G.R. No. L-27580. August 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MOVANT-APPELLANT, VS. UY PIEK TUY, PETITIONER-OPPOSITOR-APPELLEE.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
The Government seeks the review of an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila denying its petition for cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization of Uy Piek Tuy.
The main facts are not disputed.
On April 11, 1961,
the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision granting appellee’s petition for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines. No appeal having, seemingly, been taken therefrom, on April
25, 1963, appellee filed a motion to be
allowed to take his oath of allegiance, which, after due hearing, was granted
on June 26, 1963. Appellee took said
oath on August 2, 1963, on
which date the corresponding certificate of naturalization was issued to
him. Over two (2) years later, or on
March 16, 1966, the Solicitor General filed his aforementioned motion for the
cancellation of appellee’s certificate of
naturalization, upon the ground: (1)
that appellee was not qualified to become a citizen
of the Philippines, because he had not enrolled his children of school age in
local public or private schools recognized by the Government where Philippine history,
civics and government are taught or prescribed as part of the curriculum,
during the entire period of residence required of him in this country, prior to
the hearing of the petition for naturalization; (2) that he was not and is not
qualified to take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino, he having violated a
Government announced policy at the time of the taking of said oath and the
issuance of the certificate of naturalization in his favor; and (3) that said
petition for naturalization was fatally defective, in that appellee’s
certificate of arrival had not been attached thereto. Upon denial of this motion, the Government
brought the case to us by record on appeal.
It appears therefrom that appellee was born in Amoy, China, on October 13, 1926; that
he came to the Philippines on January 21, 1947; that in 1949, he went to Amoy,
China, to marry Chua Pic Luan, his present wife, and
stayed there for three (3) months; that in 1957, 1958 and 1960, he visited his
wife in Hongkong, where she resided with their
children, namely, Uy Hoc Siong,
born in Amoy, China, on April 16, 1950, and Uy Tian Siong, born in Hongkong, on October 10, 1958; that his aforementioned wife
and children were still residing in Hongkong at the
time of the filing of his petition for naturalization, on June 26, 1960; and
that they were never in the Philippines until October 16, 1960, when they came
and were admitted as temporary visitors.
Since October 10, 1957, Uy Koc Siong, appellee’s
eldest son, had been of school age, and yet he (appellee)
allowed him to remain in Hongkong and did not cause
him to be enrolled in any school recognized by our Government in which
Philippine history, civics and government are taught or prescribed as part of
the curriculum. What is more, upon the
arrival of his family in the Philippines, on October 16, 1960, he caused Uy Hoc Siong to be enrolled, for
the school-year 1960-1961, in the Quiapo
Anglo-Chinese School, the bulk of the students of which consists of Chinese
citizens, thus evincing that he did not sincerely desire his children to
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos.[1]
In other words, appellee had utterly failed to meet
the sixth requirement of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and falls
squarely within the purview of Section 4 (f) of the same Act, thereby lacking
one of the requisite qualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines
and being disqualified therefor.[2]
As a consequence, his certificate of naturalization was “obtained x x illegally,” and should be cancelled.[3]
As forcefully stated in U. S.
v. Ginsberg[4]:
“No alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless
all statutory requirements are comply with; and every certificate of
citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the government may
challenge it, as provided in Section 15, and demand its cancelation
unless issued in accordance with such requirements. If procured when prescribed qualifications
have no existence in fact, it is illegally procured; a manifest mistake by the
judge cannot supply these nor render their existence non-essential.”
Moreover, it appears that appellee’s
wife (Chua Pic Luan) and two (2) children (Uy Koc Siong
and Uy Tian Siong) came to the Philippines,
and were admitted thereto, as “temporary visitors”, yet he did not
cause them to depart from the Philippines,
upon the expiration of the extended period of their authorized stay, on April 11, 1961. Worse still, although his petition for
another extension of said period, up to 1963, had been denied by the Commissioner
of Immigration, on June 11, 1962,
he maneuvered and managed to keep them much longer, without the approval and
over the objection of said officer. The
steps taken by appellee are set forth in our decision
in Vivo v. Cloribel, et al.5, from
which we quote:
” x x x Chua Pic Luan, a Chinese
mother, and her minor children, Uy Koc Siong and Uy
Tian Siong, arrived from Hongkong and were admitted in the Philippines
as temporary visitors on 16 October
1960, with an initial authorized stay of three (3) months. The husband and father of these aliens, Uy Piek Tuy,
had applied for naturalization, and the Court of First Instance of Manila (in
its Civil Case No. 43163) granted his petition therefor
only on 11 April 1961. Meanwhile, said temporary visitors petitioned
for an indefinite extension of their stay.
Acting thereon, and purportedly in accordance with a Cabinet Resolution
on 29 February 1956 granting them concurrent jurisdiction to act on petitions
for extension of stay of temporary visitors, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Felixberto Serrano, on 16 May 1961, authorized the
change in category from temporary visitors to that of special non-immigrants
under Section 47(a) (2) of the Immigration Law for a period of stay extending up
to 11 April 1963; and the Secretary of Justice, Alejo
Mabanag, on 8 June 1961, approved the extension thus
authorized, subject to the condition that Chua Pic
Luan, Uy Koc Siong, and Uy Tian
Siong shall secure reentry permits to Hongkong valid at least two months over and beyond their extended stay, and
that they shall maintain their cash bonds filed with the Bureau of Immigration
and to pay the corresponding fees. But
the herein petitioner, Commissioner of Immigration, refused to recognize the
said extension further than 16 June 1962, and denied acceptance of payment
of the ex- tension fees.
“Thereupon, the respondents, on 4 June 1962, requested the Office of the President of the Philippines
to extend their stay up to 11 April
1963 in order to coincide with their hoped – for the forthcoming
oath-taking of allegiance of Uy Piek
Tuy. The
request was referred to the Immigration Commissioner. The latter, on 11 June 1962, informed the
respondents, through counsel, that the new Secretary of Justice, Jose Diokno, had ruled in January, 1962 that the Cabinet
Resolution of 19 February 1956 had no force and effect, and forthwith denied
the request for extension of stay of the respondents and advised them to
leave the country voluntarily not later than 16 June 1962; otherwise, they
would be proceeded against, in accordance with law.
“The respondents did not leave the country on the date
specified, but instead filed a petition for mandamus with injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 50671 in the Court of First Instance of Manila, to restrain
the Commissioner of Immigration from issuing a warrant for their arrest and
from confiscating their bond for their temporary stay and to order the
Commissioner to implement the extension previously authorized and approved by
Secretaries Serrano and Mabanag.
“His Honor, Judge Federico Alikpala,
to whose sale the case was assigned, denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction for lack of a prima facie showing and set the case for
hearing on 13 July 1962. On the said date, which was pre-selected with
the conformity of petitioner’s counsel, said counsel did not appear but
another lawyer appeared to ask for postponement. Judge Alikpala denied
the postponement and dismissed the case without prejudice.
“On 19 July 1962,
the herein respondents re-filed the same petition with the same court,
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 50993.
The petition alleged three grounds therefor,
namely: (1) the extension of the stay of
the petitioners (herein respondents) up to 11 April 1963 was authorized and
approved by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice; (2) they were
due for eventual conversion into Filipino citizens by virtue of the
granting of Uy Piek Tuy’s petition for naturalization,
which had not been appealed, and he was due to take his oath of allegiance on
11 April 1962; and (3) their departure from the Philippines would work great
injury and injustice to themselves. As
before, the petition prayed for a preliminary injunction. This time, the case was assigned to the sala of herein co-respondent Judge Gaudencio
Cloribel.
“On 21 July 1962,
respondent judge, ex–parte and without
hearing, issued an order granting preliminary injunction, and, on a bond of
P3, 000. 00, issued the writ on 24 July 1962.
“On 3 August 1962, the Immigration Commissioner filed his
answer (as respondent therein) stating, in defense, inter alia, that the visitors’ authorized stay
expired on 16 June 1962; that their change in category from temporary visitors
to special non-immigrants and the extension of their stay up to 11 April 1963
by the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice were invalid, as
subsequently ruled by their successors in office, and that it is the
Commissioner of Immigration who is vested by law with power to grant extensions
of stay; that the petition filed was not the proper remedy; that the Solicitor-General
will oppose the oath-taking of Uy Piek
Tuy; and that, even if Tuy
will become a Filipino citizen, his wife
would not automatically become a Filipino citizen, as she has yet to show that she,
herself, can be lawfully naturalized.
“Three (3) years passed without the case having been heard.
“Then, on 14 September 1965, the Commissioner filed a motion
to dismiss the case for the unreasonable length of time that the
petitioners had failed to prosecute their case, and that even the final
relief that they sought, which was to implement the extension up to 11 April
1963, had already expired. But, on
opposition of herein respondents, the court, on 26 October 1965, denied the motion to dismiss for
being ‘not well taken’.
“On 9 December 1965,
the Immigration Commissioner filed with the Supreme Court the present original
action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, contesting
the respondent court’s order of 21
July 1962 granting preliminary injunction ex parte, the writ of preliminary injunction of 24
July1962, and the order of 26 October
1965 denying the motion to dismiss.
“This Court required the respondents to answer, and on 16 December 1966, on motion of the
petitioning Commissioner, it restrained the private respondents from
representing themselves to be Filipinos and from exercising any of the rights
and privileges of Filipino citizens, until further orders from the Court.
“The conclusions derivable from the foregoing chain of
uncontested facts are: that herein
private respondents secured admission to the Philippines as temporary visitors by falsely
pretending to come for a visit but, actually, with the intent to stay
permanently; that, knowing that their authorized stay would expire on 16
June 1962, private respondents filed their petition in court for injunction,
then delayed its adjudication, the better to prolong their stay in the
country even beyond the date that they had originally sought and asked for,
which was 11 April 1963, upon the respondent court’s compounded abuse of
discretion, inaction and excess of jurisdiction.” 6
Our appraisal of the legality, propriety and connotations of the
acts thus performed, to extend the stay of appellee’s
wife and children, was lucidly articulated by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, in
this vein:
“Which was, in law, the expiry date of the respondents’
stay: the 16th of June 1962, as fixed by the Immigration
Commissioner, or 11 April 1963,
as authorized and approved by the Serrano-Mabanag indorsements? This question, as well as
the question of whether temporary visitors may change their status to special
non-immigrants without first departing from the country, were
specifically answered by this Court in Lim Chiok, et
al., vs. Vivo, L-20513, 26 December
1963, in the following manner:
‘ …The so-called Cabinet Resolution of February 29, 1956 did not
specifically authorize the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice to
extend the stay of temporary visitors. It
could not legally do so because under the express provisions of the
Immigration Law, it is the Commissioner of Immigration who is vested with
the power and authority to grant such extensions. And, the Cabinet has no power to amend or
modify the law. We so declared in Ang Liong vs. Commissioner of
Immigration (51 0. G. 2893)7 when we
said: ‘The Secretary of Foreign Affairs is not authorized to admit into the
Philippines aliens for temporary stay, or extend the period authorized by the
Commissioner of Immigration for their stay in the Philippines.’
‘Neither can the two Secretaries authorize the change of status
from temporary visitors to special non-immigrants. The law and our decisions on the matter are
clear on this point: temporary visitors
can not have their status changed to special non-immigrants without first
departing from the country.’ (citing authorities)
“As early as 1956, in fact, this Court had already
ruled that the period of stay of alien temporary visitors could not be extended
without first departing from the Islands; and in Chiong
Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration (28
September 1956), 99 Phil. 1021, we ruled:
‘No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of
Section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of ‘change’ or ‘correction’,
for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is
above the law. Any other ruling would,
as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on
false pretenses; every alien, so permitted to enter for a limited time, might
then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should
be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining
and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up
permanent residence here. In the meanwhile,
the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port
whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are
self-evident.’
“That the Cabinet Secretaries acted as
alter egos of the President, as now claimed by the respondents,
is not true; because the President, when a request for extension was
made directly to him, did not affirm the acts of the Secretaries but referred
the matter to the Commissioner. The
respondents knew that said Secretaries did not act as alter egos
of the President; otherwise, they would not have written the President
after they received the Secretaries’ indorsements. And when the Immigration Commissioner
insisted upon private respondents departing from the Islands,
they did not dare ask the President for relief.
“The other reason given by the respondents to support their petition
filed with the court below is their expectation to follow the citizenship of Uy Piek Tuy
when he should take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen.8 Such expectation is legally baseless.
“As to the wife, Chua Pic Luan, she
does not, under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
automatically become a Filipino citizen on account of her marriage to a
naturalized Filipino citizen, since she must first
prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization.9
“By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and
administrative authorities that she came to the country for only a temporary
visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay permanently; and for
having intentionally delayed court processes the better to prolong her stay,
respondent Chua Pic Luan demonstrated her incapacity
to satisfy the qualifications exacted by the third paragraph of Section 2 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, that she must be of good moral character
and must have conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the entire period of her residence in the Philippines in her relation with the
constituted government.
“And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines
only from her arrival on 16 October 1960
to 16 June 1962, she (Chua Pic Luan) also failed to meet the required qualification
of continuous residence in the Philippines
for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16
June 1962 being illegal.
“As to the foreign born minors, Uy Koc Siong and Uy
Tian Siong, our
pronouncement in Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-23239, 23
November 1966, 18 SCRA 713, applies to them:
‘As to foreign-born minor children, they are extended citizenship
‘if dwelling in the Philippines
at the time of the naturalization of the parent. “Dwelling’ means lawful residence. Since prior to the time the father of
respondents visitors was supposed to have taken his oath of citizenship . . .
their lawful period of stay had expired and they had already been required
to leave, they were no longer lawfully residing here (Kua Suy, et al. v. The
Commissioner of Immigration, L13790, October
31, 1963). ‘
“Nor can these temporary visitors claim any right to a stay
co-terminus with the result of the naturalization proceeding of their husband
and father, Uy Piek Tuy, because their authorized stay was for a definite
period, up to a fixed day, a circumstance incompatible with the termination of
the naturalization proceeding, which is uncertain and cannot be set at a definite
date.10
“It is contended for the respondents that two-year old
respondent Uy Tian Siong cannot, under Article 363 of the Civil Code, be
separated from his mother; that husband Uy Piek Tuy has the right to fix the
residence of the family (Article 110), to the company of his wife (Article
109) and those of his minor children (Article 316), and said wife and children
are obliged to obey and live with him (Articles 109, 311, 357); and that to
make said wife and children depart from the Philippines is destructive of
family solidarity (Articles 218-221).
These arguments are beside the point.
Said laws govern the relations between husband and wife inter se
or between private persons, 11 not
the relations between visiting aliens and the sovereign host-country. Respondents seem to have forgotten that they
came here for a visit, and, as visitors, they have no right to impose
upon their host a period of stay of their own choosing. Furthermore, being still aliens, 12 they are not in a position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the
principle that family rights and duties are governed by their personal law, i. e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country (of. Civil Code, Article 15).
“The date insisted upon by the Commissioner as the terminal
date of stay of the respondents (16
June 1962) had already passed when respondent judge issued his writ
of preliminary injunction (24 July
1962). This fact should have
cautioned him to issue notice to the Immigration Commissioner and hold a
hearing before issuing the writ. But
respondent judge never did hold a hearing, either on the preliminary injunction
or on the merits, so that it is mild to say that his ex–parte preliminary injunction was improvidently issued.
“The date insisted on by the respondents as their terminal
date of stay (11 April 1963)
had, likewise, long expired when the Commissioner filed his motion to dismiss
(14 September 1965) in the
court below. Plainly, the case had by
then become moot and academic, 13 and the
court was left with no further controversy to adjudicate. Hence, the respondent, Judge Cloribel, whimsically and arbitrarily denied the motion, in
open disregard of the public interest and of the national policy expressed in
the Immigration Act.
“Thus, the respondent judge, by refusing to dismiss the case,
allowed these alien visitors to remain in the country for as long as the case
remained pending in his docket; in effect, he abusively arrogated unto himself
the power to grant extensions of stay to temporary visitors, a faculty that,
under the law, belongs to the Commissioner.
Thus, respondent judge, instead of applying and interpreting the law,
has effectively disregarded the same and violated its policy.” 14
It is thus manifest that herein appellee
had, before taking his oath of allegiance, on August 3, 1963, performed acts contrary to an’ announced
policy of the Philippine Government, in violation of Republic Act No. 530,
thereby, Likewise, rendering illegal the certificate of naturalization issued
to him, and furnishing another ground for its cancellation.15
Lastly, section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 explicitly provides
that “the certificate of arrival x
x x must be made
part of the petition” for naturalization.
As far back as 1960, we have held that “this provision is mandatory.16 We reiterated this view in 1964, 17 stating that “it is mandatory for the
applicant to attach to his application a copy of his certificate of arrival, for
without it or other proof of lawful admission, his residence is presumptively
unlawful – ” as well as in 196518. In Tang Kong Kiat
v. Republic, 19 we even declared that “the
failure x x to comply with this requirement of the
law x x is fatal, “
The introduction in evidence of appellee’s
certificate of arrival could not have cured the defect of his petition, not
only because the provision requiring that said certificate be attached thereto
is “mandatory” and non-compliance therewith is “fatal”,
but, also, because, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court of the U. S., 20 the “filing of a certificate of
arrival,” as required by law “is an essential prerequisite
to a valid order of naturalization;” because the purpose of said
requirement is to provide a “natural starting point” for the
investigation that the Government is given an opportunity to undertake prior to the hearing of the petition for
naturalization, since:
” x x x The certificate of arrival is the natural starting point for this investigation. It
aids in ascertaining (a) whether the petitioner was within any of the classes
of aliens who are excluded from admission, (b) whether he is among those
excluded for naturalization, (c) whether he is the same person whose declaration
of intention to become a citizen is also attached to the petition, and (d)
whether the minimum required of continuous residence has been complied
with.”
and because the
introduction of the certificate, in evidence, at the aforementioned hearing,
would be too late to serve the purpose of said investigation.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is, accordingly, reversed,
and appellee’s certificate of naturalization hereby
cancelled, with costs against the appellee, who is,
moreover, directed to surrender the aforementioned certificate of
naturalization, within ten (10) days from the entry of judgment in this Court,
to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dizon, Makalintal,
Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Reyes and Zaldivar, JJ., on official leave abroad.
[1]
Ong Chin Guan v. Republic, L-15691, March 27,
1961; Garchitorena v. Republic, L-15102,
April 20, 1961; Haw Su Siong v. Republic,
L-13045, July 30, 1962; Wang I. Fu v. Republic, L-15819, Sept. 29, 1962;
Yap Puy Eng v. Republic, L-24805, May 23,
1968; Dy v. Republic, L-20814, Nov. 29, 1966.
[2]
Lim Siong v. Republic, L-12668, April 30,
1959; Si Ne v.
Republic, L-16828, May 30, 1962; Sy See v.
Republic, L-17025, May 30, 1962; Robert Ting Tong v. Republic, L-21138,
Nov. 27, 1965.
[3]
Section 18 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 473.
[4]
243 U.S. 472, 475, 61 L. ed. 853, 856.
5
L-25411, Oct. 28, 1968.
6
Underscoring supplied.
7
106 Phil. 793, at pages 799-800, promulgated 29 December 1959.
Ruling reiterated in Vivo vs. Cloribel, (23 November 1966) 18 SCRA 713.
8
Uy Piek Tuy
took his oath of allegiance in August, 1963 but the Solicitor General moved for
the cancellation of his naturalization certificate on 16 March 1966 (Rollo,
pages 68-69).
9
Lee Suan Ay, et al., vs. Galang, et al., 106 Phil. 706; Austria,
et al vs. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716,
22 June 1965; Lo Beng Ha Ong
vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-24503, 28
September 1968.
10
Vivo vs. Arca, L-21728, 27 December 1963.
11
Lo Beng Ha Ong vs.
Republic, supra.
12
Kua Suy vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, 31 October 1963; Vivo vs. Cloribel (1966) 18 S.C.
R.A., 713, 722; Vivo vs. Cloribel (1958) 22 S.
C. R. A., 159, 164.
13
Vivo vs. Cloribel, supra.
14
Underscoring supplied.
15
Sec. 18, Commonwealth Act No. 473.
16
Chan v.
Republic, L-14460, June 30, 1960.
17
Chua v. Republic, L-19776, September
29, 1964.
18
Yu Ti v. Republic, L-19913, Tan Sang v. Republic, L-19914, and
Tan Kong Kiat v. Republic, G.R. No. L-19915, all promulgated on. June 23, 1965.
19
Supra.
20
U.S. v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319, 62 L. ed. 320, 323.