G.R. No. L-21151. June 26, 1968
LOURDES MUNSAYAC, PETITIONER, VS. BENEDICTA DE LARA AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of injuries suffered by the plaintiff?appellee while riding as a passenger on a jeepney owned and operated by the defendant-appellant, this
action for recovery of damages was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch). The trial Judge found the driver recklessly
negligent: he drove at an excessive
speed, unmindful of the fact that the road was under repair and heedless of the
passengers’ pleas that he go more slowly.
Besides the award of compensatory damages for actual expenses incurred
and loss of income, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,000.00
as exemplary damages and P500.00 as attorney’s fees. On these last two items the defendant
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered a judgment of affirmance, quoting the trial Court’s justification for the
award as follows:
“The defendant’s admission that the accident happened and the
plaintiff’s extensive injuries as a result thereof, despite which the
defendant failed, or even refused, to placate the sufferings of plaintiff,
necessitating the filing of this action, entitled plaintiff to exemplary
damages – to set an example to others – and attorney’s fees.”
The case is now before us on review by certiorari.
The Civil Code provides that “exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good”
(Act 2229); and that in contracts “the Court may award exemplary damages
if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner” (Art. 2232).
Appellant points out that the act referred to in Article 2232
must be one which is coetaneous with and characterizes the breach of the
contract on which the suit is based, and not one which is subsequent to such
breach and therefore has no causal relation thereto, such as the herein
defendant’s failure to placate the sufferings of the plaintiff.”
Appellant relies on the case of Rotea
vs. Halili, G. R. No. L-12030, September 30, 1960, where this Court held.
“According to the rule adopted by many courts, a principal or
master can be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages based upon the
wrongful act of his agent or servant only where he participated in the doing of
such wrongful act or has previously authorized or subsequently ratified it with
full knowledge of the facts. Reasons
given for this rule are that since damages are penal in character, the motive authorizing
their infliction will not be imputed by presumption to the principal when the
act is committed by an agent or servant, and that since they are awarded not by
way of compensation, but as a warning to others, they can only be awarded
against one who has participated in the offense, and the principal therefore
cannot be held liable for them merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or
malicious intent on the part of the agent’ (15 Am. Jur.
730).”
We believe the point of the appellant is well-taken. It is difficult to conceive how the defendant
in a breach of contract case could be held to have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner within the meaning of
Article 2232 for something he did or did not do after the breach, which had no
causal connection therewith. The law
does not contemplate a vicarious liability on his part: the breach is his as party to the contract,
and so if he is to be held liable at all for exemplary damages by reason of the
wrongful act of his agent, it must be shown that he had previously authorized
or knowingly ratified it thereafter, in effect making him a
co-participant. From the decision under
review, however, there is nothing to show previous authority or subsequent
ratification by appellant insofar as the recklessness of the driver was
concerned. The mere statement that the
defendant failed, even refused, to placate the suffering of the plaintiff,
necessitating the filing of the action, is too tenuous a basis to warrant the
conclusion that the defendant approved of the wrongful act of his servant with
full knowledge of the facts.
It is not enough to say that an example should be made, or
corrective measures employed, for the public good, especially in accident cases
where public carriers are involved. For
the causative negligence in such cases is personal to the employees actually in
charge of the vehicles, and it is they who should be made to pay this kind of
damages by way of example or correction, unless by the demonstrated tolerance
or approval of the owners they themselves can be held at fault and their fault
is of the character described in Article 2232 of the Civil Code. Otherwise there would be practically no
difference between their liability for exemplary damages and their liability
for compensatory damages, which needs no proof of their negligence since the
suit is predicated on breach of contract and due diligence on their part does
not constitute a defense.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is
modified by eliminating the award for exemplary damages and affirmed with
respect to the attorney’s fees. No pronouncement
as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.