SANTA B. TAN, PETITIONER, V. CZARINA ETHELMINA TAN SALAO, CARLO TAN SALAO, MARIA RUSTICA TAN VILLASI, AND THE HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY – BRANCH …
ELBINIAS, J.:
dated November 21, 2011 issued by public respondent Hon. Maria Filomena
D. Singh (“respondent Judge” for brevity) of the Regional Trial Court
(“respondent court” for brevity), Branch 85 of Quezon City in Criminal
Case No. Q-05-135388 for “Falsification of Public Document”.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Santa B. Tan (“petitioner” or “petitioner Tan” for brevity) filed a “Complaint-Affidavit”[3]
against private respondents Czarina Ethelmina Tan Salao, Carlo Tan
Salao, Maria Rustica Tan Villasi (“private respondents” for brevity)
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Subsequently, the City Prosecutor filed an Information[4] for “Falsification of Public Document” dated June 20, 2005 against private respondents.
After the prosecution had rested its case, private respondents filed a “Demurrer to Evidence”[5].
The rest of the facts are continued in respondent court’s assailed Resolution[6] dated November 21, 2011, as follows:
“In the accused’s Demurrer to Evidence, the accused
argue that contrary to the allegations in the Information charging the
accused of the offense, all the accused never made untruthful statement
of facts as regards the ages of the other parties in the assailed
Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan, i.e., Cherry Pia Luz Siena Tan
Salao, Cena Riza Lei Tan Salao and Mary Fermina Tan Villasi. The Notary
Public who notarized the assailed Kasulatan must be held accountable
for the said false declarations and not the herein accused who are
merely parties to the assailed document. Besides, the accused contend
that the action to annul the contracts entered into by minors shall be
brought within four (4) years, pursuant to Article 1327 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The action to contest the validity of the said
Kasulatan has allegedly prescribed.In its comment, the prosecution alleges that the parties
to the sale of a valuable property have the obligation to ensure that
the parties they deal with possess legal capacity and have the capacity
to act, considering that the parties in the instant case are related to
each other. As the parties stipulated that the respective ages
of Cherry Pia Luz Siena Tan Salao, Cena Riza Lei Tan Salao and Mary
Fermina Tan Villasi should be counted based on their respective
Certificates of Live Birth, the conclusion may be drawn that Cherry Pia
Luz, Siena Tan Salao, Cena Riza Lei Tan Salao and Mary Fermina Tan
Villasi were still minors at the time of the execution of the said
Kasulatan.”[7] (Emphasis Supplied)
On November 21, 2011, respondent court issued its assailed Resolution[8],
which granted private respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed
the case for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the
Resolution[9] stated:
“ACCORDINGLY, the Demurrer to Evidence filed by
the accused Czarina Ethelmina Tan Salao, Carlo Tan Salao and Maria
Rustica Tan Villasi is hereby granted. The instant case is hereby
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.The cash bonds of the accused Czarina Ethelmina Tan Salao, Carlo
Tan Salao and Maria Rustica Tan Villasi under Official Receipts (sic)
No. 0995987 A in the amount of Php12,000.00, Official Receipts (sic) No.
0995988 A in the amount of Php12,000.00, and Official Receipt No.
0995983 A in the amount of Php12,000.00, respectively, are ordered
refunded in favor of the accused subject to the existing rules and
guidelines of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.SO ORDERED.”[10] (Emphasis was made in the original)
As a result, petitioner Tan filed the Petition for Certiorari[11] at bench, praying as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court of Appeals that the
Resolution dated 21 November 2011 be reversed and set aside, and that
the instant case be remanded for the continuation of the proceedings,
and herein Respondents be directed to present their evidence.Other relief[s] and remedies that are just and equitable under the circumstances are likewise prayed for.”[12] (Emphasis was made in the original)
Petitioner raised this lone ground:
“26. Herein Petitioner raises this Petition on the sole ground
that the Public Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting herein Private Respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence.”[13]
To begin with, the Petition for Certiorari at bench is readily
defective and dismissible. Petitioner could not, by herself, file the
instant Petition for Certiorari. The general rule is that only the
Solicitor General, on behalf of the State, may appeal from or question
any ruling favoring the accused, such as the acquittal of the accused or
the dismissal of the case against him. This was articulated by the
Supreme Court in Elvira O. Ong vs. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009, as follows:
“Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 states that the OSG shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation,
or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government in this Court and the CA in all
criminal proceedings xxx
xxx
This doctrine is laid down in our ruling in Heirs of Federico C.
Delgado and Annalisa Pesico v. Luisito Q. Gonzalez and Antonio T.
Buenaflor, Cariño v. de Castro, Mobilia Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,
Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., and
People v. Santiago, where we held that only the OSG can bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or the
State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the CA.
xxx
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended
party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the
private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant’s role is limited to that of
a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the
trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on
the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People
of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party
or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.” (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, petitioner Tan failed to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Resolution before filing the Petition
at bench. Such failure violated the following pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 30, 2009:
“On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed
the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a
motion for reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the
writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for
reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed before the tribunal,
board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a
motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent
tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors. xxx” (Emphasis Supplied)
No showing was also made by petitioner Tan that the Petition at bench fell under any of the exceptions[14] to the rule requiring the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration.
Even if the Petition could be allowed, still, any review of
private respondents’ acquittal, as sought for by petitioner Tan in her
Petition for Certiorari, would place private respondents in Double
Jeopardy.[15] This is because a
review of respondent court’s finding that no sufficient evidence was
presented by petitioner Tan to prove the guilt of the accused involves a
question on how the respondent court determined the weight of the
parties’ evidence.
The rule is entrenched, in that Certiorari does not lie to
question the respondent court’s appreciation of the evidence of the
parties. This was as had been declared by the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) and Wilfredo Cunanan, G.R. No. 173396, September 22, 2010, to wit:
“It is fitting to reiterate the holding of the Court in People v. Tria-Tirona, to wit:
xxx
xxx Certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law.The Court further expounded in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, thus:
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem – beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings,
judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It
does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of
evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an
error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction
is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or
in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is
correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will
not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of
the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said
findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to
re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.” (Emphasis made in the original)
Given that what petitioner Tan raised were errors of judgment,
then any review of the evidence and findings of respondent court would
violate private respondents’ Constitutional right against Double
Jeopardy. This was as had been similarly ruled by the Supreme Court in People of the Philippines v. Hon. Enrique C. Asis, et al., G.R. No. 173089, August 25, 2010, to wit:
“The arguments proffered in the said petition call for a review of the evidence and a recalibration of the factual findings. At the outset, the OSG faulted the trial court for giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of Abordo and his witnesses. It wrote:
In ruling that private respondent had no intent to kill private complainants,
respondent judge thus accorded full faith and credit to the testimonies
of private respondent and his witnesses Julito Bernadas and Melquiades
Palconit. His findings, however, are contrary to law and the evidence. Therefore, he acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.It further pointed out that the CA ‘failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.’ Subsequently, in its memorandum, it merely reiterated
the purported errors of the trial judge in appreciating and assessing
the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense. Apparently, it wants a review of the trial court’s judgment which it claimed to be erroneous.The OSG then proceeded to show how the evidence should have been
appreciated by the trial court in its favor and against Abordo to
demonstrate that there was intent to kill on his part.What the OSG is questioning, therefore, are errors of
judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordo’s
constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. xxx” (Emphasis Supplied)
Besides, even as to the merits, contrary to petitioner Tan’s sole ground,
respondent court properly granted private respondents’ Demurrer to
Evidence, which resulted to the dismissal of the case. On this matter,
petitioner Tan had argued as follows:
“27. Herein Petitioner respectfully submits that the Public
Respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the Private
Respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence, considering the factual antecedents
relative to the instant case.28. In the assailed Resolution, the Public Respondent
stated that ‘the second element, therefore, that the accused committed
an act of falsification is absent.’ Herein Petitioner begs to disagree.xxx
30. However, herein Petitioner respectfully submits that the Public Respondent has glossed over the fact that all the Respondents therein were related.
More specifically, the individuals belonging to a specific group in the
Kasulatan knew the respective ages of those in their own group, being
siblings with one another.31. In fact, a simple perusal of the said Kasulatan
would clearly show that the Private Respondents’ declaration applies not
to them individually, but to all of them belonging to one specific
group. The said Kasulatan provides that, for each group, the members
thereof stated that they were of legal age, or ‘may mga sapat na gulang.’32. As such, all of those in a particular group,
including herein Private Respondents, attested to the truthfulness and
veracity of the said statement for their group.33. Further, the statement made in the assailed Resolution that
the said phrase ‘may mga sapat na gulang’ is pro forma does not even
hold water or have any basis.34. It must be reiterated that the said individuals,
including herein Private Respondents, by affixing their signatures on
the said documents, attest that the matters stated therein are true and
correct to their own knowledge. This is even buttressed by the
fact that the document itself provides that the signatories thereto
affirm its contents by using the phrase, ‘sa katunayan ng lahat.’xxx
37. The attention of this Honorable Court of Appeals is likewise
directed to the fact that the DOJ, in a Resolution promulgated 19 July
2007 xxx, has judiciously ruled, and in fact agreed, that there was
probable cause to indict the Respondents therein, including herein
Private Respondents, of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents, taking into account their relations with one another.
xxx
39. The above-quoted discussion of the Resolution of the DOJ, in
conjunction with the statement in the Kasulatan itself, clearly debunk
the argument that the Private Respondents were only declaring their own
personal circumstances, and not of their siblings, and that they have no
legal obligation to divulge the said matters.40. Finally, the fact that the Private Respondents were
grouped together with their minor siblings, more specifically those in
Groups A and C, is already indicative of the intention of validating
that all individuals in their specific group are of legal age, and
possess the requisite capacity to enter into a contract. However, such was clearly not the case.
xxx
45. From the documents submitted before the Public Respondents,
as well as the admissions made therein, the same readily reveals that
the Private Respondents had siblings born after them.46. By simple mathematical computation, these siblings, being
born after the Private Respondents, are evidently younger than them, and
the Private Respondents evidently had knowledge thereof.47. Such fact was even made more glaring as at the time
of the execution of the said Kasulatan, two (2) of the Private
Respondents, namely, Czarina Ethelmina Tan Salao and Maria Rustica Tan
Villasi, had just reached the age of eighteen (18), the age of majority.
Hence, their younger siblings are clearly minors under the
contemplation of the law, and the statements of the Private Respondents
in the subject Kasulatan that they are of legal age, or ‘may mga sapat
na gulang,’ are evidently false.”[16] (Emphasis supplied)
Defeating petitioner Tan’s arguments however, is that the
prosecution failed to sufficiently prove all the elements for the crime
of “Falsification of Public Documents”, more particularly the element
that private respondents committed any of the acts of Falsification as
enumerated in Article 171[17]
of the Revised Penal Code. This is so, considering that the prosecution
failed to show that it was private respondents who drafted the
“Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan”[18]
(“Kasulatan” for brevity) and who intentionally hid the minority (age)
of their co-signatories in such Kasulatan. All of these matters were as
similarly found by respondent court, to wit:
“Third, the prosecution charges the accused with having
falsified the deed of sale allegedly for ‘making it appear’ that three
of the other signatories were of legal age when in truth they were
minors at the time.The prosecution failed to prove how the herein accused
made it appear that the said minors possess the legal capacity to enter
into a contract, considering that what the accused-parties merely
declared was the fact that they were all of legal age. The said accused
cannot be held criminally responsible for a declaration that referred to
themselves as being of legal age, without necessarily referring to the
other parties in the contract. The declaration is a pro forma statement
that is found in every contract and the prosecution failed to present an
iota of evidence to prove that accused were solely responsible for
drafting the contract AND they intentionally and maliciously hid the
minority of their co-signatories.There is even no motivation for the accused to commit the acts
charged as the accused cannot be said to have benefited from the alleged
falsification to the detriment of their co-signatories, considering
that the latter were even given their share in the subject property.
xxx
It is not principally incumbent upon the accused to ascertain
the identity of the parties and guard against any importunes and illegal
arrangements in public documents such as the subject contract of sale,
but on the notary public (Pacita Caalim-Verzonilla vs. Atty. Victoriano
G. Pascua, A.C. No. 6655, 11 October 2011). The defense is correct in
raising that the notary public should have been charged with the
offense, considering that it is his obligation to determine the identity
of the affiants and the voluntariness of their declaration, and he has
the right to refuse the notarization of a falsified document, pursuant
to Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility in relation
to Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.The second element, therefore, that the accused committed an act of falsification is absent.”[19] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, in all criminal proceedings, the prosecution had the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime.[20]
After careful consideration of all the facts, arguments, and
issues appearing on the records, as well as of the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence, respondent court, in issuing the assailed Resolution[21],
was therefore shown not to have committed grave abuse of discretion,
which in turn is meant as such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment that is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.[22]
IN VIEW OF ALL THESE, the Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dicdican (Chairman) and Dimagiba,[*] JJ., concur.
[*] Acting Junior Member vice J. Paredes per Office Order No. 34-14-RSF dated January 30, 2014.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3 – 16
[2] Rollo, pp. 56 – 59
[3] Rollo, pp. 24 – 27
[4] Rollo, pp.30 – 31
[5] Rollo, pp. 38 – 48
[6] Rollo, pp. 56 – 59
[7] Rollo, p. 56
[8] Rollo, pp. 56-59
[9] Rollo, pp. 56-59
[10] Rollo, p. 58
[11] Rollo, pp. 3 – 16
[12] Rollo, pp. 12 – 13
[13] Rollo, p. 8
[14] People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 30, 2009
[15] Goodland Company, Inc., vs. Abraham Co and Christine Chan, G.R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011
[16] Rollo, pp. 8 – 12
[17] Art. 171.
Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document
by committing any of the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a
copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including
in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.chanrobles virtual law
library
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical
minister who shall commit any of the offenses enumerated in the
preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or
document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil
status of persons.
[18] Rollo, pp. 20 – 23
[19] Rollo, pp. 57 – 58
[20] Jaime Alferez vs. People of the Philippines and Pingping Co, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011
[21] Rollo, pp. 56 – 59
[22] First Women’s Credit Corporation, et al. v. Glicerio Perez, G.R. No. 169026, June 15, 2006