ADELPHA E. MALABED, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, NAVAL, BILIRAN, RESPONDENT.

Malabed versus Asis

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed against Judge Enrique C. Asis, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran. The complainant charges the respondent judge with bias and partiality in violation of Rule 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Judicial Conduct, arising from his handling of an ejectment case on appeal. The case matters because it teaches the exacting standard for proving judicial bias, and it distinguishes a mere error of judgment, correctible by certiorari or appeal, from gross ignorance of the law that warrants administrative sanction.

Procedural History

The complainant first filed a verified complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. The Court re-docketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter and referred it to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Mario L. Guariña III for investigation, report, and recommendation. Justice Guariña recommended that the respondent be exonerated from the charges of bias and partiality. The Office of the Court Administrator, however, recommended that the respondent be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the procedural rules and fined 30,000 pesos. The case then reached the Supreme Court as an administrative matter.

Facts

Adelpha Malabed acquired a parcel of land from her brother Conrado Estreller. The spouses Ruben and Delia Cericos had begun building their house on that land. When the complainant learned she would acquire the property, she wrote the spouses Cericos, informed them of her intention to use the land, and asked them to vacate. After the title was transferred in her name, she made a written demand through counsel to vacate within 90 days. The spouses refused, and no amicable settlement was reached. On April 15, 1996, the complainant filed an ejectment case with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kawayan-Almeria, Biliran.

On July 11, 1997, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled in favor of the complainant, ordering the defendants to vacate the premises, to pay 10,000 pesos as attorney's fees and 3,500 pesos as appearance fees, 5,000 pesos as litigation expenses, and 3,000 pesos as punitive and corrective damages. The spouses Cericos appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Naval, Biliran, presided over by the respondent judge, where the case was re-docketed. On January 25, 1999, the respondent judge affirmed the decision. The spouses moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 4, 1999. On May 3, 1999, a writ of execution issued, and the sheriff padlocked the house and delivered possession to the complainant.

On May 12, 1999, the spouses Cericos, through new counsel Atty. Meljohn de la Peña, filed a petition for relief from judgment. The complainant opposed it and moved for a writ of demolition. On August 12, 1999, the respondent judge granted the petition for relief and denied the motion for demolition, finding that the complainant had failed to disclose a prior verbal agreement allowing the spouses to build the house and occupy it for twenty-five years, which he deemed extrinsic fraud. The complainant's motion for reconsideration was denied on December 20, 1999. The complainant then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which, on June 23, 2000, annulled the respondent's orders because the petition for relief was filed out of time and the alleged fraud was not extrinsic. The complainant alleged that the respondent judge favored the spouses because their new counsel had represented him in an administrative complaint, and that he reversed a ruling in her sister's case for the same reason.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for bias and partiality in favor of a party.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure for granting a petition for relief from judgment filed out of time.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

This provision is the standard against which the charge of bias and partiality is measured.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge.

This provision classifies the offense and fixes the range of the penalty.

Section 11A of the same Rules provides:

The fine for such charge is more than 20,000 pesos, but not exceeding 40,000 pesos.

This provision supplies the specific penalty the Court may impose.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the charge of bias and partiality must fail. Bias cannot be presumed; it must be proved by competent and direct evidence. The respondent judge disputed the charge, showing that the administrative case in which Atty. de la Peña represented him was filed only on April 7, 2000, months after the respondent issued the orders of August 12, 1999 and December 20, 1999. The complainant's inference of partiality was therefore speculative. The Court also held that the reversal of a judge's order on certiorari is not, by itself, a ground for an administrative action, and that a judge may not be administratively charged for an error of judgment absent bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose.

On the second issue, the Court held the respondent liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure. The petition for relief was filed on the 71st day, beyond the 60-day reglementary period, and the respondent should not have entertained it. The Court stressed that judges must exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules, and that where the law or procedure involved is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross ignorance of the law or procedure.

Doctrine

A charge of bias and partiality against a judge must be supported by competent and direct evidence; mere suspicion is not enough, for bias cannot be presumed. A judge may not be administratively charged for an error of judgment in the absence of bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, and the reversal of a judge's order on certiorari does not, by itself, prove bias. However, where the law or procedure involved is simple and elementary, a judge's failure to observe it constitutes gross ignorance of the law or procedure, a serious charge under Section 8, Rule 140, punishable by a fine of more than 20,000 pesos but not exceeding 40,000 pesos under Section 11A.

Disposition

The Court held the respondent judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the procedural rules and fined him 30,000 pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Remember This

Bias cannot be presumed and must be proved by competent and direct evidence, but a judge's failure to observe a simple and elementary procedural rule is gross ignorance of the law. Examiners use this case to test the line between a correctible error of judgment and an administrative offense, and the penalty range for gross ignorance of the law or procedure.