PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLANTIFF AND APPELLE, VS. MACARIO CASALME, DEFENDANT AND APPELANT.

People versus Casalme

The Case

This is People versus Casalme, a criminal appeal decided in July 1966. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Macario Casalme for the fatal shooting of Domingo Veras, and the trial court convicted him of murder. The case matters to a reviewee for two reasons: it is a clean illustration of how treachery is established under the Revised Penal Code even where the victim had been forewarned, and it shows how a voluntary surrender that is not reflected in the record of arrest operates as a mitigating circumstance that lowers the penalty.

Procedural History

Macario Casalme was charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of Laguna, sitting in Biñan. After trial, that court convicted him, appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery, found no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in attendance, and imposed reclusion perpetua plus a civil indemnity of six thousand pesos. Casalme appealed, assigning four errors which the Supreme Court reduced to two issues. The appeal reached the Supreme Court as an ordinary appeal from a conviction in a criminal case.

Facts

Macario Casalme and Domingo Veras were both foremen in the Canlubang Sugar Estate. On the morning of December 19, 1959, Casalme went with Marc Ian o Tuason, an assistant overseer, to the house of Marcelino Meneses, the Inspector. On leaving, the two met Veras, who gave Casalme a fist blow on the left cheek. Casalme withdrew, ran to the house of Meneses, and shouted at Veras the words "magbabayad ka rin," meaning you will pay for this. Asked why he had struck Casalme, Veras explained that Casalme had called him a sycophant and spat on his face.

At about seven in the evening of the next day, December 20, Veras was walking home on the barrio road. Two well illuminated stores stood near each other on the roadside, owned respectively by Exequiel de Claro and Albino Patricio, and nearby was the house of Casalme's sister, Juliana Bijis. As Veras reached the spot in front of the space between the two stores, he encountered Casalme, who had just come out of his sister's premises. Casalme uttered only two words, "panahon na," meaning it is time, aimed his pistol at Veras, and fired five times in quick succession. Veras could only say "huag," meaning do not, before the first shot, and was soon prostrate on the ground with three wounds, the one on the left side of the head being necessarily fatal.

Casalme was positively identified by two eyewitnesses, Victor Atienza and Elpidio Marasigan. Atienza, listening to a radio broadcast in front of Patricio's store, looked toward the shooting and saw Casalme fire the last two shots, recognizing his familiar figure though his back was turned, and saw him re-enter his sister's house. Marasigan was walking only a few paces behind Veras and saw and heard the whole encounter. Casalme's defense was alibi: that he was in Bataan visiting a sister and returned only on December 23. The trial court rejected the alibi, noting his motive, his unexplained disappearance from the barrio immediately after the shooting, his failure to claim his Christmas bonus, and his going into hiding in Tagaytay City upon learning he was suspected.

Issues

• Whether or not the identity of Macario Casalme as the killer was established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the offense committed was murder, qualified by treachery, or only simple homicide.

Applicable Provisions

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

This is the provision the Court construes in deciding whether the killing was qualified to murder, and it is the textual anchor of the ruling that surprise is not the only test.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the identity of Casalme as the killer was established beyond reasonable doubt. The alibi cannot prevail over the eyewitness evidence, and the trial judge heard and believed the testimony of Marasigan. The Court held that Marasigan's failure to relate the incident at once to the policemen of Canlubang or to the crowd at the scene did not detract from his veracity, since he did tell the Vice-Mayor and later the Constabulary in Los Baños, and his reticence was explained by fear.

On the second issue, the Court held that the offense was murder, qualified by treachery. Counsel argued that because Veras had been threatened the day before, he was not caught by surprise. The Court rejected this, holding that treachery does not connote the element of surprise alone, but exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms which tend directly and specially to insure the execution of the offense, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. When Casalme accosted his victim, who could have had no idea how the threat would be carried out, and without warning shot him five times, nothing could have been done by the latter in his own defense.

The Court also gave weight to the Solicitor-General's observation that Casalme voluntarily surrendered, first to the Justice of the Peace of Santa Rosa, Laguna, with whom he posted a bond, and then to the Constabulary headquarters of the province. There being no record that the order of arrest was ever served upon him, the recommendation to consider this circumstance in mitigation was proper.

Doctrine

First, treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code does not require surprise. It is enough that the offender employs means, methods, or forms that tend directly and specially to insure the execution of the offense without risk to himself from the defense the offended party might make. A prior threat does not negate treachery, because the victim may still have no idea how the threat will be carried out, and an unprovoked shooting at close range leaves him no chance to defend himself.

Second, alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by eyewitnesses, especially where the trial court believed the witnesses and the accused's own conduct, such as unexplained flight and hiding, tends to show guilt.

Third, a voluntary surrender to the authorities, where no order of arrest was ever served, is a mitigating circumstance that lowers the penalty, here reducing it to an indeterminate sentence within reclusion temporal.

Disposition

The judgment of the trial court was modified by reducing the penalty to an indeterminate sentence ranging from twelve years and one day to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and affirmed as to the indemnity and costs. The conviction for murder stood.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: treachery does not connote surprise alone, but exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms that insure the execution of the offense without risk to himself from the defense the victim might make. Examiners use this case to test whether a prior threat destroys treachery, and to test voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance where no arrest order was served.