NILO LIZARES, NICOLAS LEDESMA, JAIME CLAPAROLS, CARMITA C. BALCELLS, EDUARDO CLAPAROLS, EULALIA C. ROSELLO, ENRIQUE YUSAY, DOMINGO RODRIGUEZ, INC., FIRST FARMERS’ MILLING CO., I…

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction questioning
the orders of respondent Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental dated June 30, 1970,
July 20, 1970, December 10, 1970 and April 21, 1971 as having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.

The pertinent facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as
follows:

Private respondent Talisay-Silay
Milling Co., Inc. (Central) is the owner and operator of a sugar mill located
in the Municipality of Talisay, Negros
Occidental, manufacturing centrifugal sugar from sugarcanes delivered to the
mill by petitioners Nilo Lizares,
Nicolas Ledesma, Jaime Claparols,
Carmita C. Balcells,
Eduardo Claparols, Eulalia
C. Rosello, Enrique Yusay,
Domingo Rodriguez, Inc., and First Farmers’ Milling Co., Inc. pursuant to
identical milling contracts executed between the former and the latter.  Under the provisions of the milling
contracts, Central was granted, inter alia, an
easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by petitioners for the
passage of water from the Imbang
River to its sugar mill.  For this purpose, Central constructed concrete
water canals traversing the parcels of land of petitioners.  The easement of aqueduct was for a period of
fifty (50) years, which began with 1920-21 crop year up to 1969-70 crop year.  Prior to the expiration of this period, Central, by means of
separate letters, offered to lease from petitioners the areas occupied by the
canals.  However, petitioners
refused to entertain the offer of Central.

On June 22, 1970,
Central filed its complaints against petitioners Nilo
Lizares, Nicolas Ledesma,
Jaime Claparols, Carmita C.
Balcells, Eduardo Claparols,
Eulalia C. Rosello and
Enrique Yusay, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 9438,
9439, 9441, 9442, 9443, 9445 and 9446, respectively, before respondent Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental.  On July
20, 1970, Central filed its complaints against Domingo Rodriguez,
Inc. and First Farmers’ Milling Co., Inc., docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 9472
and 9473, respectively, before the same court. 
In all these cases, Central prayed for the establishment of a legal
easement of aqueduct on the parcels of land owned by petitioners (same areas
presently occupied by the canals) and for the issuance of writs of preliminary
injunction ex parte to restrain the
petitioners and/or their agents, representatives, assigns, successors-in-interest
from removing and/or destroying the canals or otherwise from obstructing the
passage of water from the Imbang River to its mill,
through the canals, during the pendency of the
litigation.

On June 30, 1970,
respondent court ordered the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction
with respect to Civil Cases Nos. 9438,
9439, 9441, 9442, 9443, 9445 and 9446, to wit:

“O R
D E R

Verified petition dated June 22, 1970, ‘having been filed’ in the
above-entitled civil cases in which it is prayed among other things, that a
writ of preliminary injunctions (sic) ex-parte (sic)
be issued to refrain the defendants from proceeding with certain acts which are
particularly described therein, and the Court, finding that it is a proper case
for injunction, that the continuance of the acts complained of during the
litigation would work injustice to the plaintiff, and that great or irreparable
injury would result to the plaintiff, before the matter can be heard on notice,
hereby orders the immediate issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for upon the filing of the plaintiff of a bond in the amount of
P2,000.00 each case.

SO ORDERED.” (p. 137, Rollo)

The writs of preliminary injunction were
issued accordingly on said date (pp. 140-146, Rollo).  On July
20, 1970, respondent court ordered the issuance of the writs of
preliminary injunction as regards Civil Cases Nos. 9472 and 9473, to wit:

“O R
D E R

A verified petition dated July 20, 1970,
having been filed in the above-entitled civil cases in which it is prayed among
other things, that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to refrain the
defendant from proceeding with certain acts which are particularly described
therein, and the Court, finding that it is a proper case for injunction, that
the continuance of the acts complained of during the litigation would work
injustice to the plaintiff, and that great or irreparable injury would result
to the plaintiff before the matter can be heard on notice, hereby orders the
immediate issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for upon the
filing of the plaintiff of a bond in the amount of P2,000.00.

SO ORDERED.” (pp. 138-139, Rollo)

The writs of preliminary injunction were
issued accordingly on said date (pp. 147-148, Rollo).

On July 27, 1970, petitioners filed a motion to dissolve the
writs of preliminary injunction which was opposed by Central in a motion dated August 21, 1970. 
On December 10, 1970,
respondent court denied the motion to dissolve the writs of preliminary
injunction, to wit:

“O R
D E R

For the resolution of the Court are the Motion to Dissolve
Injunction dated July 27, 1970,
filed by the defendants and the Opposition to Motion to Dissolve Injunction
dated August 21, 1970,
filed by the plaintiff.  After carefully
considering the lengthy, oral and written arguments of the parties, pro and
con, the Court finds no sufficient ground to dissolve the writs of preliminary
injunction issued in the above-entitled cases. 
The position of the defendants is that the injunctions were issued on
the premature assumption that, even after the expiration of the plaintiff’s
contractual easement of aqueduct, it was entitled to a legal or compulsory
easement of aqueduct on the same location or route, even without averment of
the existence of the statutory requisites for the establishment of such legal
easement, citing the cases of Bacolod-Murcia Milling
Co., Inc. et al. vs. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al, 64 O.G. 1965; and Angela
Estate, Inc., et al vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, et al. G.R. No. L-27084, July 31, 1968; while the plaintiff
maintains the following positions:  (1)
that the contractual easement of aqueduct has not expired as yet when the complaint was filed;
(2) that the complaint has sufficiently and with clarity averred that the
statutory requisites for easement of aqueduct exist, hence, the propriety and
legality of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction; and (3) that
the decisions of the Supreme Court in the Bacolod-Murcia
Co., Inc., cases aforesaid are not applicable to the issue at bar. 
The Court is inclined to sustain the position taken by the plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dissolve Injunction filed by the
defendants in the above-entitled cases is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.” (pp. 466-467, Rollo)

On December 19, 1970, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof which was, however, denied on April 21, 1971 for lack of merit (p. 486, Rollo).  Hence, the present petition.

On January 27, 1988, considering the length of time that these
cases have been pending with this Court, and to determine whether supervening
events have rendered these cases moot and academic, We resolved to require the parties to
move in the premises.  On February 29, 1988 (p. 600, Rollo) and June 23, 1988 (p. 603, Rollo), petitioners manifested that no
supervening events have rendered these cases moot and academic.

The issue is whether or not respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion in having issued the orders dated June 30, 1970 and July
20, 1970 directing the issuance of the writs of preliminary injunction, the
order dated December 10, 1970, denying the motion to dissolve the writs of
preliminary injunction and the
order dated April 21, 1971 denying the motion
for reconsideration.

The petitioners have failed to show grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent court in issuing
the questioned orders.

Petitioners allege that the cases of Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., et al. v. Capitol Subdivision, Inc., et al. (G.R. No. L-25887, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 731),
Angela Estate, Inc., et al. v. CFI of Negros Occidental, et
al. (G.R. No. L-27084, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 500) and Locsin, et al. v. Climaco, etc., et al. (G.R. No. L-27319, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 816)
constitute the leading jurisprudence in the issuance of the writs of
preliminary injunction in cases of complaints praying for the declaration of
legal easement.  In answer thereto,
Central asserts that the aforementioned decisions are inapplicable in these
cases because they refer to legal easement of right of way.

The cases invoked by petitioners may be applied to this
controversy only insofar as the general principles on the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction reiterated therein are concerned, but not with regard to
the other principles enunciated therein because they deal with legal easement
of right of way whereas Our concern here is legal
easement of aqueduct.

A preliminary injunction may be granted at any time after the
commencement of the action and before judgment, when it is established that the
plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited
period or perpetually; that the commission or continuance of some act
complained of during the litigation or the non-performance thereof would
probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or that the defendant is doing,
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
probably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights respecting the subject of the
action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.^[1]

The purpose of this provisional remedy is to preserve the status quo^[2] of the things subject of the action
and/or the relation between the parties, in order to protect the right of the
plaintiff respecting the subject of the action during the pendency
of the suit.  Because, otherwise or if no
preliminary prohibitory injunction were issued, the defendant may, before final
judgment, do or continue the doing of the act which the plaintiff asks the
court to restrain, and thus make ineffectual the final judgment rendered
afterwards granting the relief sought by the plaintiff.

In praying for the
issuance of the writs of
preliminary injunction, Central averred the following in its complaints (pp.
57-136, Rollo): 
that should the
defendants (petitioners herein) remove or demolish the concrete water canals or
otherwise interfere with the easement of aqueduct which has been availed of by
it for the last fifty (50) years through the use of said canals by obstructing,
impeding or preventing the passage of water thereon, irreparable damage would
be caused to it, as they all
together have a yearly quota to fill including the export quota which
constitutes part of the commitment of the Republic of the Philippines to the
United States; that during the crop year 1969-70, Central manufactured
871,797.50 piculs of centrifugal sugar of which manufactured sugar sixty
(60%) percent thereof or 523,078,500.00 piculs more
or less are export or “A” sugar shipped to the United States to fill
part of the aforesaid yearly quota, which at the price of P40.00 a picul on the average, amount to P208,231,400.00, or
$34,871,900.00 thereby availing to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines much needed dollars to bolster the depleted foreign exchange
reserve of the country which at the present time is dangerously low; that in
fact no damage has resulted or will result to the defendants (petitioners
herein) from the continued use and exercise of the easement of aqueduct while
on the other hand, irreparable damage will be caused to Central, the other
planters affected and even to the sugar industry and the national economy as a
whole, unless it be allowed the continuous use of the canals and its continued
use thereof be legally recognized as a legal easement of aqueduct upon payment
to defendants (petitioners herein) of a reasonable compensation to be fixed by
the court, the said legal easement to exist for a period coterminous with the
existence and operation of the mill; and that unless the defendants
(petitioners herein) are restrained from committing the act of either impeding
or in any way obstructing the passage of water from the Imbang
River through the canals presently existing on their properties by destroying
said canals or otherwise, which defendants (petitioners herein) are threatening
to do, Central’s mill operation will be completely paralyzed resulting in great
and irreparable loss and damage to it and its planters.

We agree with respondent court that Central has sufficiently
established the necessity of issuing writs of preliminary injunction against
petitioners.

Petitioners contend next that assuming crop year 1969-70 ended
only on August 31, 1970, by
the time respondent court issued its December
10, 1970 and April 21,
1971 orders, Central’s contractual right to the easement of
aqueduct has already expired.  On the
other hand, Central avers that since the writs of preliminary injunction were
issued before the expiration of the contractual easement of aqueduct, they were
issued not only to protect an existing right then, but even after August 31,
1970, to preserve the status quo
between the parties, pending judicial determination as to whether or not it
(Central) could convert its existing contractual easement of aqueduct into a
legal easement under Arts. 642-643 of the New Civil Code.

It frequently happens that, pending suits for injunctive relief, changes
take place in the conditions which give rise to the litigation, and the
question is thus presented whether the suit should stand or fall upon the facts
as they existed at the time it was brought, so as to exclude all consideration
of subsequent changes or abandonment of the acts complained of.  Generally speaking, it is the condition of
things at the time of the hearing of the suit which is material, and which
furnishes the basis for relief.  The
court is not only authorized, but it is its duty to determine not merely
whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction at the time he began the
suit but whether the facts as they appear at the time of the hearing warrant
such relief, and it may refuse to grant an injunction where, since the
commencement of the suit, conditions have so changed as to render an injunction
useless and of no effect if granted. 
Injunctive relief will generally be refused where, before the final
hearing, the plaintiff loses his interest in or title to the subject matter
sought to be protected, or where the act sought to be restrained has been made
lawful by statute or ordinance.  This
does not mean, however, that the court should deny injunctive relief in every
case of material changes in conditions
or abandonment of the acts complained of, for circumstances may still exist
which, in the face of such a situation, would justify the issuance of
injunction as a matter of sound judicial discretion (28 Am. Jur.
201, cited in The Revised Rules of Court in
the Philippines by Vicente J. Francisco, 1985 Edition, p. 178).

In these cases, the writs of preliminary injunction were issued
(as correctly averred by Central) not only to protect the existing easement of
aqueduct in its favor, but even after the end of 1969-70 crop year, to preserve
the status quo between
the parties, pending judicial determination as to whether or not Central can
convert its contractual easement of aqueduct into a legal easement of
aqueduct.  If the writs of preliminary
injunction were to be dissolved, the probability of the canals’ destruction or
obstruction by petitioners would be great, considering that they refused the
offer made by Central to lease the areas
covered by the canals.  In the
event that respondent court grants Central a legal easement of aqueduct, this
judgment might be rendered ineffectual by the destruction or obstruction of the
canals.

It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by
petitioners inasmuch as they dwell on the merits of the case pending before
respondent court.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
orders of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental dated June 30, 1970,
July 20, 1970, December 10, 1970 and April 21, 1971 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco, and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court

^[2]
The status quo is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy (Rodulfa
v. Alfonso, etc., et al., 76 Phil. 225).