G.R. No. L-30258. November 29, 1971
ALATCO TRANSPORTATION, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND PIO ROSALES, DECEASED, SUBSTITUTED BY MARIA DE ROSALES, CARMEN ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, C…
CASTRO, J.:
From 1949 to 1964 the Alatco
Transportation, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) employed Pio Rosales[1]
(hereinafter referred to as the claimant) as a regular driver of its passenger
buses plying the Naga-Partido route. The claimant started working after undergoing
a pre-employment physical examination given by the petitioner’s company
physician who found him healthy and without physical defect. The claimant received a starting monthly
salary of P120, which was raised to P135 after a year of service. Sometime in 1955, he became a driver on
commission basis, earning about P280
to P300 per month.
On October 15, 1964
he filed with the regional office no. 6 in Naga City
a claim for compensation; he alleged that because of his continuous work as a
driver and the concomitant strain and fatigue, he contracted pulmonary
tuberculosis, among other afflictions. A
report of the petitioner’s company physician, accompanying the aforesaid claim, attributed the illness of
the claimant to the nature of his work.
The physician recommended his assignment to a desk job.
The petitioner, on November
12, 1964, filed its report of sickness, disclaiming knowledge of
anything that happened to the claimant on October 15, 1964.
Hearing on the merits by referee Estanislao
D. Sarto followed; on July 31, 1966, the said referee rendered a decision in
favor of the claimant, finding that the latter had contracted his sickness in
the course of his employment. The
decision ordered the petitioner (1) to pay the claimant the amount of P2,728 as compensation, covering the period
from June 15, 1965 to July 31, 1966, pursuant to section 14 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended; (2) to pay the claimant the amount of P46.49
every week after July 31, 1966, subject to the limitations on the duration and
amount of payment provided for by the aforestated
law, and to extend further medical services to the said claimant until his
sickness is pronounced cured; (3) to pay the claimant’s counsel the amount of
P136.41 as attorney’s fees; and (4) to pay the regional office the amount of
P28 as administrative fees.
The referee denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner and, considering the said motion as partaking of the nature of a
petition for review, forwarded the record of the case to the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission.
On July 13, 1967 the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
(hereinafter referred to as the Commission), through Chairman Nieves Baens del Rosario, rendered a decision affirming the findings
of the referee, and ordering the petitioner (1) to pay the claimant the sum of
P4,914 as compensation, covering the period from June 16, 1965 to July 16,
1967, pursuant to section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended; (2)
to pay the claimant a weekly compensation of P45.50 starting July 22, 1967
until his sickness is pronounced cured, the total sum payable not to exceed
P6,000; (3) to continue providing the claimant with medical services,
appliances and supplies until his sickness is pronounced cured; (4) to pay the
claimant’s counsel the sum of P491.40 as attorney’s fees; and (5) to pay to the
workmen’s compensation fund the sum of P55 for administrative costs.
The petitioner subsequently sought reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision of affirmance. On February 5, 1969 the Commission en
banc denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, filed on March
7, 1969.
The questions presented for resolution relate to the matter of
the compensability of the illness of pulmonary tuberculosis contracted by the
claimant, and the grant to him of disability compensation and medical benefits
by the Commission.
1. At the threshold, the
petitioner claims that no basis exists to sustain the award of compensation to
the claimant, alleging as fundamental error the finding of the Comission that the claimant’s pulmonary tuberculosis arose
out of and in the course of his employment and that his work aggravated his
illness. The petitioner stresses that
the claimant was no longer suffering from the illness complained of in October,
1964 when he applied for compensation; this fact, the petitioner adds, renders
incongruous the finding of the Commission that the claimant’s work aggravated
his pulmonary tuberculosis, then pronounced cured and/or arrested by the petitioner’s
company physician.
The Commission found
“… that the cause of the sickness was in pursuance of his
(the claimant’s) employment or that it was the result of the nature of such
employment. And that all the pertinent symptoms and signs
disappeared on confinement and came back only when actually on duty. It is therefore clear that his sickness was
the result of or aggravated by the nature of his employment as driver of the
respondent company…”
The Commission also found the work
assigned to the claimant deleterious to his health, making him an easy prey of
the dreadful tubercle bacilli.
We find no cogent reason to disregard the findings of fact
arrived at by the Commission.
Modification or reversal of the findings of fact made by the Commission
may be justified only by the absence of substantial evidence in support
thereof.[2]
Repudiation of the conclusions reached must be based on a patent showing of
failure on the part of the Commission to properly evaluate the evidence on
record or to consider fundamental and clear logical relationships in the
evidence.[3]
We have carefully
examined the record; we find that the Commission’s findings of fact are amply
supported by the record.
The petitioner presses the point that the claimant, at the time
he filed his claim on October 15, 1964, was no longer suffering from active
pulmonary tuberculosis. The Commission’s
pertinent findings on this point, which indicate the contrary, deserve
attention. Primarily, the referee found
– a finding subsequent affirmed by the Commission – that the petitioner knew of
the claimant’s illness even prior to the filing of the claim in October 1964 “despite its earnest pretensions to the contrary.” Then, the
Commission also found that the claimant, due to his illness, stopped working on September 6, 1964. Then, on June 16, 1965, the claimant, by
letter, informed the petitioner of his urgent need for money for his
hospitalization and operation expenses, which the said petitioner failed to provide. Believing that his separation from the
service constituted the most immediate of means of obtaining the much-needed
money, he applied for separation which the petitioner, without hesitation,
granted. Subsequently, the petitioner
gave the claimant separation pay in the amount of P1,200 corresponding to the
period from July 1, 1949 to September 6, 1964.
We thus gather, evident from the foregoing findings of the
Commission, that at the time the claimant sent the letter seeking monetary aid
and requesting severance from the service, he was still in the employ of the
petitioner. More important, during the
intervening period from September 6, 1964 (when the claimant ceased working due
to his illness) to June 15, 1965 (when he sought separation from the service)
he evidently was still suffering from the affliction complained of; otherwise,
there would have been no urgency in his appeal for financial help to meet his
hospitalization expenses.
2. The second question
relates to the disability compensation granted to the claimant. The petitioner vigorously objects to the
order of the Commission requiring it to pay the claimant the amount of P4,914
as compensation corresponding to the period from June 16, 1965 to July 16, 1967
and the amount of P45.50 as weekly
compensation starting July 22, 1967 until full treatment of the
claimant’s illness. The petitioner
alleges error on the part of the Commission in obligating it to pay the
claimant weekly compensation from July
22, 1967, contending that the claimant’s separation from service on
June 16, 1965 resulted in the termination of employer-employee
relationship. And since section 14 of
the Workmen’s Compensation Act contemplates compensation for the period of
disability while the employer-employee relationship subsists, the petitioner
submits that it is no longer liable to pay the claimant any compensation.
The record reveals that the Commission computed the amount due
from the petitioner from June 16, 1965 – the date of the claimant’s actual
separation from the service. The
claimant’s disability, however, actually started on September 6, 1964 when his
illness compelled him to stop working.
Disability compensation represents lost or impaired earnings of a
claimant due to his illness and becomes due
from the time his earning power is lost or impaired. The liability, therefore, of the petitioner
to pay the disability compensation accrued on September 6, 1964 (when the
claimant’s illness impaired his earning capacity) and subsisted only until June
16, 1965 (when the claimant was actually separated from service or, more particularly,
when the employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the claimant
ceased). As modified, the amount of
disability compensation owing from the petitioner computed in accordance with
section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act amounts to only P1,820,
arrived at as follows: the claimant’s
daily wage of P10.83 (per finding of the Commission) multiplied by 7 working
days equals P75.81 – the said claimant’s weekly average wage. Sixty percentum of
P75.81 is P45.50; P45.50 multiplied by 40 weeks corresponding to the period
from September 6, 1964 to June 16, 1965 amounts to P1,820. We
find no basis to sustain the grant of compensation after June 16, 1965 – the
date of termination of the employer-employee relationship between the
petitioner and the claimant.
3. The petitioner finally
questions the order of the Commission requiring it to provide the claimant
with further medical services, appliances and supplies.
Fundamentally, the liability of an employer to provide medical
attendance and hospital services and supplies subsists during the entire period
of the employee’s disability, notwithstanding the cessation of
employer-employee relationship. It
suffices that the employee contracted his illness during his employment or that
the nature of his work aggravated his illness.
This obligation of the employer relating to medical attendance lasts
until arrest of the illness subject of compensation.[4]
Only the unreasonable refusal of the disabled employee to accept the medical
services extended by his employer and his voluntary obstruction of such
services constitute justifiable grounds to defeat this right of the employee to
medical attendance.[5]
Section 13 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, in obligating the
employer to furnish medical services to a sick employee, provides neither the
maximum amount payable by the employer nor the maximum time period during which
the employer’s liability for medical expenses subsists. Contrarily, the said section requires the
employer to furnish the employee with such medical, surgical, and hospital
“services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the
process of his recovery may require.” Thus, implied from the foregoing,
the employer shoulders such medical expenses, as necessity demands, until the
work-connected injury or illness of the employee ceases.[6]
At all events, because of the supervening death of the claimant
on June 28, 1969 from “parenchymatous
nephritis” – a cause apparently distinct and different from the illness
subject of the claim herein – we deem it necessary to remand the case to the
Commission for determination of the expenses for medical attendance and
hospital services advanced by the claimant in connection with his illness of
pulmonary tuberculosis. We glean from
the record that, during the period from May 22, 1964 to August 27, 1964, the
petitioner’s company physician extended medical treatment to the claimant
relative to his pulmonary tuberculosis.
The record also shows that the petitioner’s company physician ordered
the confinement of the claimant for treatment in his medical clinic from
September 8, 1964 to the 30th of the
same month. After the latter date, or
from October 1, 1964, to be exact, the record fails to evince whether or not
the petitioner still furnished the claimant with medical services. Presumably, from October 1, 1964, the
petitioner no longer extended medical services to the claimant. Hence, we find it reasonable and equitable
that the Commission determine the medical expenses advanced by the claimant
from October 1, 1964 – in the absence of any showing that from said date the
petitioner continued to extend medical attendance to the claimant – until the
final arrest of the said claimant’s pulmonary tuberculosis, or until June 28,
1969, in the event of evidence adduced showing that the claimant never fully
recovered from his illness subject of compensation up to the time of his
death. Thereafter, the obligation rests
on the petitioner to reimburse the heirs of the claimant the amount found by
the Commission as having been spent by the said claimant for his medical
services and supplies.
Consequently, due to the modified amount of disability compensation
owing to the claimant, we also recompute the
attorney’s fees and the administrative expenses the petitioner must pay.
Section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allows, for services
of a claimant’s lawyer in appealed cases, fees not in excess of ten percent of
the total sum of compensation due to the claimant. Ten percent of P1,820 equals P182 – the
amount constituting the attorney’s fees of the claimant’s counsel.
Section 55 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act requires the
employer in an adverse judgment to pay to the workmen’s compensation fund the
sum of one peso for every one hundred pesos of the entire amount of
compensation granted. The same section
also requires the payment by an employer seeking review by the Commission of a
referee’s decision, whenever the former affirms the decision of the latter, of
the sum of five pesos. Computed per the aforestated provisions, we find the petitioner liable for
the payment of the amount of P18 as administrative expenses and the amount of
P5 as cost of review by the Commission, or a total sum of P23, payable to the
workmen’s compensation fund.
ACCORDINGLY, modifying the decision of the respondent
Commission, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the petitioner company
1.
To pay to the heirs of the
claimant the amount of ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND TWENTY PESOS (P1,820) as
disability compensation pursuant to section 14 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act;
2.
To pay to the counsel of the
claimant the amount of ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY TWO PESOS (P182) as attorney’s
fees, pursuant to section 31 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; and
3.
To pay to the workmen’s
compensation fund the amount of EIGHTEEN PESOS (P18) as administrative costs
and the amount of FIVE PESOS (P5) as cost of review by the Commission, or a
total of TWENTY THREE PESOS (P23), pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act.
The award to the heirs of the claimant of the amount of ONE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND TWENTY PESOS (P1,820) is hereby declared immediately
executory.
Finally, this case is remanded to the Commission for the sole purpose
of determining the amount advanced and spent by the claimant for his medical
attendance and supplies in connection with his illness of pulmonary
tuberculosis, to be reckoned from
October 1, 1964, which amount the petitioner company shall without delay
reimburse to the heirs of the claimant. Costs against the petitioner company.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rosales died on June 28, 1969
of “parenchymatous nephritis” per the death
certificate issued by the Civil Registrar of Goa, Camarines Sur.
[2]
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and del Rosario, L-25640, March 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 1215;
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, L-25665, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285.
[3]
B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. vs. Acebedo
and Workmen’s Compensation Commission, L-29551, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 100; De
Macabenta vs. Davao Stevedore
Terminal Company, L-27489, April 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 553.
[4]
La Mallorca-Pambusco vs. Isip,
et al., L-16495, October 19, 1961, 3 SCRA 241; Itogon-Suyoc
Mines, Inc. vs. Dulay and Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, L-18974, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 199; Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and de los Reyes, L-19164,
February 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 421.
[5]
Cebu Portland Cement Company vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission and de los Reyes, ibid.
[6]
Cebu Portland Cement Company vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission and de los Reyes, ibid.