HEIRS OF SPOUSES GERVACIO A. RAMIREZ AND MARTINA CARBONEL (REP. BY CESAR S, RAMIREZ AND ELMER R. ADUCA), PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ROGELIO P. CORPUZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL…

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the July 5, 2013 order^[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 7186, dismissing the petitioners’ Complaint for Annulment of Confirmation of Previous Sale and Damages.^[2] The instant Petition also seeks to annul the order^[3] issued on July 24, 2013 denying the petitioners’ Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration, as well as the August 14, 2013 order^[4] which denied their Notice of Appeal.^[5]

On July 1, 2013, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, a Complaint for Annulment of Confirmation of Previous Sale and Damages.

On July 5, 2013, the RTC issued the first assailed order. In dismissing the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the trial court ruled as follows:

“By the foregoing jurisprudential limitation, the plaintiffs should have alleged in their verified Complaint the assessed value of the subject property as jurisdiction is determined by the assessed value of the property (Bank of Commerce vs. Spouses San Pedro, April 27, 2007). With this failure, there is no showing then that this court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over this case and with this, the court is duty bound to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter (Vargas v. Caminas, et. al. G.R. No. 1378691, July 12, 2008). Further, Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure succinctly provides that “when it appears from the pleadings x x x that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter”, x x x the court shall dismiss the claim”. This is the so-called residual prerogative of the court when it shall motu propio dismiss the claim or action (Katon vs. Palanca, 437 scra 565).

Both procedural rule and jurisprudence dictate this said dismissal of the instant civil case. And this tribunal, sad to say, is bound to apply this mandate.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the instant civil case is hereby DISMISSED for utter lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.”^[6]

Petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied for lack of merit in the second challenged order dated July 24, 2013.

On August 7, 2013, the petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal which was again denied due course in the August 14, 2013 order, for failure of the petitioners to show that a copy of the said Notice of Appeal was served upon the adverse party.

Hence, this Petition.

The petitioners assign the following errors:

1. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT MOTU PROPRIO FOR ALLEGED LACK OF JURISDICTION.

2. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

3. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS’ NOTICE OF APPEAL FOR ALLEGED LACK OF PROOF OF SERVICE TO THE DEFENDANTS.^[7]

THE PETITION IS BEREFT OF MERIT.

The petitioners, relying in the case of Russell v. Vestil,^[8] maintain that the Complaint for Annulment of Confirmation of Previous Sale and Damages filed with the Regional Trial Court, is analogous to an action for annulment of deed of sale, and is thus incapable of pecuniary estimation. As held in the said case, jurisdiction is vested with the Regional Trial Court, and as such, it is no longer necessary to prove the assessed value of the property.

In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals,^[9] it was held that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Moreover, in Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,^[10] the Supreme Court ruled that:

“In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).”

The reliance of the petitioners on the case of Russell v. Vestil^[11] is misplaced. In the said case, the petitioners sought the annulment of the document entitled, “Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of Previous Oral Partition,” whereby respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late Spouses Casimero and Cesaria Tautho to the exclusion of petitioners. The petitioners therein brought the action in order for them to be recognized as heirs in the partition of the property of the deceased. It was held that the action to annul the said deed was incapable of pecuniary estimation and the consequent annulment of title and partition of the property was merely incidental to the main action. Indeed, in the said case, it was also ruled, thus:

“While actions under Section 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P30,000.00, if located elsewhere: . . . .”^[12]

In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the Complaint was to annul the document dated May 2, 29178 captioned as Confirmation of Previous Sale. Thus, their Complaint involved title to real property or any interest therein.

The petitioners’ argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering that it is for Annulment of Confirmation of Previous Sale and Damages is not well-taken. As stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for.

Considering that the petitioners’ Complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that “the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.” We note, however, that as correctly opined by the trial court, neither the “assessed value” nor the “estimated value” of the questioned parcel of land were alleged by the petitioners in their Complaint.

In their Ex-Parte Motion For Reconsideration, the petitioners attempted to make an allegation on the “assessed value” of OCT No. 4480 by submitting the Tax Declaration of Property for Lots 1748-B^[13] and 1748-C^[14], which have the combined valuation amounting to P20,700.00.

It must stated that the principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the Complaint is to annul the Confirmation of Previous Sale in favor of the late Angel Abon over a portion of the subject property with an area of 135 square meters. This being the case, the contested area covers only 135 square meters but the Tax Declarations of Property presented by the petitioners were for Lots 1748-B^[15] (134 sq.m.) and 1748-C^[16] (997 sq.m.) to make it appear that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. At any rate, whether the trial court considers the Tax Declaration of Property for Lot 1748-B (134 sq.m.) which has an assessed value of P4,290.00 or the one for Lot 1748-C (997 sq.m.) which has an assessed value of P16, 410.00, the jurisdiction over the case will still fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, pursuant to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,^[17] which provides:

“Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.”

Moreover, a perusal of the Complaint shows that aside from their prayer for the Annulment of Confirmation of Previous Sale, the petitioners likewise pray that the Barangay Council of Sta. Lucia, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya be ordered to vacate and surrender the portion of land which was “loaned” for free to the Barangay Council by the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners.

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint.^[18] This is basic. Unquestionably, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the petitioners’ prayer for ejectment of Barangay Council of Sta. Lucia, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya from a portion of the subject property. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,^[19] as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.^[20] The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (RSP) governs the remedial aspects of such suits.^[21]

The petitioners, having utterly failed to comply with the requirement of the Rule that he shall allege in their Complaint the assessed value of the real properties in controversy, the question as to which Court has jurisdiction over the case cannot be rightfully ascertained, not to mention that correct docket fee cannot be computed. As such, the petitioners’ Complaint was correctly dismissed by the trial court.

With regard to the last assignment of error raised by the petitioners, we find that the trial court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in relying in the case of Casolita, et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al.^[22] by not giving due course to the petitioners’ Notice of Appeal, for their failure to furnish the the defendants in the case a quo, with a copy of the said Notice of Appeal. Thus:

“Under the previous rule, an appeal may be taken “by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal”. This provision was amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, particularly Section 39 thereof, by deleting the need to file an appeal bond and record on appeal, except in multiple appeals and in special proceedings, and by fixing the period of appeal to fifteen (15) days. The entire original record of the case instead is transmitted to the appellate court. Appeals from final judgments or orders of the Regional Trial Court are now taken to public respondent Court of Appeals by simply filing a notice of appeal.^[23] The simplification of the procedure for elevating to a higher court final judgments or orders of the lower courts correspondingly underscored the importance of the notice of appeal. The adverse party may only be apprised initially of the pendency of an appeal by the notice of appeal. To deprive him of such notice is tantamount to depriving him of his right to be informed that the judgment in his favor is being challenged. This requirement should be complied with so that he may be afforded the opportunity to register his opposition to the notice of appeal if he so desires.^[24] And service of the notice of appeal upon him may not be dispensed with on the basis of the appellant’s whims and caprices, as in this case. We quote with approval, in this connection, respondent court’s ruling, thus:

“The judicial position on the requirement that a notice of appeal be served upon adverse party is articulated in the early case of Philippine Resources Development Corp. vs. Narvasa, 4 SCRA 414 (1962), when the Supreme Court stated:

‘Under Section 3, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court within 30 days from notice of the judgment a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and a record on appeal. This section clearly requires that not only shall the three documents be filed with the court within the period of 30 days but that copies thereof shall be served upon the adverse party. This requirement is made in order that the adverse party may not only be notified of the intention of the appellant to take the case to the appellate court, but also to afford him an opportunity to register his opposition to any of them if he desires to do so.’

“As posited and as aptly argued in the private respondent’s brief, the requirement is not a mere technicality but goes into procedural due process which, in the absence of opposition from the petitioners (Annex A, Petition), despite proper notice and opportunity to do so (Annexes “2” and “3” Comment), cannot be countenanced as basis for alleged grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the motion to reconsider the order of dismissal was filed by counsel not of record, no proper substitution having been made.”^[25] (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Rosario and Dimagiba, JJ., concur.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 14-21.

^[3] Rollo, p. 30.

^[4] Rollo, p. 33.

^[5] Rollo, pp. 31-32.

^[6] Rollo, p. 24.

^[7] Rollo, p. 6.

^[8] G.R. No. 119347, March 17, 1999.

^[9] G.R. No. 110427, 24 February 1997, 268 SCRA 640.

^[10] 88 SCRA 623 (1979).

^[11] 364 Phil. 392 (1999).

^[12] Russell, supra, p. 745.

^[13] Rollo, p. 28.

^[14] Rollo, p. 29.

^[15] Rollo, p. 28.

^[16] Rollo, p. 29.

^[17] An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

^[18] Chico v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 37, 41, January 5, 1998; Isidro v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 503, 508, December 15, 1993.

^[19] Otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

^[20] §33(2).

^[21] §1A(1).

^[22] G.R. No. 115703. July 8, 1997

^[23] Echaus v. Court of Appeals, 187 SCRA 672; Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 643-648.

^[24] Id.

^[25] Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 4; Rollo, p. 24.