STEPHEN W. MARTIN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. CELESTINO GOMEZ, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the order
of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in its Civil
Case No. 669, fixing the amount of costs that was taxed against the
respondent-appellant Celestino Gomez. This appeal was
originally brought to the Court of Appeals but because it involves only a
question of law the Court of Appeals certified this case to this Court pursuant
to the provision of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended.

The appellant Celestino Gomez brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, in Civil Case No. 25918, against one Paglinawan, and having obtained a judgment in his favor
Gomez secured a writ of execution. The property that was levied on execution was
an Oldsmobile car which was the subject of a chattel mortgage executed by Paglinawan in favor of Gomez, but the chattel mortgage was
not registered with the Motor Vehicles Office. The automobile that was the
subject of the chattel mortgage was found in the possession of the appellee Stephen w Martin in the City of Baguio. When the Sheriff of the City of Baguio seized the automobile pursuant to the w of execution
issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, appellee Martin filed a third-party claim with said Sheriff,
claiming that he was the owner of said automobile. In view of the third-party
claim of appellee Martin the appellant Gomez filed a
bond of P4,000.00 in order that the Sheriff could
proceed with the auction sale of the automobile. After appellant Gomez had filed
the bond and the Sheriff thereby continued to be in possession of the automobile
appellee Martin filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Baguio to establish his rights as owner of
the automobile and in his complaint he prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Sheriff of Bagnio to enjoin him from
proceeding with the auction sale of the automobile. The complaint of appellee Martin was docketed as Civil Case No. 660, and it
is the case now before Us on appeal. The Court of First
Instance of Baguio issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, and so the Sheriff desisted from proceeding with the
execution sale of the automobile. However, the sheriff continued to have the
custody of the automobile pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the Court
of First Instance of Manila. Being the custodian of the automobile during the
pendency of Civil Case No. 669 before the Court of
First Instance of Baguio, the Sheriff caused the
automobile to be stored in Baguio, obligating himself
thereby to pay for the storage fees of the automobile while the same was under
his custody.

The Court of First Instance of
Baguio, after trial, rendered judgment declaring the
appellee Martin the lawful owner of the car, it having
been established that Martin bought the car in good faith, not knowing that the
car had been the subject of a chattel mortgage, and it was also established that
the supposed chattel mortgage on the car was not registered with the Motor
Vehicles Office. In ‘ho derision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio it categorically stated that the appellant Gomez
should y the storage fees of the automobile as part of the
costs.

Celestino Gomez appealed to the Court of
Appeals from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.

While the appeal was pending in
the Court of Appeals appellee Martin filed a motion
in. the Court of First Instance of Baguio for the
immediate execution of the judgment, thereby praying for the delivery of the
possession of the automobile to him. The Court of First Instance of Bagnio
granted the motion for immediate execution but imposed the condition that “the
petitioner (in order to have the car returned) is hereby required to file a bond
in favor of respondents in the amount of P4,000.00 out of which sum the sum of
P1,000.00 shall answer for the storage fees, with the condition that in case the
petitioner shall be adjudged by the appellate court not to be the owner of the
car in question and/or the judgment is reversed totally or partially, the
petitioner shall pay respondents the value of .the said car in the amount of
P4,000.00 which included the storage fees.” Appellee
Martin did not file the bond as required by the court, and so the car remained
in the custody of the Sheriff.

The Court of Appeals, in its
decision promulgated on October 14, 1959, affirmed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio in Civil Case No. 669 and,
among others, it declared:

“We hereby pronounce
petitioner as the true and lawful owner of the car in question; declare the levy
on November 29, 1956, and any further proceedings to sell the car or turn it
over to responded Gomez as null and void, thus restraining and enjoining the
respondent sheriff, his deputies, agents, or representatives from further
depriving the petitioner of his possession, much loss ownership of said car,
with costs against the respondent-appellant
Gomez.”

The decision of the Court of
Appeals became final executory on November 6, 1959,
and on December 8, appellee Martin filed a motion for
execution the said judgment. The motion for execution was accompanied by a “Bill
of Costs” which contained the following items:

On April 8, 1960 the appellee filed sin amended Bill of Costs, which contained
the following additional items:

The total amount of the amended
I»ill of Costs was P3,067.85, or an increase over the
original Bill of Costs in the sum of P3,003.50 representing the storage fees of
the car while the same was in the custody of the Sheriff.

In order to give the appellant
Celestino Gomez a chance to present evidence to show
that the storage fees that wore included in the amended Bill of Costs were exhorbitant the lower court set a hearing on the said
amended bill of costs. The parties had agreed to reduce the amount of storage
fees in favor of Dr. Rillo at the rate of P3.00 per
day and in favor of Mr. L. Esquejo at the rate of
PI.60 per day. September 15, 1960 the lower court fixed the storage in an order,
which reads as follows:

“Respondent Celestino Gomez objects to the storage fees as part the
costs on the ground that the same am net justified by the Rules of Court.
Sheriff’s fees and custodian’s fee are part of the costs (Macondray & Co. vs. Bernabe,
67, Phil. 658). The decision of this court charging storage fees as costs
against Celestino Gomez was completely affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and that the decision in now final. The parties have agreed to
reduce the amount of storage fees in favor of Dr. Rillo at the rate of P3.00 per day and Esquejo at the rate of P1.50 per day. The car was stored in
the garage of Dr. Rillo 117 days or a total of P351.00
and 993 days with Esquejo or a total of P1,489.50. Total storage fees are, therefore, fixed at P1,840.50 which must be paid by Celestino Gomez. Once final this taxation of costs may be
collected by writ of execution.”

The appellant Gomez filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order of the court fixing the storage fees at
P1,840.50 and including said amount as part of the
costs that should be paid by him. Upon the denial of his motion for
reconsideration said appellant filed a second motion for reconsideration which
was also denied. Hence, this appeal by said appellant from that order of the
lower court declaring the storage fees as part of the costs and fixing the
amount of storage fees at P1,840.50.

In this appeal appellant Gomez
contends that the lower court erred in including storage foes as costs, because
the same is not included in the enumeration of costs under Sections 10 and 11,
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. (The incidents in the present case took place
before the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule 131 of the old Rules
of Court is now Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court).

In this connection let it be
noted that in the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, declaring appellee Martin
the lawful owner of the automobile question and ordering its return to him, it
is stated:

“However, the storage fees of the
car must be charged an against the respondent Celestino Gomez.”

When the
above-mentioned decision of the trial court appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G. R. No.
22190) the question of the propriety or legality of the inclusion storage fees
as part of the costs was not raised by hint Gomez. This part of the decision
should have questioned in that (first) appeal. The Court of affirmed the
decision of the trial court “with costs against the respondent-appellant Gomez.”
It may be considered, therefore, that the Court of Appeals had also affirmed
that part of the decision of the trial court taxing storage fees as part of the
costs.

Be that as it may, We are of the
opinion that the trial court acted correctly in taxing as costs the storage fees
of the automobile in question while the same was under the custody of the
Sheriff of Baguio. Let it he noted that the Sheriff of
Baguio was in custody of the automobile pursuant to
the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 25918. By all means, under the circumstances, the Sheriff is entitled
to collect fees: (1) “for executing process . . .”, and (2) “for serving an
attachment against the .property of the defendants … together with a
reasonable allowance to be made by the court for expenses, if any, necessarily
incurred in caring for property attached (Section 7, paragraphs (a) and (b),
Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court).

In the present case the Sheriff
of Baguio attached, or levied on, the automobile in
question, took custody of it, and while in custody he caused the same to be
stored in a garage. The lower court had found that the reasonable fees for the
storage of the car for a period of 1,110 days was P1,840.50.

It may be argued that the Sheriff
of Baguio attached the automobile in question and took
custody of it pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Civil Case No. 25918 and not in connection with Civil Case No. 669 of the Court
of First Instance of Baguio which is now before Us on appeal. It must be remembered, however, that Civil Case
No. 669 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio is
connected with, or is an offshoot of, Civil Case No. 25918 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. It was because the automobile in question was levied on
execution pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the Court of First
Instance of Manila that the appellee Martin had to
file a third-party claim and later a complaint in Civil Case No. 669 before the
Court of First Instance of Baguio to assert his right
as owner and possessor of the said automobile. When appellee Martin filed his third- party claim the Sheriff
could have left that automobile in the possession of said appellee but appellant Gomez filed a bond in order that the
execution proceedings might continue and so the Sheriff continued to have the
automobile under his custody. In other words, it was the appellant Gomez who was
responsible for the car being held by the Sheriff, and if for no other reason
but on the ground of equity he should be made to pay for the storage fees of the
automobile while the same was in the custody of the Sheriff from the time that
it was seized until the day when it was returned to appellee Martin. The lower court presumably must have this
circumstance in mind when in its decision it stated that “the storage fees of
the car must be charged as costs against the respondent Celestino Gomez.”

Did the trial court correctly
include this storage fees as part of the costs. We believe
so.

The taxation of storage fees as
costs is authorized under paragraph (g), Section 10, of Rule 131 of the old
Rules of Court, which provides that the prevailing party in the Court of First
‘Instance may recover as costs.

“(g) The lawful fees paid by him
for service of any process in action. . .”

The above-quoted provision of
paragraph (g), Section 10, of Rule 131 of the Old Rules of Court is a
reproduction of a similar provision in Section 492 of Act 190 (old Code of Civil
Procedure). A similar provision appeared in Section 491 of Act 190 regarding
costs in the Justice of the Peace Courts. In the case of Macondray & Co., lnc.
vs. Jose Bernabe, et
al., (67 Phil. 658, 661), this had occasion to state what is comprehended in the
statement which reads:

“The lawful
fees paid by him for service of any process in action.” The pertinent part of the
decision in the Macondray case reads as
follows:

”
‘A.
Process Generally.—Definition.—As a legal term, process is a generic word
of very comprehensive signification and many meanings. In its broadest sense,
it is equivalent to, or synonymous with, ‘proceedings’ or procedure and embraces
all the steps and proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its
conclusion. Sonic times the term is also broadly defined ns the menus
whereby a court compels a compliance with its demands.’ (50 C.
.J., 411.) (Italics ours.)

“Within the aforesaid definition
fall, in our opinion, all the proceedings for the execution of the order of
attachment, with respect to personal properly, from the time the sheriff
attaches and takes possession of the attached properties by virtue of the order
of the court and conserves and places the same under his custody until the
attachment is lifted or the property is gold at public auction upon a judgment
or order of the same court which issued the attachment. The sheriff’s or
custodian’s fees for his services from and during the attachment are
consequently a part of the costs, mid the plaintiff is entitled to recover the
same.”

As we have adverted to, under
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec. 7 of Rule 130 of the old Rules of Court the
sheriffs are entitled to collect fees for executing process, and for serving an
attachment against the property of the defendant together with a reasonable
allowance for expenses necessarily incurred in caring for property attached. In
the case now before Us it is undeniable that the
storage fees constitute reasonable expenses necessarily incurred in caring for
the automobile that was levied on execution and held by the Sheriff. The act of
the Sheriff in having under his custody the automobile in question is “service
of any Process in action” as construed by this Court in the Macondray case, and for this “service” he is entitled to be
paid the fees as provided by law. The fees of the Sheriff in having under his
custody a property that is attached or levied on execution includes reasonable
expenses in caring for the property. And so in the present case the Sheriff of
Bagnio is entitled to the sheriff’s fees which, as we have said, include
reasonable expenses in caring for the automobile in question and this sheriff’s
fee is included in the lawful fees contemplated in paragraph (g), Sec. 10, Rule
131 of the old Rules of Court.

Appellant Gomez also contends
that even granting that the storage fees may be taxable as costs, he should not
be made to pay the storage fees from the time that the appellee Martin filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 669
and after his petition for execution was granted. This contention is without
merit. The Sheriff of Baguio continued to hold
possession of the automobile in question after appellee Martin had filed his third-party claim because
appellant Gomez filed a bond so the Sheriff could proceed with the proceedings
on the execution of the judgment. Appellee Martin had
to file an action and ask for a writ of preliminary injunction in order that the
Sheriff could not proceed with the execution sale. When the Sheriff was enjoined
from proceeding with the execution sale he continued having custody of the
automobile. Appellant Gomez should have taken steps so the Sheriff would release
the automobile, but this he did not do. It is true that appellee Martin asked for immediate execution of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 669 after the Court of First Instance of Baguio rendered judgment in his favor. But the order of the
court granting the petition for execution imposed the condition that appellee Martin should file a bond of P4,000.00, and said appellee did not
file the required bond. So the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 669
was not carried out, and the Sheriff continued to have custody of the car until
the delivery of said car to appellee Martin after the
Court of Appeals had finally decided that the car should he returned to said
appellee. Appellant Gomez was responsible for the
Sheriff’s having taken possession of the automobile and holding it during the
pendency of Civil Case No. 669, so he must answer for
all the expenses incurred in the storage of the car.

We hold, therefore, that the
lower court did not err m including the storage fees of the car as part of the
costs of the suit in the present case, and in fixing the amount of said storage
fees at P1,840.50.

In
view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is
affirmed, with costs against appellant Celestino
Gomez.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes,
J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal and Bengzon, J. P., JJ.,
concur.