HEIRS OF TANGOD CANUTO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. SPS. RUFINO AND AGNES COPATAN, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions July 1, 2013 TENTH DIVISION DIMAAMPAO, J.:


DIMAAMPAO, J.:


Defendants-appellants, the spouses Rufino and Agnes Copatan (appellants) declaim against the Orders dated 1 July 2013[1] and 26 November 2013[2] of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, which issued the Order of Demolition, and denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereof, respectively, in Civil Case No. 99-CV-1409.

This simple controversy has its provenance in an Accion Publiciana suit filed by plaintiffs-appellees Heirs of Tangod Canuto (appellees) against appellants. In due course, the court a quo rendered its 6 July 2009 Decision,[3] decreeing—

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs (appellees) and against the defendants (appellants) as follows:

  1. That Defendants (Appellants) are directed to surrender possession of the land subject matter of this suit in favor of the Plaintiffs (appellees);
  2. Declaring the Plaintiffs’ (Appellees’) father as the lawful and rightful owner of the land covered by Exhibit “A” which is the land subject matter of the suit;
  3. Declaring that the Tax Declaration and sketch plan in the name of Defendant (Appellant) Nida Copatan Legaspi are both null and void and of no effect;
  4. That the Tax Declaration of Pepe Copiti marked as Annexes “F” to “J” be cancelled for being dupli-cations of the Tax Declaration of the late Tangod Canuto;
  5. That the Defendants (Appellants) are ordered to pay jointly and severally unto the Plaintiffs (Appellees) the following:
    1. Attorney’s fees of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) plus One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as appearance fees;
    2. Litigation expenses of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00); and,
    3. Cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.”[4]

The appeal filed by the appellants was denied so that the judgment became final and executory in 2012. This ensued in the issuance of a Writ of Execution.[5]

However, the Writ of Execution remained unenforced as appellants refused to vacate the property. Inevitably, appellees filed a Motion for Issuance of a Special Order for a Writ of Demolition pursuant to Section 10(c) and (d) of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended[6] which the court granted in the first assailed Order. The court a quo ordained, thusly—

“WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF DEMOLITION issue in the above entitled case, commanding the Deputy Sheriff of this Court to demolish and remove the improvements/ structures of defendants (appellants) as follows:

  1. A two-storey residential building owned by Sps. RUFINO AND AGNES COPATAN;
  2. A separate comfort room owned by Sps. RUFINO AND AGNES COPATAN; and
  3. A bungalow house owned by the RUFINO COPATAN JR., SON OF SPS. RUFINO AND AGNES COPATAN

The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is directed to implement the Writ of Execution dated February 25, 2013 to place the plaintiffs (appellees) in possession over the lot subject matter of this case and to make a report/sheriff’s return on the execution and a monthly sheriff’s report until fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED.”[7]

Appellants moved for reconsideration[8] but the same was denied in the second impugned Order.

Left with no recourse, appellants are now before Us raising the following assigned errors:

I
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE SHERIFF TO DEMOLISH APPELLANTS’ IMPROVE-MENTS AND DELIVER THE LAND TO APPELLEES.

II
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOG-NIZING THE FACT THAT THE LAND AND IMPROVE-MENTS, SUBJECT OF THE TRIAL COURT’S DEMOLITION ORDER ARE IN THE NAME OF THE RURAL BANK OF ITOGON.

III
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE FACT THAT THE RURAL BANK OF ITOGON AND THE BUYER OF THE MORTGAGED PROPERTY, ARE INDISPENSABLE PARTIES.

The Appeal lacks merit.

At the crux of appellants’ recourse is their postulation that it is the Rural Bank of Itogon (Bank) which is now the owner of the subject property as they failed to redeem it within the reglementary period prescribed by law. Appellants mortgaged the land to the Bank as security for the loan which they procured. The Bank was declared the highest bidder in the auction sale following the foreclosure of this mortgage upon appellants’ failure to pay the loan. Appellants argue that the Bank is an indispensable party which should have been impleaded in the proceedings before the court a quo.

The arguments fail to carry the day for the appellants. The attempt to persuade Us that the judgment may no longer be executed because the property in question is owned by the Bank is dubious to the core. The records distinctly bear out that the subject realty was subsequently purchased by one Nida Legaspi (Legaspi), daughter of appellants, from the Bank. Legaspi was impleaded in the proceedings as she even adopted the Answer of appellees as her own. Appellants cannot obstinately assert that Legaspi is not bound by the ruling of the court a quo.

Upon this point, We reverberate the discourse of the court a quo—

“This court has admitted and approved the inclusion of NIDA C. LEGASPI as party defendant; she adopted the Answer of the other defendants (appellants), who happened to be her parents.

Notably, when NIDA C. LEGASPI adopted the Answer of the other defendants (appellants), she had knowledge of the case filed against her and the court had already acquired jurisdiction over her person. The fundamental requirement of due process was met.

Anent ownership over the subject property, NIDA C. LEGASPI admitted in her testimony that she bought the subject property from the RURAL BANK OF ITOGON, BENGUET. Her testimony:

x x x                                   x x x

Q: And when did you pay, we withdraw that, Your Honor. And what happened with that loan?
A: It was foreclosed by the bank because my parents were not able to pay; my mother was not able to pay their loan, sir.
   
ATTY. LACDAO:
Q: And who paid the loan?
A: Me, sir.
 
  x x x                                   x x x
   
Q: You mentioned earlier about the deed of sale; will you be kind to please show to the Honorable Court?
A: This one sir.
   
COURT INTERPRETER:
  The witness handed over the document to the counsel.
   
ATTY. LACDAO:
Q: Showing to you this Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Unregistered Land which has two pages executed by the Rural Bank of Itogon, Benguet and Nida Legaspi, will you please go over the same and tell this Honorable Court if this is the one you referred to?
A: Yes, sir.
   
ATTY. LACDAO:
  Your Honor, may we pray that this Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Unregistered land be marked as our Exhibit “11” for the defendants (appellants).

Consequently, her testimony should be considered within the bounds of judicial admission, categorized to be evidence of the highest order and no proof is required except the admission itself x x x.”[9]

In the second challenged Order, the court a quo likewise propounded that Legaspi is the absolute owner of the land, notwithstanding the fact that the Torrens title is still in the name of the Bank, viz:

“Nonetheless, to belabor, though exasperating, it is noteworthy to stress that the Deed of Absolute Sale of Parcel of Unregistered Land between Nida C. Legaspi and the Rural Bank of Itogon is a perfected contract of sale. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price and the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. Since the sale was made in a public instrument, it was clearly tantamount to a delivery of the land resulting in the symbolic possession thereof being transferred to the buyer.

x x x                                   x x x
Conversely, registration is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. x x x”[10]

It was Legaspi herself who admitted that she bought the land from the Bank. Legaspi acquired ownership over the realty, albeit during trial, the Torrens title thereon has as yet been transferred to her.

Ineludibly, the court a quo unerringly issued the assailed Orders. The Order of Demolition did not alter or modify the Decision of 6 July 2009 which became final and executory in 2012. Once a decision has attained finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, whether the modification is to be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.[11]

A final note. The judgment of the court a quo must at some point become final. In the absence of reversible errors committed by the court a quo, We refuse to disturb the repugned Orders. It would be the height of injustice if We allow appellees to enjoy a hollow victory.

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. The Orders dated 1 July 2013 and 26 November 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, in Civil Case No. 99-CV-1409, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Diamante, and Salandanan-Manahan, JJ., concur.


[1] Original Records, pp. 104-111.

[2] Id., pp. 123-127.

[3] Rollo, pp. 63-81.

[4] Rollo, pp. 80-81.

[5] Original Records, pp. 39-40.

[6] Rollo, pp. 82-84.

[7] Original Records, pp. 110-111.

[8] Id., pp. 112-113.

[9] Original Records, pp. 108-109.

[10] Original Records, p. 126.

[11] See Natividad v. Mariano, 697 SCRA 63, 75 (3 June 2013).