OSCAR VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE JOSE R. QUERUBIN, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

Villanueva versus Querubin

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition brought by Oscar Villanueva against Judge Jose R. Querubin, then presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, and the People of the Philippines. Villanueva asks the Supreme Court to nullify the order of the trial court requiring him to return and deliver to the Provincial Commander of Bacolod City the sum of 10,350 pesos and a wooden container, both of which had been seized from his house under a search warrant issued by that same judge. The case matters because it is the Court's classic statement that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure protects a person's home and possessions only against unwarranted intrusion, and that a validly issued warrant, unchallenged by the person affected, justifies the seizure and the court's continuing custody over what was taken.

Procedural History

In the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, the assistant city fiscal of Bacolod City and a special prosecutor of the Department of Justice filed a motion asking that the money seized during the raid be returned to the custody of the court. Villanueva opposed the motion, contending that the trial court had no jurisdiction, that the matter had become moot because the money had already been spent in good faith for the wages of his laborers, and that his constitutional rights against deprivation of property without due process and against unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. After a reply and a rejoinder, the trial judge issued the order of June 1, 1966 directing Villanueva to return the money and the wooden container within forty-eight hours. His motion for reconsideration was denied on June 11, 1966. Villanueva then came to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1966, required the respondents to answer and, upon the posting of a bond of 2,000 pesos, allowed a writ of preliminary injunction to issue.

Facts

On March 14, 1966, Judge Querubin issued a search warrant. On the afternoon of March 16, 1966, a team of the Philippine Constabulary led by Lieutenant Alexander Aguirre raided the house of Oscar Villanueva on Sixth Street, Bacolod City, under that warrant. The raiding party arrested eight participants in a game of monte being played in one of the rooms and seized gambling paraphernalia, among which was cash amounting to 10,570 pesos. The raiding party submitted the money to the court that issued the warrant, thereby placing the seized articles under the control of that court.

On March 24, 1966, the City Fiscal of Bacolod City filed an information for violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code against the eight apprehended persons. All the accused pleaded guilty and were convicted by the City Court. Upon the recommendation of the Fiscal, however, only 220 pesos was ordered forfeited in favor of the government, and the sum of 10,350 pesos was ordered returned to Oscar Villanueva as owner of the house. When he received that amount on April 1, 1966, he signed a receipt promising to return the money if the higher authorities should require its return by legal orders.

On April 23, 1966, the fiscal and the special prosecutor moved in the trial court for the return of the money to the custody of the Provincial Commander. Villanueva opposed the motion on the grounds already stated, and the trial court, relying on the ruling in Philips versus Municipal Mayor, held that the court that issued the search warrant has jurisdiction over the money and the wooden container, and that the accused was estopped by his own receipt from resisting the return. Hence the order of June 1, 1966, and hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the order requiring Villanueva to return the money and the wooden container to the Provincial Commander violated his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
• Whether or not the trial court retained jurisdiction over the money and the container seized under a search warrant that Villanueva never questioned.
• Whether or not Villanueva is barred by his own written promise to return the amount from obtaining the writs of certiorari and prohibition.

Applicable Provisions

The Constitution, Article Three, Section One, paragraph three, provides:

The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

This is the very guarantee Villanueva invoked, and the Court measured the actuations of the trial judge against it.

Rule 126, Section 11, of the Rules of Court provides:

The officer must forthwith deliver the property to the municipal judge or judge of the city court or of the Court of First Instance which issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified by oath.

This provision fixes the custody of seized property in the court that issued the warrant, and it is the basis for holding that the trial judge lawfully held the money.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. That right, the Court explained, refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, including his residence, his papers, and other possessions. It may be invaded only through a warrant issued upon probable cause, determined by a judge after examination under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, with a particular description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. At the core of the right is deference to one's personality and the recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, for his house, however humble, is his castle. But the guarantee does not preclude a search in one's home and the seizure of one's papers and effects as long as the element of reasonableness is not lacking. Villanueva never put in issue the validity of the search warrant, and the raid was conducted under a warrant issued after appropriate proceedings in which he and his witnesses were examined under oath. His actuation being in accordance with law, there was no denial of a constitutional right sufficient to oust the court of jurisdiction.

On the second issue, the Court held that legal custody of the seized property was appropriately with the judge who issued the warrant, for the Rules of Court require that the officer forthwith deliver the property to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory duly verified by oath. Even if the money could validly be returned to Villanueva, any restoration would have to be sought by motion and affirmatively acted upon by that judge, following Molo versus Yatco. The seizure itself could not be questioned, since the validity of the warrant was admitted, and, as Justice Malcolm wrote in People versus Veloso, an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested money or property used in the commission of the crime, or which may be used as evidence on the trial.

On the third issue, the Court held that the receipt signed by Villanueva on April 1, 1966 was an insurmountable obstacle. He promised that the money would be returned if the higher authorities required its return by legal orders. His claim that his ownership exempted him from the order conveniently ignored that the money had been seized under a valid search warrant, and precisely what the law requires is that it be deposited in the court that issued the warrant. What lacked the element of legality was his continued possession of the money.

Doctrine

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure protects one's person, house, papers, and effects from unwarranted intrusion by government, and a search and seizure is reasonable when accomplished through a warrant issued upon probable cause determined by a judge after examination under oath of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. A person who does not question the validity of the search warrant cannot later claim that the seizure made under it violated his constitutional rights. Property seized under a valid warrant must be delivered forthwith to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory duly verified by oath, and that court retains custody and jurisdiction over it; any restoration must be sought by motion and affirmatively acted upon by that court. A written promise to return the seized amount when required by legal orders estops the signer from resisting the order of return on the ground of ownership.

Disposition

The petition for prohibition and certiorari was dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction was lifted and set aside, and costs were taxed against Villanueva.

Remember This

Memorize this line: his house, however humble, is his castle, but the castle door opens lawfully to a valid warrant, and what the warrant takes belongs in the custody of the court that issued it. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of a valid search warrant, the custody of seized property under Rule 126, and estoppel by a receipt promising the return of seized money.