G.R. No. L-44723. August 31, 1987
STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS OFFICER-IN-CHARGE OF THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL’S OFFICE OF CAMARINES NORT…
BIDIN, J.:
Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal
Case No. 821 of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until the same is terminated.
The facts of the case are not disputed. On March
21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials
(scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte
against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes
for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued
a resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for
Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima
facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private
respondents sought reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by
Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated October
14, 1974.
On October
29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte an Information dated October
17, 1987 docketed as
Criminal Case No. 821, charging private respondents with the crime of Attempted
Theft.
In a letter dated October
22, 1974, the
private respondents requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the
Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated August
26, 1974 and October
14, 1974.
On November
6, 1974, the Chief
State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to “Please
elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido
et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review.”
The letter-request for
review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the Secretary of Justice dated
November 23, 1974 alleging, among other things, that an information for
Attempted Theft had already been filed against private respondents for which
reason the request for review has become a moot question as the Provincial
Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted theft.
On March 6,
1975, the Secretary
of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to
immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a
letter dated June 11, 1975.
A motion to dismiss dated September
16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court
denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie
evidence against private respondents and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.
Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court’s ruling
but in an Order dated February 13,
1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to April 23, 1976.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed
a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and
respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of
the Provincial Fiscal’s Office of Camarines
Norte.
On April 19, 1976,
respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the
case. This second motion to dismiss was denied
by the trial court in an Order dated April
23, 1976. Whereupon,
respondent fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear
therein. Hence, this
petition for mandamus.
In this action, petitioner
prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus “commanding
respondent fiscal or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act
in his place or stead to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Norte” (Petition, Rollo, p. 27).
There is no question that
the institution of a criminal action is addressed to the sound discretion of
the investigating fiscal. He may or he
may not file the information according to whether the evidence is in his
opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt (Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides
not to file the information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be
compelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the case had already been
filed in court, “fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent
of the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and
pending further proceedings. The power to
dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court” (U.S. vs. Barredo, 32
Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, supra).
“However, the matter of instituting an information
should be distinguished from a motion by the fiscal for the dismissal of a case
already filed in court. The judge may
properly deny the motion where, judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there appears to be sufficient
evidence to sustain the prosecution.
This is, as it should be, because the case is already in court and,
therefore, within its discretion and control (Abela vs. Golez, 131 SCRA
12).
This
ruling is just being consistent with the principle first laid down in U.S. vs. Valencia (1 Phil. 642) where it was held that
“after the complaint has been presented,
and certainly after trial has been commenced, the court and not the fiscal has
full control of it. The complaint cannot
be withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the court.” It is discretionary on the court where the case is
pending to grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same (Asst. Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete
103 Phil. 914).
In the case at bar, the
court below denied the fiscal’s motion to dismiss on the ground that there
was a prima facie case against private respondents. The question presented for determination now is – after a case has been filed in court,
can a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same, after his motion to dismiss it
has been denied?
This court is of the view
that the writ prayed for should issue.
Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must
proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court
to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the
accused. The fiscal should not shirk
from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at
the hands of a private prosecutor. At
all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules
of Court). Otherwise, the entire
proceedings will be null and void (People vs. Beriales,
70 SCRA 361).
“In the trial of
criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the
State” (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., p.
10). This is so because “the
prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,
in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer” (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556).
Accordingly, if the
fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he
simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to
prosecute the same. He is obliged by law
to proceed and prosecute the criminal action.
He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what
he can do is to continue appearing for
the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal
or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289).
Where there is no other
prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the
evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the
case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties.
The mere fact that the
Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the
prosecuting fiscal to move for
the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial
court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the
case. It is the court where the case is
filed and not the fiscal that has full control of it. Very recently, this Court in Mario Fl. Crespo vs. Hon. Leodegario L.
Mogul (G.R. No. 53373, promulgated June 30, 1987) ruled:
“The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion
of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what
to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that
the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal maybe
disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action
of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.”
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby Granted. Public respondent or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place
or stead, is hereby ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until
the same is terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., no part. I was the former counsel of respondent
herein Gil Alapan.