assail Eustaquia’s
credibility because although, on direct, she declared in detail how she saw
appellants kill the deceased, on cross, she stated that the persons she saw
that evening were wearing masks and her only basis for testifying that
appellants killed the deceased was that while she was lying down about to
sleep, she overheard voices which were familiar to her. Once more, this is inaccurate, because Eustaquia further stated that when she heard the voices,
she got up, went to the stairs, and saw appellants perpetrate the offense. She recognized the culprits because Rodolfo
trained the flashlight on the deceased.
The light provided sufficient illumination to enable her to recognize
all the appellants, whom she had known for a long time since they were residents of the same municipality.[10]
The overriding issue raised by the defense simmers down to the
credibility of prosecution witnesses, with respect to which, this Court has
always accorded the highest degree of respect to the findings of the trial
Judge, unless there is proof of misappreciation of
evidence,[11] which is absent in the case at bar.
Appellants’ individual defense of alibi cannot be sustained. It is well settled that evidence to support
the same must preclude the possibility of the accused’s
presence at the scene of the crime while the evidence relative to his
identification must be weak and insufficient.[12]
No proof has been shown that it was physically impossible for appellants to
have been at the scene of the incident at the time it occurred. The place where appellants Horacio and Rodolfo claimed to be were within the same
municipality where the offense was committed although in different
barrios. The evidence discloses that
passenger vehicles ply those places and appellants could have easily negotiated
the respective distances by taking a motor vehicle. Appellant Apolinario
was in the same municipality of Siangi and it would have been
an easy matter for him to have gone to the deceased’s house at about 10 o’clock in the evening, participated in
killing him, and slipped back to his house.
Moreover, the defense of alibi assumes importance only when the evidence
for the prosecution is weak especially on the aspect of identity of the
culprit.[13]
In this case, positive identification of appellants was furnished by witnesses Eustaqui and Win-ay, sufficient to establish their guilt
to a moral certainty.
As the trial Court found, appellants’ criminal act was motivated
by their desire to get the land of the deceased. The deceased had already given up a sizable
portion of his land to appellant Apolinario, which
the latter distributed to his fellow Christians, but Apolinario wanted to acquire the remaining land. Win-ay declared that appellant Apolinario got their piece of land at Gantong
(Gandon) and never paid for it.[14] She was positive that appellants’ killed her
husband because they wanted to get the piece of land, on which their house
stood, but the deceased refused to give it to them.
The trial Court correctly denied credence to the testimonies of
defense witnesses, Balitang, brother, and Ganid, nephew of the deceased, that they saw the latter being clubbed by Anao,
as the trial Court stated;
“. . . if it were true that they,
together with Lugak, who was also the brother of the
deceased, were present, by instinct, one of them being also the nephew of the deceased and they being armed with bolos as
they were in the vicinity because they would help in the clearing of the kaingin of Balud, they should
have gone to the immediate succor of their brother who was in imminent danger,
it appearing that Anao was armed only with a piece of
wood.”[15]
Further, contrary to what Ganid and Balitang claimed Win-ay declared that the
deceased’s land was not yet ready for “kaingin”
so that there would have been no reason for Ganid and Balitang to have been at Hignay’s,
(the first wife’s) house on the
night of the incident. And if
they really had been there, Eustaquia, who was in the
house, would have seen them.
Additionally, in so far as the testimonies of Mangyans,
in general, are concerned, the trial Court had this to say:
“It is a matter of common knowledge that in this province
where the Mangyans belonging to the cultural minority
are residing, their reputation as witness in Court proceedings has usually been discarded by the
Court because they are inherently liars; hence, testimony of Balitang, brother and Ganid,
nephew, respectively of the deceased, cannot be given also any weight because
whatever they have declared in Court has been overcome by the testimonies of Eustaquia Radoma and Win-ay Mangyan, surviving spouse
of Balud Mangyan;
likewise, being unlettered and most of them are residing in the mountains, the Mangyans
have always been at the receiving end whenever the transaction is between a
Christian and a Mangyan, so much so that in the case
at bar, it has been established by competent evidence that the accused,
especially Apolinario Jardiniano
wanted to grab the land of the deceased, in fact he was already given a sizable
portion of the land of the deceased which he distributed to his fellow
Christians, and he wanted to have the remaining land of Balud
Mangyan even if it would cause him to kill somebody
as he did in killing Balud Mangyan.”[16]
We come now to the nature of the crime committed and the penalty imposable. The qualifying circumstance of treachery and other aggravating
circumstances of abuse of superior strength, nighttime, dwelling, evident
premeditation and employment of means to weaken the defense of the victim were
considered by the trial Court in imposing the death penalty. It is undisputed that treachery attended the
killing of the deceased because his hands were bound, after which, he was
clubbed to death. Such means tended
directly to insure the consummation of the crime without risk to the
aggressor, inasmuch as thus bound, the deceased could not defend himself in any
manner against his assailants.
Abuse of superior
strength is also present but this is necessarily included in treachery.[17]
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling also deserves
appreciation. The victim was taken from
his house and was killed just outside his abode. Dwelling is aggravating if the victim was
taken from his house although the offense was not completed therein.[18]
There is no showing that appellants purposely sought the cover of
night or that they had taken advantage of it in order to facilitate the
commission of the crime, or for the purpose of impunity. Besides, even if attendant, it would be
deemed absorbed by treachery.[19]
There being no proof as to how and when the plan to kill was
hatched, or what time elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation
can neither be appreciated. To properly
appreciate this circumstance, it is necessary to establish with proof, as clear
as the evidence of the crime itself, (1) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has
clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and the execution to allow him to reflect.[20]
There is no evidence either that means were employed by
appellants to weaken the defense of the victim and, therefore, this aggravating
circumstance should be disregarded.
As treachery attended the perpetration of the offense, the
killing was qualified to Murder. The
penalty prescribed by law is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death.[21]
Because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, with no
mitigating circumstance to offset it, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period, which is death. For lack of the required number of votes for
the imposition of the death penalty, however, the sentence is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, except for the penalty, which is modified to reclusion
perpetua, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the accused appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad
Santos, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., concurs with the qualification that Rodolfo Ortega should be
convicted only as an accomplice.
[1] T.s.n., September 18, 1970, pp. 5 & 6.
[2] T.s.n., February 1, 1971, pp. 11-14.
[3] Ibid.,
pp. 15 & 16.
[4] T.s.n., September
18, 1970, pp. 13-15.
[5] People vs. Yu, 80 SCRA 384 (1977).
[6] People vs. Verzo,
65 SCRA 324 (1975).
[7] T.s.n., September 18, 1970, pp, 14-15.
[8] T.s.n., February 1, 1971, pp. 24-25.
[9] Ibid., p. 47.
[10] T.s.n., September 18, 1970, pp. 10-15, 36 & 38.
[11] People vs. Legones,
69 SCRA 210 (1976).
[12]
People vs. Peñafiel, 3 SCRA 911, 917 (1961).
[13]
People vs. Omega, 76 SCRA 262 (1977).
[14] Tsn., February 1, 1971, pp. 18-19.
[15] p. 30, Decision, p. 49, Rollo.
[16]
pp. 34-35, Original Rollo.
[17] People vs. Undong, 66 SCRA 386 (1975);
People vs. Pajenado, 69 SCRA 172 (1976).
[18] People vs. Lastimosa,
27 Phil. 432 (1914).
[19]
People vs. Tizon,
66 SCRA 372 (1975); People vs. Echaluce, 66
SCRA 221 (1975).
[20]
People vs. Diva, 23 SCRA 332 (1968).
[21] Art, 248, Revised Penal Code.