LUCIA JAVIER, PETITIONER, VS. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ANGEL S. TUASON AND FIDEL IBAÑEZ, JUDGE OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IX…

This is a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction. The injunction was granted upon the filing by
the petitioner of a bond in the amount of P1,000.

On December 10, 1948, respondent J. Antonio Araneta, in his
capacity as executor of the estate of the late Angela S. Tuason, filed
an action for forcible entry against Lucia Javier in the municipal
court of Manila. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering the
defendant to vacate the premises arid to pay to the plaintiff the sum
of P15 a month beginning from the month of July 1948, up to the time
she vacates the same, with costs. On appeal to the Court of First
Instance, the latter affirmed the Judgment with the addition that the
defendant should remove her house and other constructions she had
erected on the land in question. Defendant’s petition to set aside the
Judgment having been denied, she took steps to appeal from the
decision, but the court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was
filed beyond the reglementary period. Then plaintiff filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution. In the meantime, defendant sued
out for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking the
annulment of the decision, but the petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. This attempt having failed, defendant filed a motion for
suspension of the order of execution invoking in her favor the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 538. This motion was denied on
November 6, 1950. And this is the order which defendant now seeks to
annul with the institution of the present petition for certiorari.

The only issue to be determined is whether the order of execution
issued by the respondent Judge in the forcible entry case should be
suspended on the ground that the property in question is included in
the parcel of land which the Rural Progress Administration is
negotiating to purchase from the estate of Angela S. Tuason to be later
divided and sold to its actual occupants.

It appears that sometime in 1948, respondent J. Antonio Araneta, in
his capacity as executor of the estate of Angela S. Tuason, offered to
sell to the Rural Progress Administration a portion of the estate
consisting of seven (7) hectares. When the proposal was submitted to
the Board of Directors of said Government agency, said Board decided to
acquire the property at the price of P7 per square meter. This would
bring the total purchase price to the tune of P490,000. These terms
were accepted by Araneta subject to certain conditions, one of them
being that all squatters and tenants who have no written contracts with
the estate will be moved to “segregated portion of 7 hectares. But the
negotiation did not go any further. No deed of sale was ever executed,
nor has any portion of the purchase price been paid, wherefore, J.
Antonio Araneta, in the same capacity aforestated, filed an action
against the Rural Progress Administration for specific performance.
This case is now pending appeal in this Court.

These facts are not controverted. It is not also disputed that
petitioner herein is but a mere squatter, or one who is occupying a
portion of the land without any lease contract with the owner, either
verbally or in writing. And because she is a mere squatter, the owner
filed an action for forcible entry against her to compel her to vacate
the land. This case was decided adversely against her and she now
resists the order of execution which would result in her ejectment from
the property. What is her ground for opposing the order of execution?

The only ground she is invoking is Commonwealth Act No. 538, which
provides that when the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or
expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate, any motion
for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be
automatically suspended for such time as may be required by the
expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the
purchase of the lands, which time shall not exceed one year (section
l). Petitioner contends that, inasmuch as the Government is seeking to
acquire the land which includes the portion she is now occupying, and
the negotiation has not yet been completed, there is good reason for
suspending the order of execution until the termination of the case
involving the acquisition of the land which is now pending
determination by the Supreme Court.

Apparently the argument sounds logical, but it loses its force when
considered in the light of the express provisions of said Commonwealth
Act No. 538. In the first place, the law accords the privilege of
suspension of any proceeding for ejectment only when the Government
seeks to acquire through purchase or expropriation proceedings the land
occupied by the tenant. In this particular case, the Government seems
to have desisted from its original plan of acquiring the land in
question as shown by the fact that after agreeing on the terms of the
purchase it did not take any further step to consummate the sale so
much so that the owner had to institute an action for specific
performance of the terms of the agreement. And the cause of this
desistance may be either lack of money or a change of the original
plan. Be it as it may, the fact is that the proposed purchase has not
been carried out.

In the second place, the law provides that “to avail himself of the
benefits of the suspension, the tenant shall pay to the land owner the
current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court
where the action for ejectment has been instituted” (Sec. 1, Com. Act
538). Petitioner herein does not come within the purview of this
provision. She is a mere squatter and, therefore, not a tenant within
the legal meaning of this word. The word “tenant” does not include a
squatter, because a squatter is “a person who settles or locates on
land, inclosed or uninclosed, with no bona fide claim or color of title, and without the consent of the owner (Baker vs.
State, 71 S.E. 594, 9 Ga., App. 423; Penal Code 1910, sec. 216, subd.
4); and it does not appear that petitioner has paid to the land owner
the current rents as they became due or has deposited the same with the
court where the action for ejectment has been instituted. Petitioner,
therefore, cannot invoke the benefits of slid Commonwealth Act No. 538.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby dismissed, without special
pronouncement as to costs. The injunction issued is hereby dissolved.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.