EXALTACION ZAFRA SARTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JULIAN LUA, FRANCISCO UNABIA AND FELISA UNABIA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for a review of a decision of respondent Court
of Appeals dated October 31, 1964, setting aside in a certiorari
proceeding an order of the Court of Juvenile & Domestic Relations of
Manila, thus precluding the guardian designated therein, Exaltacion
Zafra Sarte, petitioner
before us, from assuming her functions as such during the pendency
of an appeal against her appointment. 
The issue raised is therefore whether in attaching to such an order the
quality of immediate enforceability, there was a grave abuse of discretion.  Respondent Court answered in the affirmative.
We are of a different mind.  On the facts
as found by it, which we are not a liberty to change, and in the light of an
applicable doctrine, it would follow that such appointment as guardian being
given effect forthwith is not offensive to what the law requires.  Respondent Court cannot be sustained.  We find for petitioner.

The background facts as set forth in the appealed decision
follow:  “From the record of this
case we gather that on November 3, 1961, respondent Exaltacion
Zafra-Sarte petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for the appointment of a legal guardian over the person and
property of Remigia Zafra,
whom said respondent herein alleged to be an incompetent person, afflicted with
mental disorder and other ailments which rendered her incapable to take care of
herself and to manage her property.  In
her verified petition, Exaltacion prayed for her
appointment as the legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia, claiming that she is a niece of the latter, being
a daughter of her (Remigia’s) sister.  Said petition was however opposed by Julian Lua, who claimed that he and Remigia
Zafra have lived together as common-law husband and
wife for more than 30 years, and by Francisco Unabia,
who claimed that he is a half-brother of the alleged incompetent.  The oppositors
prayed that either of them be appointed legal guardian of Remigia,
should she be found incompetent.”^[1]

What happened next was narrated thus in such decision:  “At the conclusion of the trial, which
forthwith followed after the issues had been joined, respondent Judge found Remigia to be really mentally deranged and for this reason
appointed Exaltacion as legal guardian of the former’s person and property in an order dated April 8,
1964 * * *.  Copy of this order was
served on the oppositors, who are now herein
petitioners, on April 16, 1964.  On April 22, 1964, Julian Lua
and Francisco Unabia submitted their motion for
reconsideration of that order of the respondent Judge, but on the same date,
while such motion was still unresolved and before the period for appeal had
expired, said respondent directed the issuance of the corresponding letters of
guardianship, and as a matter of fact such letters were issued, after Exaltacion had submitted the required bond of P1, 000.00
and had taken her oath of office as legal guardian of the person and property
of Remigia Zafra.  And on May
2, 1964, herein petitioners were notified of the order of
respondent Judge dated April 29, 1964,
denying their action for reconsideration as oppositors
in the guardianship proceedings.  They
then filed their notice of appeal and deposited their appeal bond of P120.00 in
cash, and on May 13, 1964,
they also filed their Record on Appeal. 
On June 11, 1964,
respondent Judge approved the record on appeal of the oppositors
in that proceeding and directed the Clerk to elevate that case to this Court
for review.”^[2]

Thereafter, on April 27,
1964, before such motion for reconsideration was resolved,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to enable her as such guardian to bring the
ward to the hospital before the Court of Juvenile & Domestic
Relations.  As stated in the
decision:  “On May 15, 1964,
respondent Judge favorably acted upon this motion, the opposition thereto of
herein petitioners notwithstanding, and ordered them to transfer and surrender
the person of the incompetent to Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte * * *. 
Incidentally, this last order of respondent Judge was issued after the oppositors in that guardianship proceeding had filed their
notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal.  On May 19, 1964, herein petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration of said order of the court dated May 15, 1964,
praying that the status quo as to the custody of Remigia Zafra, who is under the
charge of Felisa Unabia, be
maintained during the pendency of their appeal.  This motion for reconsideration was denied by
respondent Judge on June 11, 1964.”^[3]

On the allegation that now respondents Julian Lua,
the common-law husband and her half-brother, respondent Francisco Unabia as well as her half-sister, respondent Felisa Unabia, had no other
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to prevent the
immediate execution of the order by the Court of Juvenile & Domestic
Relations, a special civil action for certiorari was filed by them with
respondent Court of Appeals.  They were,
able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of
the aforesaid order complained of.  As
noted in the brief for petitioner: 
“Upon the facts above-stated, the Court of Appeals annulled and set
aside the order issued by the trial court on May 15, 1964, in Special
Proceeding No. 03773, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued on July 14,
1964 was ordered stayed until such time the Court of Appeals shall have the
opportunity to review the merits of the aforesaid order appointing Exaltacion Zafra-Sarte (herein
petitioner) as legal guardian of the person and property of Remigia
Zafra.”^[4]

After a motion for the reconsideration of the above decision of October 31, 1964 was denied, the
present petition for review was filed before us.  As noted at the outset, we reverse respondent
Court of Appeals.

Petitioner would impress on us that the issue as to the power of
respondent Court to suspend the effectivity of an order
appointing a guardian in the event of an appeal therefrom
was decided in Mercader v. Wislizenus.^[5]
To maintain such an assertion, she quoted an excerpt from our opinion in that
case thus:  “The order declaring the
incompetency and appointing a guardian was good,
until reversed or set aside; and authorized the guardian, in spite of the
appeal, to do whatever was necessary under the direction of the Court, to
protect the property of the incompetent.” The above citation does impart
more than a semblance of plausibility to her contention it does support her
stand.

It is to be admitted that the excerpt on which petitioner would
pin her hopes resulted from the realization of this Court that if it were not
thus there was the fear, not without basis, that the property of the person
adjudged incompetent could be frittered away during the pendency
of such appeal or converted to the use of designing persons.  The above consideration does not detract from
the general principle announced that such appointment of a guardian should be
considered good until reversed or set aside on appeal.  No such weighty and persuasive reason that
would call for a different ruling may be discussed from the facts as found by
the Court of Appeals.  The above
statement from the opinion of Justice Moreland is thus impressed with a force
sufficient to give more than legal color to what was ordered by the Court of
Juvenile and Domestic Relations of Manila. 
For it to yield deference to such a pronouncement by this Court cannot
certainly earn the stigma of a grave abuse of discretion.

Why did respondent Court view the matter otherwise?  It relied on two California
decisions, one promulgated in 1911, Coburn v. Hynes^[6]
and another in 1917 O’Donnell v. Sixth Judicial District.^[7]
They speak to the effect that upon the filing of an appeal, the guardian
appointed was automatically precluded from exercising her functions.  As correctly noted in the brief for
petitioner the holding of each of the above cases to that effect is predicated
on relevant statutory provisions of the State of California.  As a matter of fact, such a doctrine goes
back to an 1892 pronouncement of the California Supreme Court.^[8]
Respondent Court should have displayed less receptivity to the persuasive force
of the above doctrine.  It might have
been otherwise if there were no Mercader ruling.  As it is, respondent Court was not justified
in setting aside the order sought to be assailed in a certiorari
proceeding made in reliance on a decision of this court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of October 21, 1964 is reversed with
costs against private respondents.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., took no part.

^[1]
Decision, Brief for Petitioner, p. II.

^[2] Ibid.,
pp. II-III.

^[3] Ibid.,
p. IV.

^[4]
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 4-5.

^[5]
34 Phil. 846 849 (1916).

^[6]
120 Pac. 26.

^[7]
165 Pac. 759.

^[8]
In re Woods 29 Pac. 1108.