RURAL BANK OF MALALAG, INC., COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG, RESPONDENT.

In a letter-complaint dated March 11, 1993, the Rural Bank of
Malalag Inc., through its manager, Antonio P. Dulanas, charged Judge Segundino
D. Maniwang of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Malalag-Sulop, Davao
del Sur, with undue delay in the disposition of six collection cases, namely
Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227, 228, 229, 230 and 231.

I

Civil Cases Nos. 226, 227 and 228 were filed on September 10,
1991. Complainant alleged that no
action was taken by respondent with respect to these civil actions except for
the pre-trial conference on March 12, 1992. Respondent admitted that he did not take any action on the cases but he
claimed that two of the cases were not triable under the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure.

Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231 were filed on November 15,
1991. The defendants were served with
summons on November 27, 1991; hence, the answers were due on December 12,
1991. As no answers were filed as of
May 6, 1992, complainant filed a motion for the resolution of said cases on May
7, 1992.

On June 2, 1992, the defendants filed a motion to admit their
answers. On June 10, 1992, respondent
admitted the answers and denied the motion for resolution on the grounds that
the answers raised “factual matters which need to be clarified in a formal
hearing.”

On June 26, 1992, complainant filed a second motion for
resolution of the cases.

In his Order dated July 10, 1992, respondent denied complainant’s
motion to declare defendants in default, stating: (a) that the said motion was a prohibited pleading under Section
15 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; (b) that he could not just
disregard the answers filed by defendants
for they raise a meritorious defense; and (c) that there were factual matters
which should be clarified in a formal hearing.

After the preliminary conference on August 20, 1992, respondent
issued pre-trial orders stating, in common, that the following factual issues
had yet to be resolved:

1. Whether or not
defendants have fully paid their indebtedness to plaintiff.

2. Whether or not
defendants signed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Mrs. Dulanas
(complainant’s representative) to withdraw all the checks due them as public
school teachers (Rollo, p. 25).

As required by respondent, complainant filed its position
paper. The defendants, however, did not
file their position paper.

On September 15, 1992, complainant again filed a motion to
resolve the cases, arguing that the defendants had waived their right to
present evidence after having failed to submit their position papers.

In his Order dated October 27, 1992, respondent denied
complainant’s motion to resolve, stating that there was a need to conduct a
hearing in order to resolve the factual issues. Furthermore, he claimed that the records pertinent to the said
factual issues were in the hands of the officials of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), necessitating the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum. He also
noted that the hearing “would also give the defendants the opportunity to
establish the merits of their defense and prevent a denial of substantial
justice” (Rollo, pp. 37-38).

Complainant alleged that respondent failed to resolve the civil
cases pursuant to Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure after the
defendants therein failed to file their answers to the complaints, and pursuant
to Section 10 thereof, after the defendants failed to submit their position
papers. It also alleged that respondent
deviated from the Revised Rule of Summary Procedure by conducting regular
trials, under the guise of “clarificatory hearings.”

In his comment, respondent averred that when Civil Cases Nos.
229, 230 and 231 were filed on November 15, 1991 in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop, where
he was the acting presiding judge, he had other duties as acting judge of Sta.
Cruz, Davao del Sur and as permanent circuit judge in Padada-Kiblawan, Davao
del Sur. In May 1991, he was designated
to try a case in the MCTC of Bansalan-Magsaysay. He could only conduct the hearing of cases in the MCTC of
Malalag-Sulop once a week, giving preference to criminal cases involving
detained prisoners. Thus, not all the
cases in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop could be heard and tried by him, including
the civil cases filed by complainant.

Respondent denied the charge of deviation from the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure in the handling of Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231. According to him, his denial of the motions
to resolve the cases filed by complainant was, in fact, consistent with due
process in order to give the defendants a chance to establish their claim of
payment. He argued that there would
have been a failure of justice if he resolved the cases of complainant on the
basis of the complaints and its evidence alone, in disregard of the meritorious
defense in the answers.

He also denied the charge that he held full-blown trials in
contravention of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, asserting that what he
conducted were only “clarificatory hearings” for the purpose of
allowing the DECS representatives to bring to court the payrolls of the
defendants. The first
“clarificatory hearing” was continued on another date because the
payrolls submitted to the court were voluminous and one of the DECS representative
failed to attend the hearing.

II

We find respondent’s explanations unsatisfactory.

Respondent’s explanation for his inaction in Civil Cases Nos.
226, 227 and 228 was that two of the cases cannot be tried in accordance with
the summary procedure because of the amount involved. He was referring to Civil Case No. 226, which involved the
collection of the amount of P19,890.91 and attorney’s fees of P5,000.00 and
Civil Case No. 227, which involved the amount of P19,666.07 and attorney’s fees
of P5,000.00.

It is true that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not
apply where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim exceeds P10,000.00,
exclusive of interests and costs. But
if Civil Cases Nos. 226 and 227 cannot be heard summarily, respondent has not explained
why he failed to set these cases for trial in accordance with the regular
procedure. From March 12,1992, the date
of the pre-trial, up to March 22, 1993, the date of the filing of the
administrative complaint, there was no action taken by respondent on these
cases. While these cases were filed on
September 10, 1991, respondent set them for pre-trial only on March 13, 1992.

Respondent has not explained either why Civil Case No. 228, which
involved only the amount of P7,390.95, was not heard under the summary
procedure.

He has not shown his case load in the MCTC of Malalag-Sulop, MCTC
of Padada-Kiblawan, and MCTC of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur. However, taking into account his
multifarious duties, respondent’s culpability is slightly diminished.

As to Civil Cases Nos. 229, 230 and 231, respondent has not
explained why after the defendants failed to file their answer, he did not
follow Section 6 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides:

“Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendants fail to
answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio,
or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being
excessive or otherwise unconscionable x x x.”

He has not explained the justification for allowing the admission
of the answers, which were filed more than five months after their due date.

He has not explained why he did not decide the cases after the
defendants failed to submit the affidavits of their witnesses on the factual
issues defined in the orders, together with their position papers setting forth
the law and the facts relied upon by them.

Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is very
explicit that:

“Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in
the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their
witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order,
together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied
upon by them.”

Said Section 9 should be read together with Section 10 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the first paragraph of which provides:

“Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits
and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the
court shall render judgment.”

x x x                                                                      x
x x                                                                 x
x x

While the third paragraph of Section 10 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure allows the court, should it find it necessary to clarify
certain material facts, to issue “an order specifying the matters to be
clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on
the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order,” it has
to render judgment “within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last
clarificatory affidavits or the expiration of the period for filing the same.”

It is clear from said provisions, that a court cannot resort to
“clarificatory procedure,” when the parties fail to submit their
affidavits and position paper as required by Section 9 of the Rule. The courts cannot issue subpoena duces
tecum in cases triable summarily merely on the basis of the
answers. It is only after evaluating
the affidavits and position papers submitted by the parties that the court can
determine whether he should resort to the “clarificatory procedure”
provided in Section 10 of the Rule. If
any of the parties fail to submit their evidence and position paper within the
reglementary period, the court cannot thereby set the “clarificatory
procedure” into motion. Otherwise,
a party can derail the proceedings and defeat the purpose of the summary
procedure by not filing the affidavits of his witnesses and his position paper,
thus forcing the court to resort to said procedure.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to IMPOSE on respondent a
FINE of P5,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ.,
concur.