DANIEL CABUNILAS, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MANABAT, AND HON. C. G. LARROBIS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, promulgated on June 1, 1977, in CA-G.R. No. SP-06104-R,
affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
dated July 14, 1976,
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against Naga Municipal Judge C. G. Larrobis
and private respondent Antonio Manabat.

As found by the Court of
Appeals, the facts of this case are as follows:

“Record shows that on January
8, 1976 herein petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry
against private respondent Antonio Manabat before the
Municipal Court of Naga and the same was docketed as
Civil Case No. R-118.  The case was set for hearing on January 30,
1976 but petitioner requested for a postponement of the hearing by sending a
telegraphic message on January 29, 1976 to the Municipal Court, as well as to
the respondent’s counsel, on the ground that petitioner’s counsel, Atty.
Enrique C. Llenes, died on January 26, 1976, or four
(4) days before the scheduled hearing. 
The telegram was received by the Municipal Judge on January
29, 1976, at 3:00 in the afternoon but, despite the said
telegraphic motion for postpone­ment, the Municipal Judge, on February
25, 1976, dismissed
the complaint on the ground of non-suit. 
A motion for reconsideration was filed on March 3, 1976 but again the Municipal Judge, in an order
dated March 20, 1976,
denied the motion.  Hence, the filing of
the petition for certiorari before the Court of First Instance of Cebu on the ground that respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he dismissed the
complaint on the ground of non-suit.

“On July 14, 1976,
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, for lack of
merit, dismissed the petition for certiorari” (pp. 18-19, rec.).

The record further shows that on August 8, 1976,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu.  Said motion, was however, denied in an order
dated August 25, 1976.

On September 15, 1976,
petitioner perfected his appeal to the Court of Appeals and thereafter filed
his “Brief and/or Memorandum” to which neither respondent Manabat nor respondent Municipal Judge filed a reply brief
or memorandum (p. 4, rec.).

The dismissal of petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry
against respondent Manabat by respondent Naga Municipal Judge was,
according to the
municipal judge, on the ground of non-suit, or lack of interest on the part of
petitioner in prosecuting his complaint in view of his failure to appear on the
scheduled first hearing of the case on January
30, 1976.

It is not denied by
respondents that petitioner dispatched two telegrams — one to the court presided
by respondent judge and another to respondent Manabat,
through his counsel.  Petitioner,
therefore, never lost interest in the prosecution of his complaint.  The respondent municipal judge acted hastily
when he dismissed the complaint and certainly committed grave abuse of
discretion when in an order dated March
20, 1976 he denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on
March 3, 1976.  When a person dies, the first impulse of
anyone who learns of his death is to express words of sympathy and compassion
to the persons affected by his death.  A
client of a lawyer who dies while the case of his client is still pending trial
is one such person who deserves compassion and sympathy upon the untimely death
of his lawyer.  Such is the normal
feeling and reaction of a civilized man. 
It is most unkind to take advantage of a person’s death.  A trial judge, whose duty is to administer
justice as law and common sense command him to do, should exhibit such
exemplary understanding.  After all, a
resetting of the case to another date to enable plaintiff to secure the
services of another counsel would not in any way prejudice the substantial
rights of private respondent Manabat, the defendant
in a forcible entry case.  On the
contrary, one such postponement would doubtless be to his benefit, since it
would have the effect of prolonging, through no fault of his, his possession of
the property subject of the proceedings.

Of course, WE do not
overlook the fact that the failure of petitioner to appear on the very hour and
date of the first scheduled hearing may authorize the respondent Judge to
dismiss the complaint for non-suit, pursuant to the provision of Sec. 11, Rule
5 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

“Section 11.  Dismissal upon plaintiff’s
failure to appear.  – If the
plaintiff does not appear at the time and place designated in the summons or in a subsequent order, the justice of the peace or municipal judge may dismiss the action for failure to
prosecute, and render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs.  But such dismissal without hearing shall not
be a bar to a subsequent action for the same cause.”

But, then, after the dismissal, when a
motion for reconsideration was filed on well-founded ground, respondent
municipal judge should not have resorted to legal technicalities in maintaining
his order of dismissal.

To compel a party to refile the case
under Section 11 of Rule 5 aforecited, would be to subject him to more expenses and to further
delay in the prosecution of his case.

Time and time again WE have emphasized that the Rules of Court
should not be interpreted to sacrifice substantial rights of a litigant at the
altar of technicalities to the consequent impairment of the sacred principles
of justice (Alonzo vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Case
& Nantz vs. Jugo, 77
Phil. 517, 522).  WE ruled that the Rules
of Court frown upon hair-splitting technicalities that do not square with their
liberal tendency and with the ends of justice (Case & Nantz
vs. Jugo, supra).

Thus, WE find both respondents Municipal Judge and Court of
Appeals seriously abused their discretion by refusing to liberally construe and
interpret the Rules of Court, which require our courts of justice, in the
exercise of their functions, to act
reasonably and not capriciously, and enjoin them to apply the said rules in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases (Sec. 2, Rule 1, Revised
Rules of Court).

WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED AND THE ORDERS
OF RESPONDENT MUNICIPAL JUDGE C. G.
LARROBIS OF FEBRUARY 25, 1976 AND MARCH 13, 1976,
AS WELL AS THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS PROMULGATED ON JUNE 1, 1977, ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE AND
THE RESPONDENT MUNICIPAL JUDGE IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO REINSTATE PETITIONER’S
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. R-118, AND THEREAFTER TO HEAR AND
DECIDE THE SAME IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.  WITHOUT COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Fernandez, and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Martin, J., no part.