G.R. No. L-27006. June 30, 1970
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, PRESIDED FORMERLY BY JUDGE L. PASICOLAN, AND NOW BY JUDGE ANDRES C. AGUILAR, THE SPOUSES FRANCI…
RE YES, J. B. L., J.:
Petition for certiorari against the order of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga in an expropriation case (Civil
Case No. 1130), declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of ownership of one of the condemned lots, in the same proceeding.
The controversy here is an incident in the case filed by the
Republic of the Philippines
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, for the
expropriation of the so-called Henson Estate, situated in the municipality
of Angeles of that province and
belonging to the heirs of the deceased Jose P. Henson, viz., Amanda Henson-Nepomuceno, Manuela Henson vda.
de Suarez, Sor Maria Luisa Henson, Mariano Henson, Ines Henson vda. de Dizon, Francisco Henson-Roque,
and the minors Placido H. de Guzman, Jr. and Vitali H. de Guzman, who were all named defendants in the
complaint. The records show that when
the complaint was filed on 18 September 1956, the estate had already been
subdivided and partitioned among the above-named heirs. One of the lots assigned to defendant
Francisca Henson-Roque was Lot No. 6, Block 6, plan
Psd-2017, with an area of 757 square meters.
After a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of all the defendants,
one Antonio Feliciano, representing himself to be the owner of the lot
identified as Lot No. 6, Block 6, plan Psd-2017, with proper leave of court,
filed a motion in intervention praying for the dismissal of the case as far as
such property was concerned. The motion was opposed by the plaintiff Republic
of the Philippines, pointing out that the sale of the land by Francisca Henson-Roque to movant-intervenor was
made on 16 September 1957, or a year after the filing of the expropriation
case, in violation of Section 20 of the Land Reform Act of 1955 (Republic Act
1400).[1] Acting on the foregoing motions, the court,
in its order of 6 October 1958, declared as null and void the sale of the lot
to Antonio Feliciano; reconsidered the order allowing the intervention of
Feliciano and treated Francisca Henson as the defendant in the case; and
directed the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel
the certificate of title (TCT No. 17235-R) issued in the name of Feliciano.
It appears, however, that on 5 August 1958, or before the above
order was issued, Feliciano sold the same lot to the spouses Juan Punzalan and Eufrosina Wingco, as a result of which TCT No. 17235-R in the name of
Feliciano was cancelled and another one (TCT No. 19484-R) was issued in favor
of the Punzalan spouses. Required later to show cause why the sale of
the lot to them should not be declared invalid and their title cancelled, the Punzalans contested the jurisdiction of the lower court,
submitting that not being a land registration court, it is without authority to
pass upon the validity of the sale and of the certificate of title. Besides, it was claimed that the sale of the
lot to them was in good faith and for value.
On 30 January 1959, the lower court promulgated an order stating that
since the issue in that incident revolves around the validity of the sale of
the lot (after the expropriated case had started), which issue would call, for
the determination of the interests of third parties in the property, the proper
procedure would be to have the said question ventilated and threshed out in a
separate action.
Thereafter, in a joint motion dated 28 July 1960, plaintiff and
defendants manifested in court that they had come to an amicable settlement of
their controversy, the defendants agreeing to the sale of their land and to the
government’s immediate taking of possession thereof upon payment of the
provisional value to be fixed by the court.
Taking cognizance of such agreement between the parties, the court, on 3
August 1960, entered an order of condemnation against the defendants’
properties. The value of the condemned
land was later provisionally fixed at p3.00 per square meter, and the amounts
accruing to each of the defendants ordered delivered to them.[2]
On 21 August 1960, the defendants prayed for the modification of
the condemnation-order, to exclude therefrom eight
lots which the said defendants allegedly wanted to retain for themselves. One
such lot was the parcel of land, Lot 6, Block 6, plan Psd-2017. Then, it seems that another motion dated 8 February 1962, was also filed by
defendants, increasing to sixteen the number of lots sought to be excluded from
the’ condemnation-order. The prayer for
exclusion this time was based on the contention that the said lots were already
sold to third parties when the expropriation case was instituted on 18 September 1956. By order of 3 April 1962, the lower court granted
the defendants’ motion and directed the exclusion of the enumerated 16 lots
from the order of condemnation. The
records show, however, that on 27 February 1963, the court changed its stand
and ordered the re-inclusion of Lot 6, Block 6 in the list of expropriable properties, declaring further that the issues
of the validity of the two sales and the propriety of the cancellation of the
titles issued to the vendees should be determined at the instance of the
affected party or parties.
On 17 July 1963,
the Punzalans once more applied to the court for the
exclusion of the lot from the order of 3
August 1960, and for the cancellation of the lis
pendens notice at the back of their certificate
of title. This motion was denied by the
court on 28 August 1963,
reasoning that to grant movants‘ prayer at that point
would amount to prejudging the matter of the validity of their (movants) title to the land.
On 25 October 1963,
the court issued another order giving the government 30 days within which to
initiate the necessary action to settle the question of the Punzalans‘
title over the property. When the given
period elapsed without the government’s making any move on the premises, the Punzalans filed another motion in the expropriation case
reiterating their prayer for the exclusion of the lot from the
condemnation-order and for cancellation of the lis
pendens annotation on their title. On 17
December 1963, the court denied movants‘
motion; ordered the lifting of its previous order of 25 October 1963, and declared itself possessed
of authority to pass upon the issue raised in that incident, in accordance with
Section 10, Rule 69[3]
of the Rules of Court. There was a lull
in the proceeding in the lower court until 14 September 1966, when the judge to whom the case was
reassigned[4]
issued an order disavowing jurisdiction over the question of the validity of
the subsequent sales of the lot, and directing its exclusion from the order of
condemnation of 3 August 1960.
When its motion for reconsideration of this latest order was denied, the
plaintiff Republic of the Philippines came to this Court by way of the present
certiorari proceeding.
The sole issue in this case, i.e., whether or not the court that
hears the expropriation case has also jurisdiction to determine, in the same
proceeding, the issue of ownership of the land sought to be condemned, must be
resolved in the affirmative. That the
court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the
condemned or sought to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner
thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised
Rule 69, which provides:
“SEC. 9. Uncertain
ownership. Conflicting claims. – If the ownership of the property taken is
uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may
order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid to
the clerk of court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled thereto.
But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to
either the defendant or the clerk before the plaintiff can enter upon the
property, or retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been
made.” (Underlining supplied.)
In fact, the existence of doubt or
obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the
properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action
nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof.[5] The Rules merely require, in such
eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should
state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot be
ascertained or specified with accuracy.[6]
Now, to determine the person who is to be indemnified for the expropriation
of Lot 6, Block 6, Psd-2017, the court taking cognizance of the expropriation
must necessarily determine if the sale to the Punzalan
spouses by Antonio Feliciano is valid or not.
For if valid, said spouses must be the ones to be paid by the condemnor; but if invalid, the money will be paid to
someone else.
Neither can it be maintained that, not being a land registration
court, the court below is bereft of authority to enter a judgment cancelling the certificates of title issued to Feliciano
and herein respondents Punzalan spouses. For it must be realized that should the
parties’ evidence so warrant, any order for the cancellation of the certificates
of title that may be found to have been unduly or illegally obtained would only
be the necessary consequence of the lower court’s vested power to rule on the question
of rightful ownership of the property involved herein. And that would not go against the doctrine of
inviolability of the Torrens title; because if it could be established, a
declaration by the lower court of the nullity of the sale of the lot to herein
respondent spouses and the consequent cancellation of their certificate of
title would not constitute a reopening of the registration proceeding by virtue
of which the lot was brought under the operation of the Torrens System. In other words, the land will remain a
registered land; it is merely the right of the present registered owners over
the said property that would be affected.
It is easy to understand, finally, that if the Punzalans‘ title were to be tried in a separate action,
then, should their title be upheld, a multiplicity of expropriations would
ensue, and the Government would have to readduce its
evidence on the value of the land, and a second set of commissioners of
appraisal must be appointed. Proceedings
would be thus unnecessarily complicated and multiplied.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted,
and the respondent court’s order of 14
September 1966 is hereby reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
[1]
“SEC. 20. Prohibition against
alienation. – Upon the filing of the petition referred to in sections
twelve and sixteen, the landowner cannot alienate any portion of the land
covered by such petition except in pursuance of the provisions of this Act, or
enter into any form of contract to defeat the purposes of this Act, and no ejectment proceedings against any tenant or occupant of
the land covered by the petition shall be instituted or prosecuted until it
becomes certain that the land shall not be acquired by the
Administration.”
[2]
Order of 9 August 1960.
[3]
Now Section 9, Revised Rule 67.
[4]
Following the retirement of the judge who was previously hearing the
expropriation case.
[5]
See Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40
Phil. 326; Metropolitan Water District vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil.
293.
[6]
Section 1, Revised Rule 69.