BERNABE MIRASOL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ANTONIO MAGSUCI, BIBIANO LAYGO AND CRISANTA NATAL, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dismissing the
plaintiff-appellant’s complaint for unlawful detainer
under Civil Case No. 3963.

On May 2,
1956,
Bernabe Mirasol filed with
the Municipal Court of Iloilo an action for unlawful detainer, with prayer for damages, against the
defendants-appellees herein, Biblano Laygo, Antonio Magsuci and Crisanta Natal. After
trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The above-named
defendants were ordered to vacate the premises in question and to pay for the
use and occupation of the same. On appeal to the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, the above decision was reversed, against which reversal the plaintiff
perfected an appeal. In the Notice of Appeal, the plaintiff stated that he was
appealing to the Supreme Court. However, somehow, the records of this case were
transmitted to the Court of Appeals. This latter court, on noting the above,
certified the case to this Court which accepted it under its resolution of
June 28,
1960.

The land in dispute refers to a
2,286 square meter lot situated in the District of Manduriao, Iloilo City. It is registered with the
Iloilo Registry under the names of Jose and Asuncion Miraflores, brother and sister and both deceased, for 2/5
and 3/5 shares respectively, as Lot No. 2575 of the Cadastral Survey of Iloilo.
Until the filing of the case at bar with the Municipal Court of Iloilo, the
respective shares of the above co-owners were still unsegregated.

On June 15, 1955, the heirs of
Jose Miraflores, namely: Desiderio, Leticia and Josefina, all surnamed Miraflores, conveyed in absolute sale to the
plaintiff-appellant, Bernabe Mirasol, the latter’s 2/5 share therein, A day later, or on
June 16, 1955, the same children of Jose Miraflores,
but this time in their capacity as devisees and legatees of their aunt, Asuncion
Miraflores, entered into a “contract to sell”
Asuncion’s share in the abovementioned lot with the
same plaintiff-appellant, Bernabe Mirasol, on condition that, among others, the latter would
advance the expenses necessary for the probate of the will of Asuncion Miraflores. On September 15, 1955, Desiderio Miraflores wrote a
letter to the plaintiff-appellant to advise him of the rescission of the above
contract to sell in view of the latter’s failure to pay “for all the expenses ”
incurred in the proceedings over Asuncion’s will.

It turned out that on February 6,
1951, however, the heirs of Jose Miraflores, thru
their attorney-in-fact, Jose Mesa, had leased to the herein defendant-appellees the latter’s 2/5 share in the aforementioned lot.
Only the agreement with appellee Antonio Magsuci, though, was reduced to writing, the other two
defendants having merely entered into an arrangement with Jose Mesa whereby, for
P5.00 a month, they were allowed to stay in the premises in question. The
contract with defendant Antonio Magsuci was for a
period of three (3) years, renewable for another two. This option was exercised
so that the lease was extended up to February 6, 1956. On March 23, 1956,
however, Jose Mesa renewed the said agreement for another three (3) years, or
until February 6, 1959. This agreement of March 23, 1956, though, is assailed by
the plaintiff-appellant as null and void on the ground that at the time of its
execution, the leased property had already been sold to the appellant and Jose
Mesa, therefore, had no longer any authority to convey or encumber the same. In
the original as well as in the renewed contracts, the parties expressly agreed
that the leased portion would be used to put up a gasoline station.

On August 9, 1955, the plaintiff
wrote a letter to the defendant-appellee Antonio Magsuci, requesting that the latter’s rental for the
property occupied by him under the lease contract mentioned above be paid to him
or his lawyer inasmuch as he had bought the said property from the said
defendant’s lessors. On August 22, 1955, Antonio Magsuci rejected the above request on the ground that he
never had any agreement, verbal or written, with the plaintiff. There are no
records of similar correspondences between the plaintiff and the other
defendants, Bibiano Laygo
and Crisanta Natal. Subsequently, however, all three
defendants were served letters of demand to vacate the premises in question by
the plaintiff and when the said defendants refused to do so, the plaintiff
initiated the case at bar.

In dismissing the complaint, the
trial court held:

“There is no dispute that the
plaintiff is the owner of 2/5 undivided portion of lot 2575 of the cadastral
survey of Iloilo. But with respect to the 3/5 portion of said lot, the plaintiff
cannot claim absolute ownership of same for the reason that the contract to sell
is not a final deed of sale which gives rise to the claim of absolute ownership
of the land by the plaintiff. In Special Proceeding No. 1163, the ownership of
the 3/5 portion of said lot 2575 is still under litigation between the heirs of
Encarnacion Miraflores on
one hand and Desiderio Miraflores and his two sisters on the other. The case is
still pending before the Court. The conditional contract to sell is predicated
on the final probate of the will of deceased Asuncion Miraflores. If the will is not probated, Desiderio Miraflores and his two
sisters cannot execute a final deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff. On top of
this predicament is the move of Desiderio Miraflores in withdrawing the promise to sell the 3/5
portions of the land to the plaintiff. (Exh. 11). This
makes the claim of ownership of the plaintiff precarious indeed. It should be
borne in mind that the 2/5 portion belonging to the plaintiff is not as yet
segregated and we cannot say that the gasoline station of the defendant is built
exactly on said 2/5 portion belonging to the plaintiff. It being shown that the
plaintiff has no absolute and definite claim of ownership of over 3/5 portion of
the land; there being no positive proof that the gasoline station of the
defendant is built in the 2/5 portion belonging to the plaintiff; the defendant
had been paying the rentals due in accordance with the contract of lease which
is due to expire in 1959 this action for unlawful detainer is premature. The plaintiff may contend that the
contract of lease was not duly registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
and there it has no effect on him, but the fact that the gasoline station
existed long before the deed of promise to sell was executed is a more effective
and concrete notice to the plaintiff of the existence of the lease rights of the
defendant Magsuci. Besides, the original lease
provides that the lessor shall make a reservation in
the deed of sale that the purchaser shall be bound to respect the lease.”

We find for the
plaintiff-appellant.

To begin with, the portion of the
property leased by the heirs of Jose Miraflores to the
defendants-appellees and from which the latter are
sought to be ejected is the very same 2/5 portion sold in absolute sale by the
said heirs to the plaintiff-appellant. Consequently, it is entirely immaterial
that it is unsegregated from the totality of the whole
parcel and that the ownership over the remaining 3/5 portion is unsettled since
the said defendants-appellees‘ right to stay in the
premises in question is confined and limited to the 2/5 portion pertaining to
the plaintiff-appellant. Wherever else in the entire lot might the said 2/5
portion be ultimately designated, there and there only could the
defendants-appellees have constructed the gasoline
station mentioned in the lease contract. Thus, and contrary to the lower court’s
ruling, there need be “no positive proof that the gasoline station of the
defendant is built in the 2/5 portion belonging to the plaintiff.” That gasoline
station could not have lawfully been constructed elsewhere.

To be sure, it will not matter
the least who eventually owns and where the remaining 3/5 of the lot in question
is finally located. It is not, after all, involved in any way in the only
defense asserted by defendants-appellees: namely, the
existence of a lease agreement over the 2/5 portion.

Then, too, upon the purchase of a
leased property, and proper notice by the vendee to the lessee, the latter must
pay the agreed rental to the new owner (De Jesus v. Sociedad, 23 Phil. 76) since the sale places the vendee into
the shoes of the original lessor to whom the lessee
bound himself to pay. When, therefore, notwithstanding such notice the herein
appellees refused to pay their respective rentals to
the plaintiff-appellant, the new owner, the latter became entitled to evict the
lessees from the premises and to recover from them the unpaid rent thereon.

In connection with the
abovementioned notice given by the plaintiff-appellant to the herein
defendants-appellees, it may be mentioned that the
said appellees had absolutely no ground to disbelieve
or even doubt the truth of the plaintiff’s claim of ownership over the leased
property nor his right to the rentals therefor. While
the said notice was signed by the plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, it also had, below the letter, the following note:

(Sgd.)
BERNABE MIRASOL

With our conformity

(Sgd.)
DESIDERIO MIRAFLORES

(for himself and for Leticia and
Josefina, surnamed Miraflores)”

Finally, we find merit in the
plaintiff-appellant’s contention that the agreement of March 23, 1956 between
Antonio Magsuci and Jose Mesa, the Mirafloreses‘ attorney- in- fact, extending the lease period
up to 1959, was null and void. It should be recalled that the sale in favor of
the plaintiff-appellant of the very same property involved in the above lease
agreement took place on June 15, 1955. Notice of this sale was given to the
defendants sometime in August, 1955. Therefore, on March 23, 1956, Jose Mesa no
longer had any authority to contract for the said property since he was merely
the attorney-in-fact of the Mirafloreses who, by then,
were no longer the owners of the same. All these, Antonio Magsuci had actual notice of.

We hold, therefore, that the
plaintiff-appellant’s notice to the herein appellees
sometime in August 1955 that he had bought the leased property and that,
therefore, the rentals on it should be delivered to him, obliged the said appellees, as lessees to comply with the demand. When they
failed to do so, the plaintiff-appellant acquired the right to evict them from
the premises and to recover from them the unpaid rent.

The increase in rent demanded by
the plaintiff-appellant from the defendant-appellee
Antonio Magsuci should begin to run only from February
6, 1956, when the original lease contract, as extended pursuant to the option
therein granted to the lessee, expired. Prior to this date, the rent should be
computed at the rate stipulated in the said original contract. For the
defendants Bibiano Laygo and
Crisanta Natal, the rent of P10.00 a month, as
demanded by the plaintiff-appellant in his letters to them of April 14, 1956,
may be allowed to start from the date their receipt thereof considering that
they had no formal contract with the heirs of Jose Miraflores and that their informal arrangement with Jose
Mesa, the said heir’s attorney-in-fact, was on a month to month basis. (Art.
1687, Civil Code)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed. The defendants-appellees are directed
to vacate the premises in question and to pay the herein appellant the amounts
above-specified up to and until the said appellant shall have actually recovered
from them the possession of the said property, plus legal interest from the
filing of the complaint and costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, Sanchez
and Ruiz
Castro,
concur.

Reyes, J. B. L., J.,
concurs in
separate opinion.

CONCURRING SEPARATE
OPINION

REYES, J.B.L.,
J.:

I concur on the basis that the
lessee Magsuci and the lessor having understood that the lessor’s 2/5 share in land owned in common is that portion
where the gasoline station was later erected by the lessee Magsuci, the latter is in estoppel
to contend that his lessor’s share was anywhere else

For the same reason, the other
lessees can not now be heard to dispute that the lots occupied by them are not
in the share corresponding to their lessor.

It is elementary that a lessee
can not deny his lessor’s title to the property leased
as of the time the lease was entered into.