🎧 Case Brief Lecture

DAVID AQUINO, PETITIONER, VS.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC. (FORMERLY TABACALERA CREWING AGENCY), AP MOLLER A/S, MAMERTO A…

September 17, 2012

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Aquino versus National Labor Relations Commission

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by David Aquino, a Filipino able seaman, against the National Labor Relations Commission, his local manning agency Maersk Filipinas Crewing, its president Mamerto Amomonpon, and the foreign principal AP Moller. Aquino claims total and permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees after he was diagnosed with nephrotic syndrome and hypertension and declared unfit for sea duty. The case matters because it is the Court's clean statement of who carries the burden of proof when a seafarer invokes the disputable presumption of work-relatedness under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, and of how the three-day post-employment medical examination rule operates.

Procedural History

Aquino filed a complaint for disability benefits and damages before the Labor Arbiter. On May 29, 2013, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, holding that Aquino had forfeited his benefits by failing to report to the company-designated physician. Aquino appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which on September 4, 2013 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiter. Aquino moved for reconsideration, and the Commission denied it in a Resolution dated November 11, 2013. Aquino then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, raising grave abuse of discretion.

Facts

On September 30, 2011, Aquino signed a six-month contract of employment under the POEA Standard Employment Contract to board the vessel MV Nicolai Maersk as an able seaman. His duties included maintaining the deck, acting as lookout for four to six hours at night, assisting the bunker barge during refueling, and helping the cook in provisioning the boat. He had been hired continuously by the respondents since 1995.

His contract expired on May 23, 2012, and he disembarked. When he applied for another engagement, the required pre-employment medical examination showed high protein in his urine. He was confined at the University of Santo Tomas Hospital in June 2012 and later diagnosed with nephrotic syndrome, hypertension, and benign prostatic hypertrophy. His physician assessed that he had membranoproliferative glomerulonephritis since July 2012, about two months after he left the vessel, and declared him unfit for sea duty.

Aquino claimed that his hypertension arose from extreme physical and psychological stress at work and that he was entitled to disability benefits, which the respondents refused. The respondents answered that he reported no illness while on board, that his illness was acquired after his contract ended, that it was not work-related, and that he failed to submit to a post-employment medical examination within three days of his return.

Issues

  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in finding that Aquino's illnesses were not work-related and that he was not permanently and totally disabled.
  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in denying his claims for benefits, damages, and attorney's fees despite his alleged entitlement.

Applicable Provisions

Section 20(A)(4) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides:

Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.

This is the presumption Aquino relied on, and the Court held it does not relieve him of proving the causal link.

Section 20(A)(3), second paragraph, of the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides:

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

This is the reporting rule whose exception Aquino failed to satisfy.

Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

This fixes the quantum of proof Aquino had to meet before the labor tribunals.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, and in labor disputes it may be ascribed when the findings are not supported by substantial evidence. The Court stressed that the presumption in Section 20(A)(4) is merely a disputable presumption. It must be read together with Section 32-A, which requires the seafarer to establish that his work involved the described risks, that the disease was contracted as a result of exposure to those risks, that it was contracted within the period of exposure, and that there was no notorious negligence on his part. While nephrotic syndrome is listed as an occupational disease, Aquino failed to show that the specified conditions were met. He did not establish the reasonable linkage between his disease and his work, and awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. He never specified the working conditions, the risks, or how his work caused or contributed to his illness. The Court also held that he failed to comply with the three-day reporting rule, and that the exception for physical incapacity required a written notice to the agency within the same period, which he did not send.

On the second issue, the Court denied moral and exemplary damages because Aquino failed to prove bad faith, fraud, or oppressive conduct. Attorney's fees were likewise denied absent exemplary damages or gross and evident bad faith. The Court closed by affirming that liberality in favor of the seafarer is not a license to disregard the evidence on record.

Doctrine

  • The disputable presumption that a non-listed illness is work-related does not shift the burden of proof to the employer; the seafarer must still prove by substantial evidence that his illness is work-related and existed during the term of his contract.
  • For a listed occupational disease, the seafarer must satisfy the conditions of Section 32-A, including exposure to the described risks and contraction of the disease within the period of exposure.
  • Failure to submit to a post-employment medical examination within three working days results in forfeiture of benefits, unless the seafarer was physically incapacitated and gave written notice to the agency within the same period.
  • Substantial evidence is the quantum of proof in labor cases, and it must be more than a mere scintilla.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, the Commission's decision and resolution were affirmed, and Aquino's complaint was dismissed in its entirety.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: the disputable presumption of work-relatedness does not allow the seafarer to sit down and wait, for he still bears the burden of proving the causal link by substantial evidence. Examiners use this case to test the Section 20(A)(4) presumption, the Section 32-A conditions for occupational diseases, and the three-day reporting rule with its written-notice exception.