GERONIMO T. SUVA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. CECILIO CORPUZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

On January 24, 1958, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered
decision in Civil Case No. 2438 ordering Geronimo T. Suva to pay Cecilio Corpuz,
et al. the sum of P3,600.00 as damages and the costs of suit.

Suva appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where on December 11, 1959
it was affirmed in all respects. Suva again tried to appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court by way of certiorari, but the latter Court, in a resolution
entered on March 18, 1960, dismissed the appeal “finding that the questions
involved are factual and that there is no merit in the petition.”

The decision having become final and executory, the case was remanded to the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for execution, and on September 10, 1960,
upon motion of the winning litigants, said court issued the corresponding writ
of execution.

On October 11, 1960, Suva filed before the same court of first instance a
petition entitled “Petition to Enjoin Enforcement of the Decision of this
Honorable Court dated January 24, 1958 in Civil Case No. 2488”, praying that
said decision be considered as having no force and effect and its execution be
permanently enjoined on the grounds of (a) fraud, accident, mistake and
excusable negligence; (b) newly discovered evidence; and (c) excessive damages
had been awarded or the evidence was insufficient to justify the decision. He
also prayed that, pending hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued in order that the decision may not be immediately
executed.

In view of the petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, the court set the same for hearing on October 21, 1960, during which
Suva’s counsel presented documentary evidence in an effort to justify the
issuance of the writ, but respondents’ counsel manifested his opposition
contending that the motion was untenable for the reason that the court has no
jurisdiction over the case, the petition states no cause of action, and it is
barred by a prior judgment. Thereupon, respondent’s counsel moved to dismiss the
petition.

Instead of ruling on the oral motion to dismiss, the court ordered
respondents’ counsel to put it in writing, and after the same had been filed,
petitioner registered his opposition thereto. On December 5, 1960, the trial
court issued an order denying the motion for the issuance of the writ, but
granted the motion to dismiss, finding well-taken the grounds therein
stated.

Petitioner took the present appeal directly to this Court purely on questions
of law.

It appears that the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 2438 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
became final and executory when the petition for review, by way of certiorari,
filed with the Supreme Court was dismissed on the ground that “the questions
involved are factual and that there is no merit in the petition.” And when the
case was remanded to the court of origin for the execution of the judgment,
petitioner commenced the present petition, before the same Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija for the purpose of enjoining the execution of the
decision contending that said decision is invalid and of no force and effect.
This cannot now be done considering that the decision has already become
final and executory and has been rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction.

It is true that the present petition is founded on the grounds of (a) fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence; (b) newly discovered evidence, and
(c) excessive damages or insufficiency of evidence, but the same cannot be
entertained at this instance because, as already stated, the decision which is
sought to be set aside has long become final and executory. Under Section 1,
Rule 37, or Section 1, Rule 55, of our Rules of Court, a new trial can only be
sought either within 30 days after notice of judgment, or before entry of final
judgment, and not when the judgment has become final and executory. And
apparently, the petition filed by petitioner is in the nature of a new
trial.

It may also be true that, as contended by the petitioner, the damages that
were caused to the properties of respondents were not caused by his negligence
in taking cart of his irrigation system but rather by the big volume of water
that entered the irrigation canal caused by flood for which reason he cannot be
held responsible for the resulting damages. But even if this fact be true, the
same cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant the reopening
of the case. This is a matter that could have been proven in the original case
with the exercise of proper diligence which apparently has not been observed bv
petitioner’s counsel. At any rate, the decision in dispute can no longer be set
aside being final and executory and having been rendered by a competent
court.

In the circumstances, we find no error on the part of the court a quo
in dismissing the petition even if in ite order the reasons supporting it had
not been expressly stated. Its statement that it finds the petition not
well-taken after due consideration of the motion to dismiss and the opposition
interposed thereto is, in our opinion, a substantial compliance with the
law.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.

Padilla, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Regala, and Makalintal,
JJ., concur.
Reyes, J. B. L., J., concurs in the result: no
showing of extrinsic fraud.