G.R. No. L-39999. May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO AND JOSE FARLEY BEDEÑA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENT.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Appeals’ decision which reversed the trial court’s judgment of
conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion
on the ground of reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered
them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00 to the
complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
“The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
PEPITO BEDEÑA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VULLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO
alias “KAMLON”, JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of
the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:“That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o’clock in the
morning, in the municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedeña,
Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo
Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon,
John Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and
mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of
threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to
close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the
door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying
said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the
amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and moral
damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.“That in committing he offense, the accused took advantage of
their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal
mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban Camarines Norte, and
that it was committed with evident premeditation.”
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla,
Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedeña guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby imposes
upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day;
to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in
the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00;
and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and
all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.“The accused Federico Realingo alias ‘Kamlon’, David Bermudo,
Christopher Villoac, Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales,
Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are hereby ordered acquitted on
grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation in the
crime charged.”
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of
Appeals. They contended that the trial court’s finding of grave
coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the
petitioners, the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of
market premises and the removal of the complainants’ stall because the
municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the
market stall was a nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the
lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants’
stall was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor
which gave the stall owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market
premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of
five months and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law.
They also challenge the order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00
actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
“WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the
sense that the appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt,
but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally to complainants the
amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.”
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results
in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied
the motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
“x x x ‘appellants’ acquittal was based on reasonable doubt —
whether the crime of coercion was committed, not on facts that no
unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into their hands,
destructing (sic) complainants’ properties is unlawful, and, as evidence
on record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the
imposition of actual damages is correct. ”
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF DAMAGES T0
COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME CHARGED FROM
WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER
26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS’ ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT,
NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF
ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN
JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT PETITIONERS
COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS, ‘TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR HANDS,
DESTRUCTING (sic) ‘COMPLAINANTS’ PROPERTIES’ AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN
DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6, 1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED
DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER
CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,
APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456-CR, JOINTLY, AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the
respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting
them from the criminal charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is
included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a
consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the
criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no
civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be imposed upon
him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the
defendant for the return of the amount received by him may not be
enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil
action for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil.
748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila Railroad Co. v.
Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69
Phil. 623; People v. Mañago, 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA
1067; Aldaba v. Elepaño, 116 Phil. 457).
In the case before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they
did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. There is no
dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition
with axes and other instruments, and the carting away of the
merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense
such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
“For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the
violence must be employed against the person, not against property as
what happened in the case at bar. x x x.xxx xxx xxx
“The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for
threats or malicious mischief. But the law does not allow us to render
judgment of conviction for either of these offenses for the reason that
they were not indicted for these offenses. The information under which
they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or
malicious mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was
‘by means of threats’, it does not allege the particular threat made.
An accused person is entitled to be informed of the nature of the acts
imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid
information.“We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
“While appellants are entitled to acquittal, they nevertheless are
civilly liable for the actual damages suffered by the complainants by
reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3(c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51
OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the
fact from which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the
stall and loss of the properties contained therein; exists, and this is
not denied by the accused. And since there is no showing that the
complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate
civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the
criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental
proposition that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is
impliedly instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right
to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the
criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98;
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability
which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.
As early as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge
Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et al. 473 Phil. 607 laid down the rule
that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil
liabilities against the accused and, where provided by law, his
employer. There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime
and the liability arising from the same act as a quasidelict. Either
one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the
accused. However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both
types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or
crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the Civil Code
provides:
“Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant”
Section 3(c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
“Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.- In all cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil
action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided
by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing
and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for
damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which
the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence
is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De
Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for
instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability
(See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does
not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the
accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA
1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Article 29 of the Civil Code, also provides that:
“When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon notion of
the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.“If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.”
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the
criminal case would not constitute an obstacle to the filing of a civil
case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
“x x x The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum
for and in the interest of the Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and
for his personal benefit is not a declaration that the fact upon which
Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred
by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense
charged, which is the one impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
(Section I, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration would not
bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in
the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or
legal considerations other than the commission of the offense charged. A
person may be acquitted of malversation where, as in the case at bar,
he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at
least to make a proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the sane
for purposes which are not authorized nor intended, and in a manner not
permitted by applicable rules and regulations.” (Republic v. Bello, 120
SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action
to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil
case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the
accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He
was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The constitutional
presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all
witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more studied
consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable
statutes and precedents. To require a separate civil action simply
because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant
loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
“(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones,
complying with the instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of
the Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara had not vacated the
premises in question, with the aid of his policemen, forced upon the
store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of
Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and
after all the goods were taken out from the store, ordered the
demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the trial
of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor
the materials of the demolished stall have not been made known.”
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
“On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not
up to that time complied with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief
of Police Galdones and some members of his police force, went to the
market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of the
Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first
inventoried the goods and merchandise found therein, they had them
brought to the municipal building for safekeeping. Inspite of notice
served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and merchandise
thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.“The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P 1,300.00 Value of furniture and equipment destroyed 300.00 Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00 P9,600.00 “It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall
of the complainants Vergaras and carted away its contents. The defense
that they did so in order to abate what they considered a nuisance per
se is untenable. This finds no support in law and in fact. The couple
has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed
them to lease the stall. It is, therefore, far-fetched to say that the
stall was a nuisance per se which could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the
destruction of the complainant’s market stall and had its contents
carted away. They state:
“On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the
Mayor to vacate the passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras
were still in the premises, so the petitioners Chief of Police and
members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to the Mayor’s
directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of
the goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal
building under the custody of the Municipal Treasurer, x x x.”
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil
Code, earlier cited, that “when the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted.” According to some scholars, this provision
of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be
modified by a rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and
simplicity and following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
“x x x if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the
civil action but inadequate to justify a conviction in the criminal
action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on reasonable
doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer
to this question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are
distinct and separate actions, and will (a) dispense with the
reinstituting of the same civil action, or, one based on quasidelict or
other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence; (b)
save the injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the
civil action or enable him to take advantage of the free services of the
fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling implications of
permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on
delict, or quasidelict, or other independent civil actions.“x x x But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner
here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil Code should be amended because it
clearly and expressly provides that the civil action based on the same
act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and
therefore, may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal
action. To dismiss the civil action upon” acquittal of the accused, and
disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would likewise
render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any
significance, and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are
distinct and separate.“In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that
there is much sophistry and no pragmatism in the doctrine that it is
inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages against the
accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must
recognize the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the
nature of an acquittal on reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive
effects of a reservation or institution of a separate civil action, and
that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby
(Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a
court to grant damages despite a judgment of acquittal based on
reason-able doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a
remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a
criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for
damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that the remedy can
be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case
may be filed but there is no statement that such separate filing is the
only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition
of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same
criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of
acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not,
however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing
that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial
requirement, a provision which imposes an uncalled for burden before one
who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act
may be, accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in
arriving at the intent of the legislator that they could not possibly
have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to
recover just compensation by making a separate civil action mandatory
and exclusive:
“The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws
in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless
instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a
reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the
accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.“This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. x x x It is just
and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon
the accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But
for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private because
the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law? (Code
Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to
be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal
case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial
court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the
civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to
file a separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering
moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and
review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of
Appeals did not err in awarding damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
De Castro, J., did not take part.