INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO T. LOPEZ, SATURNINA M. VDA. DE LOPEZ, ADMINISTRATRIX-APPELLEE, VS. DAHLIA LOPEZ AND ROY LOPEZ MINORS, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER AND NATURAL…

This appeal is directed against the order dated October 6, 1964 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental denying appellants’
motion to reopen the in­testate proceeding of the late Emilio Lopez.

The facts are not disputed. 
On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix
of the estate of the deceased (Sp. Proc. No. 3740), filed with the lower court
a project of partition adjudicating the whole estate to herself and her legitimate
chil­dren with the deceased.  In an order
dated March 30, 1964 the
lower court approved the project of partition and declared the intestate
proceeding “terminated and closed for all legal purposes.” Seventeen
days there­after, or on April 16, 1964, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both
surnamed Lopez,^[1]
(represented by their mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed
a motion to reopen the proceed­ing, together with a petition claiming that they
were illegitimate children of the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his
extra-marital relations with Lolita B. Bachar, and
asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate
given to them.  The motion was opposed by
the judicial administratrix on the ground that the
proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was
already in the hands of the distributees; and that
the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which
should be an independent action against the individual distributees.

On October 6, 1964
the trial court issued the following order:

“Taking into consideration the petition of Dahlia Lopez and
Roy Lopez represented by their mother and natural guardian Lolita B. Bachar, dated April
13, 1964 and the opposition to the said motion to re-open filed by
attorneys for Saturnina Vda.
de Lopez dated May
6, 1964, the Court finds that the said peti­tion to reopen is not
in order.  The said proceeding was
already ordered closed and that the property was divided to their respective
heirs.  In the opinion of the Court,
under the law, reopening is not the proper remedy (Tomias
et al. vs. Tomias, et al., G. R. No. L-3004, May 30, 1951).  In view thereof, the said petition to reopen
is hereby denied for lack of merit.”

The movants asked for reconsideration,
which was denied, and thereupon appealed directly to this Court.

The issues posed before us for resolution are:  (1) whether or not the motion to reopen the
estate pro­ceeding was filed too late; and (2) whether or not such motion was
the proper remedy.

On the first issue appellee’s position
is that the order declaring the intestate proceeding of the late Emilio Lopez
terminated and closed had the effect of finality, and thereafter the court had
no more jurisdic­tion to reopen the same; and that since the estate had been
distributed the title thereto had become vested in the distributees.

Of vital importance is the fact that appellants’ motion to
reopen, as well as the petition attached there­to, is based on their claim that
they are illegitimate children of the deceased. 
On the face of such claim they are legal heirs of the deceased and hence
entitled to share in his estate.  Having
been omitted in the partition pre­sented by the judicial administratrix
– and approved by the Court, they were not bound thereby.  The following statement of
this Court in Vda. de
Marbella vs. Kilayko, et
al., 104 Phil. 41, citing Lajom vs. Viola, 73 Phil.
563, expresses the general governing principle:

“A judicial partition in probate proceedings (and the same
thing can be said of partition in intestate proceed­ings) does not bind the
heirs who were not parties thereto.  No
partition, judicial or extra-judicial, could add one iota or particle to the
interest which the petitioner had during the joint possession.  Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of
ownership and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more
than his own true right.  A judicial
partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of
such definitive character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has
been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the pres­criptive
period, bring an action for reivindication in the
province where any of the real property of the de­ceased may be situated.”

The motion to reopen was not too late.  The court’s order declaring the intestate
proceeding closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance.  It was no different from judgments or orders
in ordinary actions.  Thus, Section 2 of
Rule 72 provides that “in the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
Special Proceedings.” And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become
final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned.  In this case appellants’ motion to reopen was
filed only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure.  The remedy was therefore invoked on time.

The next issue – as to whether the remedy
pursued was proper, or whether it should have been an independent action
against the individual distributees to annul the
partition and recover appellants’ shares in the estate – is not a novel
one.  In Arroyo vs. Gerona,
54 Phil. 909, this Court said:

“Taking up the question of jurisdic­tion of the court to
entertain the appel­lants’ motion (to annul the deed of par­tition and the
order approving it) filed on July 9, 1929, it must be remembered that in Benedicto vs. Javellana (10 Phil.
197) this Court held that all demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or
party in interest to a testate or intestate succession, shall be acted upon and
decided in the same special proceedings, and not in a separate action, and the
judge who has jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance, and who,
when the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the
interested parties, shall take cognizance of all such ques­tions.

“In our opinion the court that approved the partition and the
agreement in ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is here
alleged, the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be
filed in the course of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted
that the pro­bate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment
procured by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it was
issued are pending, but even, as in this case within a reasonable time
thereafter.” (as reiterated in Yusay vs. Yusay Gonzales, 106
Phil. 46).

The order of the trial court sought to be reviewed cites the case
of Tomias et al., vs. Tomias
et al., 89 Phil. 216.  That case is not
here applicable, since it involved the annulment of the decision in an ordinary
action for partition, which had already become final.  The alleged natural child’s remedy, said the
court, was to file a separate action against the
children to whom the estate had been adjudicated.  More to the point here is the following
statement of this Court in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 730:

“The only instance that we can think of in which a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or in advertence not imputable to negligence.  Even then, the better practice to secure
relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the
effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another
court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and
reshuffle properties long ago distri­buted and disposed of.”

Finally, in the recent case of Uriarte
vs. Uriarte, et al., G. R. No. L-21938-39, May 29,
1970, this Court, thru Justice Arsenio Dizon, pointed out that there are two alternatives for an
acknowledged natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of
the de­ceased parent, to wit:  (1) to
intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its
reopening if it has already been closed.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside and the
case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceeding, with costs
against appellee.

Reyes, J.B.L., Acting C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., on leave.

^[1]
Dahlia was born in 1954, two years before Emilio Lopez died; Roy
was born posthumously.