PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION AND LEONCIO B. MONZON, PETITIONERS, VS. MLQSEA FACULTY ASSOCIATION AND DIONISIO Q. QUIMOSING, RESPONDENTS.

In the light of our controlling decisions,^[1]
there can be no question as to the power of the Court of Industrial Relations
to inquire into alleged unfair labor practice acts attributed to the petitioner
Philippine Educational Institution.  It
is now well settled that the full protection of the Industrial Peace Act may be
availed of by faculty members of such an institution of whom respondent Dionisio Q. Quimosing was one.

Moreover, the facts as found, as will hereafter be more fully
explained, must remain undisturbed, in the absence of any showing of grave
abuse of discretion.  That ought to have
placed beyond question in the usual course of things the decision arrived at by
the Court of Industrial Relations, now sought to be reviewed, as far as the
commission of unfair labor practice acts and the consequent right to
reinstatement with backpay of respondent Quimosing.

It is not the case here. 
For the scope and extent of the enforceability of such a right must be
inquired into, there being an allegation, which was not denied, that petitioner
Philippine Educational Institution, had as of March 12, 1964, been
dissolved.  Such an issue, the answer to
which should prove decisive of this litigation, was unfortunately left
unresolved by the labor court.

The Court of Industrial Relations on August 11, 1964, through the Honorable Ansberto P. Paredes, rendered its
decision, a reconsideration, of which was denied by the court en banc
on December 18, 1964,
finding as proven the unfair labor practice acts attributed to now petitioner
Philippine Educational Institution.  It
ordered reinstatement with back pay.

In the complaint for unfair labor practice acts, filed by an
acting prosecutor of such court against the above edu­cational institution,
with now petitioner Leoncio B. Monzon,
being included, it was alleged that Dionisio Q. Quimosing, one of the professors in the School of
Engineering and Architecture of the respondent Philippine Educational
Institution, was on March 20, 1960 elected president of the MLQSEA Faculty
Association, which entity was included as a complainant.  Respondents in the unfair labor practice
case, now petitioners,” were duly informed of his election as such on April 8, 1960.  Then on May 13 of the same year, charges for
unfair labor practice acts were filed against the above respondents on behalf
of the union and its fifteen dismissed members. 
Less than a month later, on June 11, Quimosing’s teaching load was
reduced.  Thereafter, on or about Sept. 10, 1960, he was informed that
he would not be given any teaching assignment for the second semester of the
School Year 1960-1961.^[2]

In the responsive pleading filed by now petitioners, as re­spondents,
there was a denial of the material averments of the complaint.  It was alleged that the reduction in the
teaching load was due to the diminished number of first and second year
students in that institution.  Mention
was likewise trade of the fact that complainant Dionisio
Quimosing himself advised respondents that he did not
like to stay in such school, prefer­ring to teach at the Guzman Institute of
Technology.^[3]

With the issues thus joined, the case was heard by the Hon. Ansberto Paredes, Associate Judge
of the Court of Industrial Relations.  In
his decision of August 11, 1964,
affirmed by the court en banc, he found as proven the follow­ing
facts:  “Respondents are guilty of
unfair labor practice acts.  The series of
events, like the election of Quimosing as president
of the union, the confrontation by President Monzon
about his union activities, filing unfair labor practice complaint against
respondents which took place prior to the reduction of the load of Quimosing and the ultimate separation of Quimosing from the faculty of the School of Engineering and
Architecture show that management dismissed Quimosing
for no other cause than his union membership and activities.  * * *.”^[4]

To the contention that Quimosing’s load
was reduced due to the diminished enrolment, it was considered a sufficient
answer that the subjects taken from him were given to a professor who was
“a non-union member * * *.”^[5]

Nor did the explanation that his teaching load was reduced
because he was likewise connected with the Guzman Institute of Technology find
acceptance.  According to the
decision:  “(1) Quimosing
would not choose Guzman Institute of Technology because his position at the
MLQSEA was more stable than at the GIT, for he was one of the founders of the
former school; [and] (2) He had interest in the said school as he was
stockholder thereof.”^[6]

Nor could the decision give credence to the argument that his
teaching at the Guzman Institute of Technology was in violation of the school’s
regulations for “(1) it is an undisputed
fact that Quimosing had no knowledge of such rule, neither
does the Bureau of Private Schools prohibit the same; (2) other instructors of
the school who were non-union members like Mrs. Lourdes Baron, Mr. Valentin de la Puente, Arnulfo Quintanas, Carlos Banaag, Procopio Eleazar, the late Paul Verzosa and Dean Alma Jose, were allowed to teach in other
schools * *.”^[7]

1.  As mentioned at the
outset, the above facts must be deemed conclusive as far as we are concerned,
there being no abuse of discretion shown.

It was Justice Laurel who, in the first decision, promulgated in
1939, concerning the scope of the power of
this Court to alter factual conclusions reached by the Court of
Industrial Relations, expressed the view that we should not disturb “the
findings of facts made by the Court of Industrial
Relations * * *.”^[8]
A year and two months later, on November, 1940, he was much more definite.  Such findings “are conclusive and will
not be disturbed in the absence of a showing [of abuse of discretion.”^[9]

Such a doctrine was reiterated after the Republic came into existence, by the then Justice, later
Chief Justice, Paras, who used and employed more
emphatic language.  It was his view that
we are not authorized to make a factual
inquiry, the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations being decisive.^[10]
Justice Tuason
restated the matter thus:  ”Only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth, may be raised in an
appeal by certiorari from an award, order or decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations.  * * * In
consonance with this rule, we have steadfastly refused to interfere with the
findings of fact of that court.  * *
*.”^[11]

In 1949, the Laurel
formulation was again followed, this Court stating that the findings of fact of
the Court of Industrial Relations “are conclusive upon this court in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion.”^[12]
It would follow then that as long “as there is evidence to support a decision
of the industrial court,” it may not be revoked or reversed “just
because it is not based on overwhelming or preponderant evidence.”^[13]
In one decision though, in consonance with the statutory language, Justice Tuason spoke of the need for the evidence in support being
“substantial or credible.”^[14]

Whenever the finding of the Court of Industrial Relations is one
of fact then, it is one ordinarily which this Court as noted by Chief Justice Paras is “not authorized to review, much less alter.”^[15]
Or as he phrased it differently but to the same effect, we “are not in a position to pass upon [it]” in view
of its being “conclusive.”^[16] Or as more categorically set forth by him a
year later:  “It is needless to
state that under the rules and repeated decisions of this Court findings of
fact of the Court of Industrial Relations in an appeal by certiorari are
conclusive and cannot therefore be reviewed.”^[17]

So it has remained up to
the present.^[18] In a 1962 opinion, the doctrine was
phrased a little differently.  Thus:  “It is a firmly established and
well-known rule ‘that as long as there is evidence to
support the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, this Court should
not interfere, nor modify nor re­verse it, just
because it is not based on, an overwhelming or preponderant evidence.'”^[19]
A little later the same year however, there was a reiteration of the view that
this Court would desist from reviewing or altering findings of fact of the
Court of Industrial Relations, “unless completely devoid of basis” or
arrived at with “grave abuse of discretion.”^[20]

The doctrine as formulated in the latest opinion of this Court,
through Justice Makalintal, is to the effect that on a matter “addressed to the sound
discretion” of the Court of Industrial Relations, “upon its own
consideration of all the ‘pertinent circumstances”, there must be a showing
that “such discretion has been gravely abused” to justify a reversal
on our part.^[21]
There is no such requisite
showing here.

It is beyond question therefore, that on the facts as found by
the Court of Industrial Relations and there being no abuse of discretion shown,
the unfair labor practice acts imputed to petitioners must be accepted as having been
established.  That would dispose of the
first two errors imputed to the Court of Industrial Relations.

2.       That brings us to
what, at the outset, was set forth
as the decisive issue, namely, the scope of the right to reinstatement with back
pay of respondent Quimosing, in view of the
allegation that petitioner Philippine Educational Institution was, dissolved as
of March 12, 1964.

In the brief for the petitioners, the third error assigned
challenged the correctness of the decision insofar as it would reinstate respondent “to his former position and
[given] his original load without loss of whatever rights, privileges and
benefits, including seniority with full back wages from the time of his
dismissal up to his actual reinstatement, minus his earnings elsewhere during
the pendency of this case.”^[22]

In support of the above third assignment of error, the brief for
the petitioners alleges:  “Appended
to as Annex C-1 of the Petition is a copy of the Certificate of the Securities
and Exchange Commission to the effect that the Philippine Educational Institution,
Inc., the former employer of the respondent Dionisio
Q. Quimosing, was dissolved as of March 12, 1964.  As a consequence of its dissolution on the
date above-mentioned, the said corpo­ration is now in the process of
liquidation.  The corporation is
completely out of business and the school which it operated before is closed;
the corporation cannot operate said school or do any other business without
violating the corporation law.  The
Philip­pine Educational Institution, Inc. cannot, even if it wants to, operate
any school at all; all that it can do is to liquidate its assets and
liabilities.  How then could Quimosing be reinstated to his former position when the school in which he was teaching
during the first semester of 1960-1961 is closed.  To what former positions can he be reinstated?  The answer is obvious:  None!^[23]

The brief then noted that respondents, while admitting the
dissolution of petitioner Philippine Educational Institution, would hold the
MLQ Educational Institution responsible for the liability thus incurred.  Petitioners characterized such a contention
as “absurd.”^[24]
They explained why:  “The MLQ
Educational Insti­tution, Inc. is a corporation separate and distinct from the Philippine Educational
Institution, Inc., and it cannot be made responsible for the liabilities of
another corporation that has been dis­solved.  We do not think that this allegation
in the said Affirmative Defenses warrants serious consideration.  The MLQ Educational Institution, Inc. is not
even a party to this case; it has never been accused of unfair labor practice
and certainly no judgment can be rendered against it.”^[25]

Respondents, in seeking to refute the third assignment of error,
would point out “that the Court of Industrial Relations has not made any
finding of fact as to the dissolution of the petitioner institution.”^[26]
They argue that such a matter
could “be determined by the Court of Industrial Relations in due and
proper time.  And the time for
determining whether respondent Quimosing can be
reinstated to his former position in the petitioner institution is when the
decision of August 11, .1964 will be implemented on motion for execution.  It is believed that that will be the time
when petitioners can raise the issue as to these facts.”^[27]

There would be nothing arbitrary or unreasonable if this
Court, considering the certification of the Securities and Exchange Commission
as to the dissolution of the Philippine Educational Institution and the failure
of respondents to deny such a fact as noted in the brief for the petitioners,
would rule on the impossibility of such reinstatement under the circum­stances
and the limitation of such monetary liability to a period not extending beyond
March 12, 1964.

Nonetheless, in the light of the basic principle that sustains
both Durable Shoe Factory v. Court of Industrial Relations,^[28]
and Columbian Rope Co. of the Phil. v. Tacloban
Association of Laborers and Employees,^[29]
it would be more desirable if the Court of Industrial Relations were given the
opportunity to make an express finding of fact on the matter.  This is likewise to adhere to the doctrine
announced by us, barely two months ago, in Gracilla
v. Court of Industrial Relations,^[30] In that case, having in mind, Serrano
v. Public
Service Commission,^[31] we emphasized that not only would a
determination of such character be in consonance with the deference paid to the
cardinal primary rights of due process in. proceedings of a quasi-judicial
character, the administrative agency being called upon to decide every rele­vant
issue raised, but also, would avoid the untoward effect flowing from the
absence of such a determination by the administrative agency, resulting in the
exercise of our power of review being, as far as such issue is concerned,
condemned to futility.

WHEREFORE, the decision of August 11, 1964, as affirmed by
the Court en banc on December 18, 1964, is affirmed, insofar as
respondents are found guilty of the unfair labor practice acts complained of,
but the case is remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, for it to make a
determination, according to law, as to whether or not petitioners Philippine
Educational Institution was, as alleged, dissolved as of March 12, 1964, and,
if in the affirmative, to fix the extent and scope of the right of respondent Quimosing to back wages from the time of his dismissal up
to such date of dissolution.  If the fact
of such dissolution is not established, the Court of Industrial Relations
should adjudge the matter in a manner consistent with our opinion.  Costs against petitioners.

Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, and Dizon, JJ., did not take part.

^[1]
Far Eastern University v. Court
of Industrial Relations, L-17620, August 31, 1962; Feati University
v. Bautista, L-21278, December
27, 1966.

^[2]
Brief for the Petitioners, Appendix, Decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations, pp. 13-14.

^[3]
Ibid, pp. 14-15.

^[4]
Ibid, pp. 17-18.

^[5]
Ibid, p. 18.

^[6]
Ibid, pp. 18-19.

^[7]
Ibid, p. 19.

^[8]
Pambusco Employees’ Union, Inc. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 68 Phil., 591, 597 (1939).

^[9]
Manila Electric Co. v. National Labor Union, 70 Phil. 617, 620
(1940).  This doctrine was reiterated in Mindanao Bus Co. v.
Mindanao Bus Co. Employees Assn, 71 Phil. 168, 177 (1940); Bohol
Land Trans. v. BLT Employees Labor Union, 71 Phil. 291, 296 (1941); Olaivar v. Manila Electric Co., 71 Phil. 503, 505
(1941). Cf. Rex
Taxicab v. Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 621, 631
(1940).

^[10]
Leyte Land Trans. Co. v. Leyte Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union,
80 Phil. 842, 845 (1948).

^[11]
Kaisahan v. Court of Industrial Relations, 81
Phil. 566, 568-569 (1948).  The need for
such findings being supported by substantial or credible evidence was stressed
by the same jurist.  Union
of Phil. Edu. Emp. v.
Phil. Edu. Co., 91 Phil. 93,
101 (1952).

^[12]
Bachrach Motor Co. v. Rural Transit Em­ployees’
Assn., 85 Phil. 242, 245 (1949).

^[13]
Philippine Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil. 303, 312
(1950).

^[14]
Union of the Phil. Edu. Emp. v. Phil. Edu. Co.,
91 Phil. 93, 101 (1952).

^[15]
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. v. Atok-Big Wedge Mutual Benefit Assn., 93 Phil. 62, 63
(1953).

^[16]
Heacock Co. v. National Labor Union, et. 95
Phil. 553, 559 (1954).

^[17]
Santos, et al., v. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., 98 Phil. 23, 28 (1955).

^[18]
Pangasinan Trans. v. C.I.R., 101 Phil. 480 (1957); G. P.
T. C. Employees Union v. C. I. R., 102 Phil, 538 (1950); National Fastener Corp. v.
C.I.R., L-15834, San. 20, 1962; San Miguel Brewery v. Santos,
L-12682, Aug. 31, 1961.

^[19]
National Labor Union v. C.I.R., L-14975, May 15, 1962.

^[20]
Kaisahan v. Tantangco,
L-18338, Oct. 31, 1962.  See also Rizal
Cement Workers Union v. C.I.R., L-18442, Nov. 30, 1962; Industrial Corn. Agricultural Workers Organization
v. Bautista, L-15639, April 30, 1963; Lu Do v. Phil. Land-Air-Sea
Labor Union, L-18450, May 29, 1964; National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v.
C.I.R., L-20838, July 30, 1965; Manila Pencil Co. v. C.I.R., L-16903,
Aug. 31, 1965; East-Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., L-17037, April 30, 1966; Barnachea Tabigne, L-22791, May
16, 1967.

^[21]
Laguna College
v. C.I.R., L-28927, Sept. 25,
1968.

^[22]  Decision, Annex A, Brief for the Petitioners,
p. 20.

^[23]
Ibid, pp. 10-11.

^[24]
Ibid, p. 11.

^[25]
Ibid, pp. 11-12.

^[26]
Brief for the Respondents, p. 16.

^[27]
Ibid, pp. 17-18.

^[28]
99 Phil. 1043 (1956).

^[29]
L-14848, Oct. 31, 1962.

^[30]
L-24489, September 28, 1968.

^[31]
L-21465, August 30, 1968.